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Abstract 
Poor mathematics performance in South African schools is of national concern. An attempt to 
gain insight into the problem prompted a study into the possibility of a relationship between 
visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. A theoretical review revealed that inherent 
limitations of traditional psychological theories hinder an adequate explanation for the 
possible existence of such a relationship. The theory of situated cognition seems to be better 
suited as an explanatory model, and simultaneously clarifies the nature of both visual 
perception and mathematics. A small exploratory study, with a sample of 70 Grade 6 
learners, provided empirical evidence towards the plausibility of the relationship. 
Specifically, it proved the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with 
scholastic mathematics achievement. The results of the study, interpreted within the situated 
cognitive framework, suggest that a conceptual emphasis in mathematics education – as 
opposed to a factual emphasis – might improve mathematic ability, which may credibly 
reflect in scholastic performance. 
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Relationship between Visual Perceptual Skill and Mathematic Ability 
 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
In 2008, approximately 60% of South Africa’s matric students failed mathematics 
(South African Press Association [SAPA], 2009). In 2009, less than a quarter managed to 
achieve more than a 40% pass mark in mathematics. Experts were quoted as warning that 
these disastrous results would continue, unless the basics were properly taught in primary 
school (Govender, 2010). A study by Stellenbosch University in 2010, commissioned by the 
Western Cape Education Department, subsequently revealed that only 35% of Grade 3 
learners, in 45 Western Cape schools were sufficiently skilled in mathematics (Mokone & 
Davids, 2010). 
Mathematics education has been a priority of both the South African government and 
the private sector since 1994 (Bernstein, 2005). Yet, more than fifteen years later, less than 
half the students who wrote the matric final exam managed to pass. This dismal statistic is 
despite a noticeable increase in the number of children attending extramural maths classes. 
One well-known maths class franchise (Own a Master Maths education franchise, [s.a.]) 
boasted a 38% growth in their enrolment between 1995 and 2000, with an additional 8 000 
students enrolling over the next four years. The Centre for Development and Enterprise 
(CDE) also recently reported (cited in Bernstein, McCarthy & Oliphant, 2013) finding 
significant increases in private extra maths class attendance. 
Mathematics is becoming increasingly important in our increasingly technological 
world. The government recognises this trend, as evidenced by the fact that mathematics 
literacy is now compulsory in the South African education system. However, our children are 
failing to cope with the demand in school. Education is a critical multi-disciplinary field, 
where psychological theory has much to contribute to furthering education research, as well 
as to ensuring a well-educated future generation. 
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1.1 Context 
Practice in mathematics is essential in order to consolidate and strengthen certain 
critical skills and techniques. However, practice is of no benefit where a concept is not fully 
grasped. Furthermore, mathematics teaching is hierarchical, where new concepts build on 
those previously taught. It is therefore essential for learners to grasp each concept 
consecutively in order to avoid mathematical stagnation; an insight first endorsed by Piaget 
(1970). Bernstein et al. (2013) have also claimed that early mathematics learning deficits 
hinder subsequent mathematics learning. 
Difficulties in mathematics may therefore stem from levels that are more elementary, 
with the most basic level involving the cognitive tools required for mathematics. It is widely 
accepted that visual perceptual skill forms the foundation of all learning, and for mathematics 
and reading in particular (Halliwell & Solan, 1972; Leonard, 1986; Piaget, 1970; Rosner, 
1982; Wurzburg, 1994; Hegarty & Waller, 2005), on the basis that they both involve 
decoding symbolic information. 
A set of five essential visual perceptual component skills were categorised by 
Chalfant and Scheffelin (cited in Martin, 2006) in 1969, thus: 
1. Visual discrimination is the ability to discern similarities and differences of visually 
dominant features. 
2. Figure-ground is the ability to distinguish distinct shapes from an irrelevant 
background. 
3. Visual closure is the ability to identify a figure when visually fragmented or 
disorganised. 
4. Spatial relations are the ability to perceive the position of objects in space both in 
relation to each other and to oneself, incorporating directionality and laterality. 
5. Visual memory is the ability to recall previously seen visual information. 
Together, these skills enable the complex visual perceptual facility. The collective 
contribution of the component skills thus determines composite visual perceptual skill. 
Rosner (1982) suggested that the perceptual skills appear to be partly innate and partly 
learned, and are consequently trainable. Moore (1997) has similarly expressed that “visual 
skills and visual integrative abilities are inherent […] However, the degree to which its 
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structures are efficient and integrated with each other becomes a developmental question” 
(p. 27). 
Well-developed visual perceptual skill may be a particularly beneficial cognitive tool 
when it comes to the practice of mathematics. 
 Visual perceptual skill enables identification of the representation of numerals, which 
enhances the memory of number facts. 
 One proposal, supported by Lakoff and Núñez (2000), is that perception is the basis of 
conception. Concepts metaphorically map to abstract thought, a definitive aspect of 
mathematics. 
These claims support Rosner’s (1982) assertion that, irrespective of whether mathematics is 
taught by number facts or by number concepts, visual perceptual skill will aid learning. 
Taking cognisance of this, mathematics lessons ought perhaps to comprise a 
combination of mathematics teaching as well as a visual perceptual skill training program, 
thereby addressing the two most critical components of learning: knowledge acquisition and 
analytic ability. Rosner (1982) has encapsulated this by saying, “the better one’s perceptual 
skills, the more one learns from concrete experiences; and the more one learns from concrete 
experiences, the better his perceptual skills” (p. 302). However, before implementation, or 
even researching the beneficence of such a scheme, clarification is required as to whether 
visual perceptual skill does indeed relate to mathematic ability in children. 
Although the importance of visual perceptual skill for mathematics learning seems to 
be generally accepted, there is little agreement on an explanation for why this should be the 
case. Controversy is therefore evident as to the precise nature of the relationship between 
visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability, and to the specific aspects or component 
perceptual skills that are most relevant when it comes to mathematics. 
 
1.2 Goals and Hypotheses 
The goal then, is to explore the apparent link between visual perceptual skill and 
mathematic ability in children. A discussion pursuant to this goal suggests that classical 
cognitive theories are somewhat inadequate in their conception of both mathematics and 
visual perception, which may contribute to the uncertainty surrounding the possible existence 
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of a relationship between them. The relatively recent situated cognitive theory (Robbins & 
Aydede, 2009) is introduced as a basis for the development of a more coherent explanation 
for the suspected relationship, which simultaneously clarifies the nature of both mathematics 
and visual perception. Subsequently, a small exploratory study is used to test the ensuing 
hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics 
achievement, and the relative contribution of a set of component skills is thereby determined. 
 
1.3 Design and Methodology 
A natural correlational design was considered most appropriate at the outset, due to 
the focus of the hypothesis on scholastic mathematics achievement. The research sample 
consisted of 70 Grade 6 learners from diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. The 
third edition of the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills (TVPS-3) was used to assess participants’ 
visual perceptual strengths and weaknesses. Performance on a grade-appropriate mathematics 
test served as a measure of scholastic mathematics achievement (the dependent variable). 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation determined the significance of the relationship 
between visual perceptual skill and scholastic mathematics achievement. A regression 
analysis, utilising the TVPS-3 subtests’ scores as the independent variables, and a correlation 
matrix, determined the relative contribution of individual component skills to this 
relationship. 
 
1.4 Delineation 
Is there a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability? The 
simplicity of this question belies the complexity of its component constructs. Both visual 
perception and mathematics are multi-disciplinary topics, involving – amongst contributions 
from other fields – insight from psychology, philosophy, neurophysiology, linguistics, 
artificial intelligence, education, and mathematic theory, where each discipline may harbour 
several pertinent theories. Consequently, there are a number of potentially conflicting 
paradigms. 
The growing sphere of cognitive science involves the attempt, in all aspects of 
cognition, to resolve conflicts among various extant paradigms and disciplines, with the 
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subsequent creation of a unified inter-disciplinary field. Insight into the plausibility of a 
relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability therefore entails a striving 
towards a broad cognitive science of mathematical cognition and visual perception. Such an 
endeavour demands analysis and synthesis, not only of empirical evidence, but also of 
various select theoretical contributions. Constructing this study as a researcher with an 
educational background in classical cognitive psychology, investigation necessarily begins 
with the wisdom of conventional theories largely considered as legitimate within the field of 
psychology. Conventional psychological theory intimates a relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability. However, it has proven difficult to provide a feasible 
description of this relationship, or an explanation for its existence, within this conventional 
framework. Inherent shortcomings of traditional theories have steered the direction of further 
investigation towards the cognitive science theory of situated cognition. The present study 
follows the course of this investigative path. 
The complexity of mathematics eludes simple definition. In addition to the precepts of 
various theories through which it is analysed and understood, there is a pervasive and resolute 
folk belief in mathematics as being universal, infallible, and transcendent of human 
experience. Chapter 2 therefore presents various philosophical and cognitive perspectives on 
mathematics in an attempt to gain clarification on the subject.  
The nature of mathematics is generally viewed as an essentially philosophical 
consideration; hence, an assessment of the foremost contemporary philosophies of 
mathematics is pursued in this study, to include rational realism, formalism, and 
constructivism. Although none of these can adequately account for all aspects of 
mathematics, the assessment made here reveals the intuitionist augmentation of 
constructivism as the most acceptable when taken from a cognitive psychological 
perspective. Accordingly, mathematics is presumed to be a fundamentally mental 
construction, built upon a base of particular, innately intuitive concepts, and developed 
through perceptual and cultural experience. 
The cognitive and conceptual nature of mathematics suggests the necessity for a 
deeper probe in to how we actually do mathematics, in order to enhance our understanding of 
mathematics. Thus, a brief review of mathematical cognition presents a selection of pertinent 
conclusions from decades of research. The review begins by looking at the cognitive concepts 
that support arithmetic, which include the number sense, counting principles, symbolic 
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representation, and the mental number line. The development of these concepts is examined, 
which exposes the explicit involvement of various visual perceptual component skills, which 
carries through to basic arithmetic. When it comes to mathematics beyond arithmetic, 
however, uncertainty prevails. Research in this aspect being scarce, deliberation on associated 
influences such as language, education, intelligence, working memory, and visuo-spatial 
abilities provides some insight into higher mathematical cognition. However, it is apparent 
that the view of mathematics as essentially a formally analytic process – as opposed to an 
experientially conceptual one – is still in evidence within the scientific community. It is 
suspected that conventional psychological theories of cognition may have contributed to the 
apparently discrepant beliefs in this regard.  
Notwithstanding confusion as to what mathematics entails, it is only within the 
framework of a coherent and viable theory of visual perception and mathematical cognition 
that the possibility of a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability 
can be determined. Traditional cognitive psychological theories of the twentieth century 
prove insufficient in accounting for either, which obfuscates an account of any relationship. 
In substantiation of this claim, Chapter 3 highlights select theories as representative of the 
tradition, while exposing their respective limitations. 
A summary of traditional perceptual theories suggests that the nature of visual 
perception is poorly understood, yet these theories nonetheless intimate a connection between 
perception and cognition. Piaget’s prominent theory of cognitive development is evaluated in 
terms of the support it provides for this connection. His hypotheses evidence an appreciation 
of the fundamental interaction between perception and the construction of logico-
mathematical cognition. However, the recent criticism of certain aspects of Piaget’s theory 
(see Section 3.2) mitigates its support of a relation between perception and mathematic 
ability. In the latter half of the 1900s, disillusionment with behavioural psychology instigated 
the ‘cognitive revolution’, which brought the information-processing paradigm to the fore. A 
brief introduction given here to various information-processing theories pertaining to 
perception and arithmetic exposes the fundamental inadequacies of the information-
processing paradigm. 
Classical cognitive theory thus appears inadequate in supporting a valid relation 
between visual perception and mathematical cognition. Despite this theoretical deficiency, 
there exists compelling empirical evidence (presented in Section 3.4.1) of a relationship 
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between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. There are, however, conflicting 
conclusions among the evidence. Furthermore, closer analysis reveals a generally superficial 
interpretation of the evidence in support of such a relationship. This misinterpretation may be 
attributed to the limitations of prevailing interpretative frameworks. These generally involve 
a conventional, formalist mathematical philosophy and classical cognitive theory, which is 
predicated on a belief in a pre-determined objective world. Cognition within this context 
demands inner representations, which prove problematic. 
Inner symbolic representation, common to many perceptual theories, is particularly 
evident in information-processing theory and constitutes a problem that is inadequately 
addressed. The predicament involved in cognitive interpretation of perceptual representations 
is proposed here as constituting one of the primary obstacles to a perceptual and cognitive 
theoretical synthesis. Examination of three potential solutions follows. These include 
connectionism, ecological theory, and embodied cognition. The root of the problem, 
however, appears to rest in the underlying assumption – evident in classical cognitive 
psychology – of an objective external world with predetermined properties. This indicates the 
need for a radical paradigm shift, to ensure further progress. 
It is apparent that an innovative comprehensive cognitive science of mathematical 
cognition and visual perception is indispensable to the elucidation of a possible relationship 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. Chapter 4 introduces a current trend 
in cognitive science, namely situated cognition, which shows promise in meeting this 
challenge. Situated cognition successfully circumvents the dilemma of interpreting 
representations by eradicating the notion of mind-body, or inner and outer, duality of the 
world. Specifically, situated cognition occurs with the world, as opposed to within the world, 
thereby generating a holistic mind-body-world system. Embodied sensory-motor activity with 
the enacted world thus grounds the regress of meaning. Categorisation and perceptual 
metaphor promote conceptualisation, which supports abstract cognition. In addition, the 
human world includes embodied individuals who exist as a society of language-users. 
Linguistic metaphor thus extends embodied meaning into the social context, supporting 
higher levels of abstract cognition. The cognitive science theory of situated cognition helps to 
clarify the natures of visual perception, mathematical cognition, and the connection between 
them. In doing so, it exposes the viability of an elucidated relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
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Analysis of the theory of situated cognition in Chapter 4 begins with a summary of 
key psychological contributions. Being a relatively new paradigm, clarification of the 
associated concepts and terminology follows. A review of various interpretations expands on 
the concepts of autopoiesis, embodiment, societal embedment, the amalgamated mind, and 
environmental extension. Thereafter, reflection on various germane implications of a situated 
cognition includes the issues of intelligence, knowledge, concepts, and rationality. The 
relevant constructs are then revisited from a situated cognitive perspective. 
Situated visual perception, being a difficult concept to grasp, is elucidated through the 
concrete aspect of colour perception. Next, the important roles of context and action in visual 
perception are highlighted, leading to an appreciation of the particular significance of visuo-
spatial perception, which is then more fully discussed. This notion is extended in a 
consideration of visual perception and temporality. According to situated theory, the primary 
purpose of visual perception is guided action. In the execution of this function, visual 
perception gives rise to abstract conceptualisation. 
The exploration of the nature of situated mathematics reveals it to be contrary to all 
prevailing contemporary mathematical philosophies. Mathematics, an abstraction, is a 
metaphorical conceptualisation by human situated cognition. Situated mathematical 
cognition, by virtue of the nature of situated mathematics, operates primarily through the 
emergent cognitive capacity for conceptual metaphor. This is abstract conceptualisation, 
which arises by means of visual perception. Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) innovative 
comprehensive theory of mathematical cognition has clarified the crucial sensory-motor 
grounding of mathematical cognition. 
The implications of situated theory for mathematics education are then considered, 
particularly in terms of situated mathematics and mathematical cognition. Examples are 
presented showing the potential practical applications of Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) 
theoretical insights. The implication is that a visual and conceptual focus in mathematics 
education – as opposed to a factual algorithmic focus – may prove beneficial. 
A summation of the diverse theoretical contributions presented provides a firm 
argument for the validation of the situated cognitive paradigm. Accordingly, situated visual 
perception and mathematical cognition are co-constituted emergent cognitive capacities, 
through embodied sensory-motor activity embedded in, and extended into, the enacted 
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physical and social environment. This fosters the reasonable presumption of a relationship 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
Such theoretical conclusions prompted the design of a small exploratory study to 
investigate the presumed relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
Positive empirical evidence would further validate the situated cognitive paradigm. 
Specifically, the study tested the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively correlates 
with scholastic mathematics achievement, and the relative contribution of a set of visual 
perceptual component skills was determined. Chapter 5 outlines the research methodology of 
this study. 
Chapter 6 presents a description of the data collected, and the results of the statistical 
analyses. The conclusion reached is that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with 
scholastic mathematics achievement. This is in validation of the situated cognitive theoretical 
prediction of a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. However, 
contrary to this theory, the visual memory component skill was found to be of greater 
significance than spatial relations were. 
The theoretical significance of the results of this study is discussed in Chapter 7, and 
the consequences for the didactics of mathematics are considered. In addition, potential 
shortcomings of the study are reflected upon. Two major issues concerning the manner of 
visual perceptual skill testing, and the appropriateness of the methodology are discussed. 
Finally, recommendations for further research are proposed. The chapter concludes with a 
brief discussion on the merits of the pursuit towards a comprehensive cognitive science, from 
which the theory of situated cognition has evolved. Situated theory has already contributed 
significantly to our understanding of cognition in general, and elucidated the natures of visual 
perception and mathematics. In so doing, it presents a viable framework for addressing the 
presumed relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. Furthermore, 
the knowledge gained from the efforts of cognitive science has the potential for a positive 
influence on mathematics education. Continued multi-disciplinary efforts are proposed as a 
worthwhile endeavour. 
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CHAPTER 2: Perspectives on Mathematics 
 
The common view is that mathematics is calculation with numbers. However, this is 
more precisely taken as the definition for arithmetic. Arithmetic may have historically been 
synonymous with mathematics, but today it is only one important branch. The mathematical 
domain has significantly expanded throughout history, and its expansion is expected to 
continue. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (2008) defines mathematics as “the branch of 
science concerned with number, quantity, and space, as abstract concepts” (p. 881). Yet even 
this definition seems to fall short of the boundaries of the field, with its omission of motion 
and change. 
Devlin (2000), in concordance with most modern mathematicians, has defined 
mathematics as “the science of patterns” (p. 7). Mathematical understanding of the term 
pattern includes: order, structure, and logical relationships. The more than sixty current 
branches of mathematics each study a different kind of pattern. Because these patterns are 
generally abstract, an abstract symbolic notation is required to describe them. These patterns 
originate from the world or the mind, and so are as varied as to include those that are real or 
imaginary, perceptual or cognitive, static or dynamic, numerical or qualitative. 
The human brain is the ultimate pattern perceiver; in particular, visual perception is 
the interpretation of patterns of visual sensations. If mathematics is the science of patterns, it 
is quite conceivable then, that mathematical cognition may recruit the highly evolved human 
visual system to aid in the analysis of mathematical patterns. This is irrespective of whether 
they originate from patterns of light falling on the retina, or are alternatively more abstract, 
since the recruitment of basic neural abilities in the development of more complex facilities is 
the natural evolutionary process. 
The mathematical definition therefore seems satisfactory, although it subtly implies 
some indecision as to whether mathematics exists in the world, awaiting discovery, or 
whether it is a human invention. The nature of mathematics, a description of its objects 
(numbers) and relationships, is an indispensable factor in the progress towards a 
comprehensive cognitive science of mathematics. Historically, the nature of mathematics was 
the preserve of philosophy, as was visual perception. Philosophical attitudes and paradigms 
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have therefore undeniably shaped, and will continue to affect, prevailing psychological and 
scientific thinking. 
 
2.1 Contemporary Philosophies of Mathematics 
Contemporary philosophy of mathematics is divided into three broad belief systems: 
rational realism, formalism, and constructivism (Ernest, 1991; Davies, 1992; Dehaene, 1997; 
Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Sousa, 2008). Each has influentially contributed to the apparent 
eternal, absolute, infallible, and transcendental nature of mathematics. 
2.1.1 Rational Realism 
Realists believe, as a matter of faith, in the real physical existence of the external 
world, which is independent of the mind and of perception. This philosophy is epitomised by 
both Platonism and Cartesian dualism. 
Platonism dictates the existence of abstract objects and concepts as real, independent, 
timeless, objective entities transcendental to human existence. Mathematical objects and the 
number concept therefore exist on an abstract plane, external to the mind. The function of 
mathematics is to discover and to observe these entities. Many mathematicians ascribe to this 
view since it resonates with their subjective experience of doing mathematics. Specifically, it 
lends credence to the apparent objectivity and autonomy of mathematics. According to this 
view, the fact that mathematics describes the necessary structure of reality presumably 
explains its scientific effectiveness. This may certainly justify the static structural aspects of 
mathematics, such as set theory. However, Ernest (1991) has argued that Platonism 
inadequately accounts for the important constructive computational side of mathematics, such 
as iterations and recursive functions. 
Descartes established the mathematical principles of optics, and his hypotheses laid 
the foundations for modern perceptual theory. He regarded mind and matter as separate, 
divinely linked substances; with reason favoured over the senses as the source of truth and 
knowledge acquisition. In her critique of Descartes’ theory, Wolf-Devine (1993) has 
contended that it presents an initial clarity and logical argument, yet the causal connections 
between the rational mind and the mechanical body remain elusive. For nearly 400 years, 
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philosophers have struggled to reconcile this Cartesian legacy of the mind-body problem. 
Despite these problems, perhaps due to its intuitive appeal, various forms of dualistic 
rationalism have dominated psychological theory, with the notable exception of the 
materialist philosophy of behavioural psychology. 
From a contemporary psychological perspective, with its accompanying 
neurophysiologic evidence, the rational realist position is indefensible. Cartesian dualism is 
now deemed unacceptable, in terms of the lack of a viable description of the interaction 
between reason and the physical body. Similarly, it is also unclear as to how the physical 
Platonic mathematician interacts with the abstract realm of real, but immaterial, mathematical 
objects (Dehaene, 1997). It is possible that the reality of mathematics to mathematicians is 
but an illusion, and simply reflects an exceptional capacity for visualisation; an aptitude 
considered to promote mathematical thinking (discussed further in Section 2.3.5). 
2.1.2 Formalism 
The formalist attitude towards knowledge acquisition emphasises organisation, 
consistency, and formal principles. Few psychological theories are formalist, although 
computational theory and connectionism intimate a degree of formalism. 
As a philosophy, formalism is dedicated to mathematics. Euclid (cited in Lakoff & 
Núñez, 2000), around 300 BC, organised the entire body of geometric knowledge of that time 
to show that all then-known geometric facts could be logically deduced from five 
fundamental self-evident facts. This gave rise to the notion, as mathematics expanded, that 
each sub-discipline was similarly deductive, and rested on a foundation of limited postulates, 
or axioms, taken as truths. The development of Cartesian analytic geometry in the 1600s 
further established a link between geometry and algebra (Dehaene, 1997). However, 
acceptance of the legitimacy of non-Euclidean geometry in the early nineteenth century 
challenged the grounding of algebraic mathematics in geometry. In the following decades, 
attention turned to the exploration of the connection between logic and mathematics, 
culminating in the invention of formal symbolic Boolean logic, which formed the basis of the 
modern digital computer. Boole (cited in Dehaene, 1997) believed that logic, besides 
providing the grounding of mathematics, also grounded the ‘laws of thought’. Since all 
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formal systems are equivalent, it was therefore hypothesised that if the Turing machine1 
could successfully process all forms of mathematics, then it may also simulate, and thus 
expose, all logical thought (symbolic processing is discussed further in Chapter 3). 
Consequently, formalism rose to prominence, its progress following the rise of the digital 
computer and its logical foundations. 
The attempt to formalise all mathematics and reduce it to logic thus dominated early 
twentieth century mathematics. Mathematics, as such, is a small compilation of axioms 
conveyed in symbolically written formal logic, from which all mathematical truths are 
logically derived. The challenge for formalist mathematicians is to disprove Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem (cited in Davies, 1992), presented in the 1930s. Gödel showed that 
such an axiomatic set could never be both complete and consistent. In other words, logical 
proofs are inadequate to the demonstration of all mathematical truths. This is a consequence 
of a paradox associated with self-referential systems in general. The following example 
illustrates this paradox. 
Consider this statement: 
“This statement is a lie.” 
If the statement were true, then it would be false. Yet, if it were false, then it would be 
true. 
Therefore, mathematical theorems may be logically deduced from the axiomatic set, 
however, the axioms themselves cannot be mathematically proved true. The only conclusion, 
therefore, is that mathematics must rest on a base of assumptions. This has the undesirable 
effect of introducing the fallibility of mathematics. 
Formalist mathematics is thus a hypothetico-deductive system, which is able to 
describe arithmetic by its rules, but for which there is no basis. In stark contrast to realism, 
formalist mathematical objects bear no relation to reality whatsoever. They are simply a set 
of entirely abstract symbols that satisfy certain axioms and geometric theorems. Such 
symbols are intrinsically meaningless; meaning within the system derives from their rules of 
use. Mathematical statements therefore consist of un-interpreted strings of symbols, which 
display syntax, but are semantically void. Wittgenstein (cited in Dehaene, 1997) captured the 
crux of this philosophical standpoint in his pithy comment: “all mathematical propositions 
                                                          
1 A Turing machine is a hypothetical computational device that manipulates symbols according to formal rules. 
It mathematically models a machine that can be adapted to simulate the logic of any computer algorithm. 
22 
 
mean the same thing, namely nothing” (p. 243). Mathematics is thus a purely human-invented 
‘meaningless’ activity, involving the manipulation of symbols according to precise formal 
rules. As such, any connection between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability would 
be taken as specious, at best. The only possible role of visual perceptual skill in this type of 
mathematics would be the decoding of the arbitrary symbol strings; a task related more to 
linguistic ability than to mathematic ability per se. 
To date however, the formalist program has not only failed in its own goals, but has 
also failed to satisfy a number of other crucial concerns. One of these, raised by Dehaene 
(1997), is as to why the formal rules of arithmetic should be judged as being more 
fundamental than the rules of other formal systems, such as the game of chess. According to 
the formalist philosophy, there is no substantial difference between these two formal systems. 
Yet the common human perception is that the laws of nature operate in accordance with only 
one of these systems. Essentially, nothing in the formalist philosophy justifies the 
effectiveness of mathematics in modelling the real world. Neither does it account for innate 
mental concepts such as number (see Section 2.2.1 for discussion on the number sense). 
In addition to the inherent failings of the formalist view of mathematics, it is also 
deficient in terms of a broader philosophical foundation and in a supporting framework of 
available psychological theories. In spite of this, it unfortunately seems to have had the most 
influential impact on the common perception of mathematics, namely as simple formal 
symbol manipulation divorced from reality. This influence manifests even in the classroom, 
despite the availability of alternative teaching methodologies based on tested educational 
psychology theories (cited in Davis & Maher, 1997; Alexander, White & Daugherty, 1997). 
2.1.3 Constructivism 
Constructivism advocates that there is no such thing as a knowable objective reality, 
in that all knowledge derives from mental constructions. This is not a rejection of physical 
reality, as in the idealism of Berkeley (2004), which reduces the external to the mental, 
leading to the contentious mental creation of external reality. Rather, there is 
acknowledgement of the reality of the external, but this reality is unknown to us, due to our 
perceptual and conceptual distortions. 
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Accordingly, as in formalism, mathematics does not exist in the external world. The 
physical existence of any abstract structure being impossible, since it is only through mental 
conception that abstraction comes into being. Although, in contrast to the formalists’ 
meaningless inventions, constructivists take mathematical objects to be mental constructions 
directed by the internal structure and function of the brain, and constrained by external 
reality. 
Intuitionism evolved from constructivism to include particular innate, intuitive 
concepts independent of experience, such as that of number, as a base for further 
constructions. Mathematical objects are thus primitive, a priori mental categories. Although 
Kant, a founding intuitionist, believed these to be synthetic a priori categories. This is 
because of his radical conception of innateness, whereby knowledge is the product of our 
conceptualisation of intuitive information from the senses. This is not knowledge 
construction, as per social constructivism. Rather, truths are a priori in that they are 
independent of experience; yet synthetic, as they cannot be reduced to logical truths 
independent of the synthesising activity of the mind. Kant (cited in Dehaene, 1997) thus 
nevertheless rationalises that, “the ultimate truth of mathematics lies in the possibility that its 
concepts can be constructed by the human mind” (p. 244). In other words, the effectiveness 
of mathematics in nature is the result of our own mental projection. Davies (1992) expressed 
this clearly when saying that “we read mathematical order into nature rather than read it out 
of nature” (p. 150). 
Social constructivism and intuitionism thus found mathematics upon social-linguistic 
rules and conventions, and innate mental categories respectively. Yet, this replacement of the 
foundational assumptions of formalist mathematics is not entirely successful in redressing the 
fallibility of mathematics. However, it may be argued that together, cultural and neural 
determination and constraint is sufficient to render mathematics contextually infallible. In 
essence, as Ernest (1991) explained, this negates the apparent absolute, universal truth of 
mathematics, restricting it instead to human mind-based and social relativity. 
From a classical psychology perspective, amongst the broad philosophies of 
mathematics discussed, intuitionism is the most acceptable in terms of how that philosophy’s 
claims relate to what is known of the brain. Empirical psychological evidence (cited in 
Dehaene, 1997) affirms the innate basic number sense, located in specialised neural circuits 
of the inferior parietal lobe. Hence number, like colour, is a fundamental dimension, 
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perceived by virtue of brain structure having evolved to reflect, or to represent, the properties 
of the external world. Brain structure and function, through perception and conception, thus 
determines our view of objective reality, with any other objectivity being fundamentally 
unknowable. Constructivism, and intuitionism, essentially conveys active construction of all 
conceptual knowledge, based on perceptual experiences and previous individual and cultural 
knowledge. Yet a definitive definition of mathematics remains elusive. 
Núñez (2008) has characterised mathematics as precise, objective, rigorous, 
generalisable, stable, and effective in the real world; and none of the three broad philosophies 
of mathematics can adequately account for all of these characteristics. It is argued that the 
recent introduction of an alternative philosophy of the nature of mathematics and 
mathematical cognition, expounded in Section 4.6, provides a more adequate account. It 
endorses the relevance of social construction and limited innate functional capabilities, while 
the incorporation of situated cognitive emergence essentially endows the enacted 
environment with a more pivotal contribution in conceptualisation. This perspective 
emphasises the creation of mathematics – a cognitive creation together with the environment, 
however – rather than exclusively a social construction within the context of the environment. 
Mathematics is thus a product of specific neural capabilities, positioned within the human 
body, located within a specific environment, together with the particular biological and social 
evolution of these factors (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991; Sfard, 1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 
2000). Despite a disparity in the intuitionist and situated processes of conceptualisation, there 
is nevertheless agreement over the conceptual nature of mathematics. 
 
2.2 Mathematical Cognition 
In line with contemporary philosophy, cognitive science conceives of mathematics as 
being concerned with concepts. These concepts, which are largely founded in sensory-motor 
experience, manifest in mathematical formal proofs with symbolic notation. With this 
emphasis on the conceptual nature of mathematics, clarity on the social evolution of 
mathematics and the realisation of mathematic ability demands insight into the underlying 
cognitive processes. A discussion of contemporary views on mathematical cognition offers 
deeper insight, by bringing attention to the particular neural structures involved, and 
elucidating contributory influences. 
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Although mathematics is not solely calculation, arithmetic is yet an important part. A 
sense of number is, in turn, an important pre-requisite for arithmetical cognition (Dehaene, 
1997; Devlin, 2000; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Bobis, 2008; Sousa, 2008). 
2.2.1 The Number Sense 
A sense of number is in its essence the conception of numerosity, namely an intuition 
that endows numbers with meaning. Dehaene (1997) has credited Tobias Danzig with coining 
the term number sense in 1954. Danzig defined it as the ability to perceive the change in a 
small collection after the addition or removal of an item. Devlin (2000) expanded this 
definition, suggesting two important sub-components: 
1. The ability to compare collections presented simultaneously. 
2. The ability to remember and compare collections presented successively. 
This definition suggests that the number sense is a direct consequence of the sensory 
processing system. Van Loosbroek and Smitsman (1990), Dehaene (1997), and Giaquinto 
(2007) have all conceded that the numerosity of a collection is a concrete, invariant property 
that is extracted and perceived as other properties, such as colour and form.   
Piaget’s (1963, 1969) influential constructivist ideas asserted that successive 
maturation of the infant nervous system, together with information gathered through 
observation of the environment, enabled the construction of understanding, and the 
conceptualisation of the world, including that of number. According to Piaget’s theory 
(discussed further in Section 3.2), the number sense manifests between 2 to 7 years of age. 
However, contemporary research (cited in Dehaene, 1997; Devlin, 2000; Lakoff & Núñez, 
2000; Cordes & Gelman, 2005; Sousa, 2008; Bobis, 2008) questions the validity of Piaget’s 
developmental timeline. Empirical studies demonstrate a rudimentary number sense in infants 
as young as 6 months old. The evidence further suggests that it is probably a neonatal 
attribute. Unfortunately, support for this claim is elusive due to practical constraints. 
Evolutionary survival depends on the number sense abilities, in order to assess predator 
threats and food source opportunities. It is thus considered a genetic acquisition within most 
animal species, and cannot be learned. Devlin (2000) has cited cases of patients with specific 
brain abnormalities as providing neurophysiologic confirmation of this. He found that these 
patients could learn number facts; however, the facts have no meaning for them. Wheatley 
(1997) provides a concise discussion of what such a deficiency in numerical meaning entails. 
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Debate still exists as to the exact mechanism of number processing. Limited evidence 
of discrete number-detecting neurons lends little support for Dehaene’s (1997) speculative 
accumulator model of analogical number processing. Yet, regardless of the specific 
neurophysiology, the evidence (cited in Dehaene, 1997) supports an imprecise or ‘fuzzy’ 
representation of number. The innate number sense is consequently severely limited. For 
larger collections, it merely allows for comparisons, approximations, and estimations. Instant 
and accurate numerosity perception, known as perceptual subitizing, is apparent only for four 
or less objects (Atkinson, Campbell & Francis, 1976; Dehaene, 1997; Devlin, 2000; Lakoff & 
Núñez, 2000; Sousa, 2008). Positron emission tomography (PET) scans, during subitizing, 
reveal activation solely in the visual cortex, confirming the role of the visual processing 
system (Sousa, 2008). Specifically, Dehaene (1997) considered subitizing to depend on the 
visual pathways dedicated to object localisation and tracking. The capacity to subitize, 
inherent even in non-human animals, supports a nominal degree of arithmetic ability. It 
enables rapid enumeration of small collections, as well as the addition, subtraction, and 
comparisons of their numerosities. 
The importance of the basic number sense to mathematical development is well-
recognised in the literature (Dehaene, 1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Giaquinto, 2007; Bobis, 
2008; Sousa, 2008). Dehaene (1997) suggested that cognitive development and education 
function to connect this foundational sense to other cognitive structures. An additional 
cognitive capability, not present in other animals, markedly promotes human number sense 
expansion. This capability, believed to be a defining human distinction, is the creation and 
manipulation of symbol systems. Yet, more fundamentally important than symbolic 
representation, is the underlying mental facility of abstraction. 
Abstraction (discussed further in Sections 2.2.6 and 4.3.2) facilitates the 
generalization of the language-independent number sense across different perceptual 
modalities, encouraging the conceptual development of number. A study by Sfard (1997), in 
collaboration with Linchevsky, offers a sound portrayal of the consequences of the 
incomplete conception of number, which they attribute to inadequate abstraction. Their 
sample of dyslexic children showed a significant discrepancy between their superior aptitudes 
for calculation with the relatively concrete concept of money, as opposed to purely abstract 
number. 
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2.2.2 Counting 
Developmentally, there is initially an apparent disconnection between number concept 
and counting, and uncertainty still exists as to whether counting is innate or learned. Devlin 
(2000) reported that anthropologists estimate that our ancestors acquired the capacity for 
counting between 100 thousand and 200 thousand years ago. However, certain isolated 
cultures, such as the Australian Aborigines, do not exhibit counting beyond the basic number 
sense of one, two, and many. This would seem to provide evidence against the theory of an 
innate sense of counting, although on the other hand, may simply reflect a lack of necessity to 
enumerate accurately within these cultures. Consensus on the matter has yet to be reached. 
The anthropologist Sheets-Johnstone (1990) resolved several ambiguities concerning 
counting development with a lucid account of its tactile-kinaesthetic grounding and cognitive 
evolution within humans. She maintains that a similar process occurs during infant 
development, with the added benefit of an already extant cultural number system. It may be 
due to this benefit that confusion regarding the development of counting originates. Counting 
is customarily described as a complex process, incorporating two important principles 
(Sousa, 2008): 
1. The one-to-one principle necessitates sequentially and systematically assigning the 
correct number word to each item counted. 
2. The cardinal principle involves the recognition that the last number in the sequence is 
the total number, an important concept for addition and subtraction. 
This description demands an existing verbal number system. However, the account provided 
by Sheets-Johnstone (1990) reveals that neither numbers, as abstract entities, nor their 
linguistic counterparts, are essential to primitive counting. It is the basic number sense that 
necessarily supports counting. Extending beyond approximate comparative perceptual 
subitizing, by one-to-one correspondence of the elements themselves it is possible to 
ascertain whether two categories have exactly the same quantity of elements, without 
individual enumeration. This represents a non-standard qualitative concept of number, based 
on perceptual matching. Sheets-Johnstone has claimed that various non-human animals 
display comparable pre-literate counting abilities. It is the increasing abstraction of the 
number concept, and the human symbolic facility, that eventually enables the individual 
enumeration of elements counted. Individuals, as well as most cultures, appear to learn to 
count spontaneously, through finger enumeration as the original symbol system. Although 
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some cultures increased their counting repertoire by including other body parts, modern brain 
imaging studies (cited in Devlin, 2000) show substantial activity in the left parietal lobe when 
performing basic arithmetic. This is the neural region responsible for finger motor control.  
After mastering concrete object, and symbolic finger counting, further abstraction 
takes place. The inclusion of the abstract number sense expands the intuitive number sense, 
permitting mental counting and basic arithmetic. The level of abstraction now endorses a 
number as an abstract entity, rather than as a simple qualitative description. It thus becomes 
an object unto itself (Devlin, 2000). Symbolic number representation reflects recognition of 
this fact. 
2.2.3 Symbolic Representation 
Archaeologists have discovered notched bones from about 35 thousand years ago, and 
have interpreted them as number tallies. Tallies, like symbolic finger counting, indicate a 
basic conception of numerosity. The purely abstract concept of number, essential to 
mathematics, appears to have developed much later. Around 8 000 BC the Sumerians 
conveniently replaced their commercial clay envelopes containing tokens with clay tablets 
engraved with abstract markings to denote the number of tokens. Although there was still no 
culturally universal number system, the use of these symbolic markings evidenced a step 
towards a higher level of numerical abstraction (Devlin, 2000).  
Symbolic representation is intrinsically important to mathematics (Davis & Maher, 
1997). Dehaene (1997) credited this seminal human development to dispelling the fuzzy 
quantitative representation of numbers. The Arabic number notational system has since 
proved the most efficient and successful. This creative invention has substantially simplified 
the practice of mathematics. Arabic numerals, and symbolic algebraic notation developed in 
Alexandria in 250 AD, enable the expression of mathematical formulae, facilitating the 
dissemination of mathematical ideas and thus substantially contributing to the expansion of 
mathematics. Written symbolic notation also surmounts the constraints of mental arithmetic 
imposed by a limited working memory (Tversky, 2005a; Rowlands, 2010; Clark, 2011). 
In spite of this, mathematics is not simply a form of symbol manipulation; it further 
involves abstract patterns and numerical concepts. Even though it is possible to ‘do’ 
arithmetic purely through the rules governing the manipulation of symbols, the process will 
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only make sense if the meaning of the symbols and rules are understood (Presmeg, 1997a; 
Wheatley, 1997; Alexander et al., 1997; Devlin, 2000; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Gallistel & 
Gelman, 2005). This understanding is achieved precisely through the innate number sense 
and the proper abstraction of number. 
2.2.4 The Mental Number Line 
Providentially, unlike language words in general, digits are more than symbols that 
hold the possibility of an attachment of meaning. Mental conception of the symbol occurs in 
conjunction with the meaning, namely its magnitude, as a unit (Brysbaert, 2005). This 
unconscious and automatic process results in direct cognitive comprehension of digits as 
quantities (Dehaene, 1997). Whereas language processing, including number words, is 
located in Broca’s area of the left frontal lobe, the left parietal lobe processes Arabic digits of 
the number system. Devlin (2000) suggested that this is a result of the abstraction of number 
from finger enumeration. 
Quantity is not the only attribution of numbers. They also seem to elicit a spontaneous 
spatial association (Fias & Fischer, 2005). On these grounds, cognitive scientists construe the 
principal conceptual structure for whole, positive integers to be a mental number line. Several 
experiments (cited in Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 2005) over the past 50 years reveal 
important effects of number comparisons, which elucidate this conceptual mental 
representation of number. 
 Number comparisons take longer for numbers with similar magnitudes, namely ‘the 
size effect’, due to their closeness on the mental number line, which creates 
confusion. 
 Number comparison speed is also slower for larger numbers, known as ‘the distance 
effect’, which is thought to stem from an increasing compression along the mental 
number line. 
 Dehaene (1997) reported a spontaneous left-to-right association for small-to-large 
numbers that he termed the Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes 
(SNARC) effect. Although the SNARC effect serves to support a spatial component 
in number conception, Dehaene admits that Western cultural factors, related to the 
direction of reading, largely influence the left-right orientation. Subsequent studies 
confirm that cultures who read from right to left, display the appropriately opposite 
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spatial number association. A similar down-up vertical association for small to large 
numbers was also found to exist (Devlin, 2000). 
Based on these effects, the conceived mental number line is taken as a row of points, 
with a culturally specific orientation in space, along which numbers are sequentially located, 
following unequal graduations approximating a logarithmic scale. The number concept, 
through the organisation of the mental number line, thus incorporates a strong spatial 
component. The spatial sense rests upon spatial relations, a crucial visual perceptual skill 
enabling the perception of objects in space both in relation to each other and to oneself, 
incorporating directionality and laterality. 
2.2.5 Arithmetic 
The number sense, cognitive counting principles, the facility for abstraction and 
symbolic representation, and the conceptual mental number line, constitute the elementary 
cognitive tools that support basic arithmetic. All are either innate, or spontaneously develop 
through the functional architecture of the brain, and are subsequently honed through cultural 
influence (Ernest, 1991; English, 1997a; Bisanz, Sherman, Rasmussen & Ho, 2005; 
Giaquinto, 2007). 
Already at this level, an intimate relationship between visual perceptual skill and 
mathematic ability is beginning to unfold. Visual perceptual skill is directly implicated in the 
number sense, particularly the component skills of visual discrimination, figure-ground and 
visual memory. Finger counting also relies heavily on visual discrimination, together with 
visual-motor integration. Abstraction, the facility underlying symbolic representation, is a 
direct consequence of categorisation (Tversky, 2001). Categorisation relies on the perception 
of similarities and differences, a complex ability that necessitates visual discrimination in 
particular, and to a lesser extent figure-ground, visual closure and visual memory. The mental 
number line conception depends upon the spatial relations visual perceptual component skill. 
Possessing these basic cognitive tools enables children, with little instruction, to deduce 
correct solution strategies for simple addition and subtraction (Alexander et al., 1997; 
Dehaene, 1997).  
More advanced arithmetic involving multi-digit calculation, multiplication, and 
division is often the stage at which problems with mathematics originate. Dehaene (1997) has 
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rationalised this by the supposition that number processing rests on the foundation of the 
analogical approximate number sense. Although this drawback may certainly prevent the 
kind of speed and efficiency of calculation skills of a digital computer, it should not preclude 
a natural extension to advanced arithmetic. Gurganus (2004), Bobis (2008), and Sousa (2008) 
have all asserted that number sense development is attainable through appropriate 
stimulation. 
Conventional schooling in the Western world, however, does not seem to encourage 
this development. On the contrary, there appears to be active suppression of the perceptually 
based intuitive number sense, through over-emphasis on rote learning. Unfortunately, this 
occurs regardless of the plausibility of the fact that the innate non-verbal number sense 
imbues linguistic numerical representation with meaning, and further mediates verbal 
numerical reasoning (Gallistel & Gelman, 2005). Moreover, rote learning of arithmetic tables 
necessitates the recruitment of the verbal memory system. Dehaene (1997) presumed that the 
surfeit of deceptive verbal patterns in the tables confuses the natural pattern-perceiving ability 
of the brain, an ability that should, by definition, aid mathematical cognition. He deftly 
illustrates this informally, with a challenge to memorise an address book, such as what 
follows here: 
 Charlie David lives on George Avenue. 
 Charlie George lives on Albert Zoe Avenue. 
 George Ernie lives on Albert Bruno Avenue. 
and a second example, for professional addresses: 
 Charlie David works on Albert Bruno Avenue. 
 Charlie George works on Bruno Albert Avenue. 
 George Ernie works on Charlie Ernie Avenue. (p. 127) 
Every child faces this monumental task if taught arithmetic tables by rote learning, as these 
addresses are in fact merely disguised arithmetic tables. The home and work addresses 
represent addition and multiplication respectively, with names rather than number words. 
Their mathematical equivalences, which could alternatively be easily computed (for example 
through finger counting), are: 
 3 + 4 = 7 
 3 + 7 = 10 
 7 + 5 = 12 
 3 x 4 = 12 
 3 x 7 = 21 
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 7 x 5 = 35 
 
The customary school ban on finger counting thus degrades the addition and 
multiplication tables to mere mathematical facts. As a result, intuitive mathematical 
understanding, or conception, is lost (English, 1997a; Wheatley, 1997; Mayer, 2005). This 
impedes learning, as understanding enhances associative memory. In addition, a child’s 
interest in mathematics may begin to wane through its disconnection from the real world 
(Sousa, 2008). These considerations possibly also contribute to the negative perceptions 
towards mathematics, which further frustrate mathematical learning. 
2.2.6 Higher Mathematics 
Mathematics beyond arithmetic has very little to do with numerical calculation. Yet, 
perhaps surprisingly, this level in particular demands a well-developed conception of 
numbers and their spatial arrangement. Arithmetic rote learning offers no assistance, 
notwithstanding even greater redundancy since the advent of the electronic calculator. Novel 
problem solving through analysis, involving concept formation, analogy, metaphor, and 
inductive and deductive reasoning, now receives emphasis. This is achievable only through a 
comprehensive awareness of the mathematical relationships and patterns involved. The 
proper abstraction of number is essential for the perception of these relationships and 
patterns. 
Devlin (2000) has identified four levels of abstraction, or symbolic thought: 
1. The lowest level, shared by most animal species, is in essence the absence of 
abstraction, where objects of thought are restricted to real objects within the 
perceptual environment. 
2. In the second level, the range of thought extends to include real, familiar objects 
presently beyond the immediate perceptual environment. The apes function 
comfortably at this level of abstraction. 
3. The third level, attainable only by human beings, is a prerequisite for language, where 
symbolic objects of thought may also include unfamiliar or imaginary versions of real 
objects. 
4. Finally, in the highest level, the range of thought includes even that which has no 
direct correspondence to the real world of objects. 
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It may be argued that Devlin’s first level is an underestimation of non-human animals’ 
capabilities. Alternatively, it simply indicates diverse interpretations of abstraction. All 
animals must at least be capable of differentiation, for example, to differentiate between that 
which is food and not food. Such pre-lingual categorisation, even if restricted to real objects 
within the perceptual environment, may be considered a demonstration of minimal 
abstraction (see Section 4.3.2 for a revision of Devlin’s levels of abstraction). Nevertheless, it 
is the fourth level mentioned above that is relevant to higher mathematics. This level is the 
epitome of mathematical cognition, since mathematical objects are entirely abstract. Núñez 
(2008) described such abstract concepts as “rich and precise entities that lack any concrete 
instantiation in the real world” (p. 333). 
Through the process of abstraction, abstract entities become objects in their own right 
(Devlin, 2000). As an instance of an extreme degree of abstraction, Dehaene (1997) has 
reported that maths geniuses describe the seemingly real existence of numbers as objects 
populating a virtual, symbolic mathematic landscape. Albeit an extreme example, this 
nonetheless lends credence to the speculation that generally, with sufficient abstraction, the 
natural faculties of the brain that assist in navigating the real world may similarly be utilised 
in the abstracted mathematical world. Visual perceptual skill constitutes one such resource, 
acknowledged as such since Gibson’s theory of direct perception. 
Considerable research (cited in Sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.5), particularly 
neuropsychological, has led to a modest appreciation of foundational mathematical cognition, 
exposing more fully its relationship to visual perception. Until recently, cognitive science 
contributed very little beyond this, possibly due to the misconception that mathematics is 
merely calculation, involving simple formal manipulation of symbols. To date, there is no all-
encompassing science of mathematical cognition, nor yet consensus on interdependent 
mental influences. 
 
2.3 Influences Associated with Mathematical Cognition 
Further insight into mathematical cognition calls for an assessment of the contribution 
of several cognitive capacities and related influences. Evidenced by the content of current 
research, the influence of language, education, intelligence, working memory, and visuo-
spatial abilities are of particular interest to the practice of mathematics. 
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2.3.1 Language 
An inevitable consequence of the view of mathematics as simply a form of arithmetic 
symbol manipulation, is the impression that mathematics involves merely an alternative use 
of, or expansion upon, linguistic ability. According to Devlin (2000), symbolic thought 
enables the development of language from which, together with the basic number sense, 
mathematic ability arises. Gallistel and Gelman (1992) have similarly hypothesised that, 
building on innate number sense, the generative structure of number is inferred from 
linguistic and grammatical properties of verbal counting and quantifying. Gleitman and 
Papafragou (2005), on the other hand, express their scepticism of the plausibility of such 
linguistic mediation of number ability. In brief, they highlight the non-recursive nature of 
English language counting words – particularly up to eleven – along with most natural 
language quantifiers. 
The impression given by views such as those of Devlin (2000), and Gallistel and 
Gelman (1992), is that numerical ability is considered subordinate to language. Sheets-
Johnstone (1990) condemned this view for contributing to the enigma of numerical origins. 
There can be no doubt, though, that language supports the progressive development of 
mathematics. It undeniably promotes the consolidation of mathematical ideas, and facilitates 
their propagation between individuals, across cultures, and over generations. However, this 
does not necessarily implicate a linguistic cognitive foundation for basic mathematic ability. 
An interesting incident in 1913 (cited in Dehaene, 1997) relates to the present 
discussion, showing that even mathematical discourse is not always an absolute necessity to 
mathematical cognition and innovation. Professor Hardy, a Royal Society contemporary of 
Whitehead and Russell, received a letter from Srinavasa Ramanujan Iyengar, a poorly 
educated Brahmin in India. The letter contained novel mathematical formulae, in addition to 
accepted mathematical theorems, presented as if they were Ramanujan’s own. Many were 
derived indirectly from obscure mathematics, with which Hardy was nevertheless familiar, 
since he had personally contributed to them. Later collaboration between the two men 
revealed that Ramanujan possessed a sophisticated sense of number that enabled him to 
conceive of innovative arithmetical relations. In his youth, he had effectively reinvented past 
mathematics, independently. Dehaene (1997) described Ramanujan as a mathematical genius, 
due to the fact that “he had seen further than any other mathematician without sitting on 
anybody’s shoulders” (p. 145). Language and mathematical formulae may communicate 
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mathematical ideas, and assist in their evolvement, but rarely reflect the essence of the 
mathematical cognitive process. 
Even so, previously believed to be limited to mere expression of thought, language is 
increasingly seen as an indispensable component of cognition (Vygotsky, 1962; Ernest, 1991; 
English, 1997a; Sfard, 1997; Clark, 2011). Gleitman and Papafragou (2005) have cited 
Wittgenstein to illustrate this position where he states that “the limits of my language are the 
limits of my world” (p. 633). Ernest’s (1991) construal was that all logical truth, including 
that of mathematics, is “dependent on the socially accepted linguistic rules of grammar” 
(p. 31). However, Gleitman and Papafragou (2005) again remained unconvinced of such 
extremism, due to the relative impoverishment of language, in their view, which necessitates 
non-linguistic inference in order to achieve a richness comparable to that of thought. Sheets-
Johnstone (1990) also argued against cognitive language-dependence, although she does 
acknowledge a degree of linguistic contribution to higher-level cognition. Her argument is 
based on evidence of non-verbal modes of cognition, plus primitive pre-verbal cognition. 
Language development and its cognitive value are contentious issues that have been widely 
researched. Much of the contention is possibly a result of different interpretations of the 
definition and constitution of language. Modern theories tend towards the more moderate, 
with a common critical thread as reflected in Ortony’s (cited in Sfard, 1997) statement that 
“language, perception, and knowledge are inextricably intertwined” (p. 344). 
An increasingly popular view is that mathematics is mostly inductive, comprising 
imagistic, analogical, and metaphorical reasoning, as opposed to purely logical deductive 
reasoning (English, 1997a; Wheatley, 1997; Sfard, 1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). This 
superficially appears to further distance the role of language from the practice of 
mathematics. Yet, on the contrary, it exposes more clearly the linguistic contribution. 
Presmeg (1997b) has stressed the role of mental images, constructed from concrete 
perceptual experiences, during the process of conceptualisation in metaphorical, or abstract, 
cognition. Taking a broader view of language, she has then gone on to explain that 
metaphorical conceptualisation is also symbolically mediated, arguing that language is the 
only medium in which it can occur. Although a controversially exclusive argument, linguistic 
metaphorical conceptualisation, in general, cannot be easily refuted. In a cogent treatise of 
relevance to this argument, Kruger (2003) articulated that “language is not the 
communication of pre-existing thought, but is itself the form in which thought becomes 
incarnate” (p. 44). To elaborate, Núñez (2008) regarded metaphor primarily as a 
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subconscious human cognitive mechanism, which subsequently manifests via its pervasion 
into language. Sfard (1997) has insightfully admitted a consequence of this, which 
simultaneously reinforces the explanation: “Construction of new knowledge”, through 
metaphorical conceptualisation, is actually the “creation of a new discourse” (p. 358). 
Metaphorical thinking thus entails a harmony of both images and linguistic sketches, or 
descriptions. In mathematics, perceptual experiences lead to the formation of mental images, 
which are indispensable to the creation of new concepts and the concurrent convergence of 
mathematical discourse. 
Both linguistic and mathematical cognition thus present as commonly a result of the 
primitive brain functions of categorisation and abstraction. Certainly, labelling and verbally 
defining categories promotes categorisation refinement, augmenting abstraction and leading 
to higher levels of symbolic thought (Clark, 2011); thereby fortuitously benefiting 
mathematical cognition. However, on the other hand, pre-lingual categorisation is an 
evolutionary-derived perceptual skill. Effective perceptual categorisation manifests in 
symbolic thought, through the facility for abstraction. Symbolic language words and 
symbolic numerical digits are thereafter processed distinctively, both neurally and cognitively 
(refer to Section 2.2.4; Barnes, Smith-Chant & Landry, 2005), which is suggestive of them as 
two distinct capabilities. This view is supported by neurophysiologic evidence of literacy and 
numeracy double dissociations (e.g. Cipolotti, Butterworth, & Denes, 1991 and Cappelletti, 
Butterworth, & Kopelman, 2001 (cited in Butterworth, 2005)). Several instances have been 
observed in brain-damaged patients. Additional cases have been artificially invoked by 
electrical brain stimulation, causing temporary dysphasia and calculation impairments. A 
remarkable double dissociation between the use of verbal numbers and Arabic numerals is 
reported by Anderson, Damasio, and Damasio (1990), Cipolotti (1995), and Mc Closky 
(1992), (cited in Fayol & Seron, 2005). There have also been reports of double dissociations 
between linguistic arithmetic factual knowledge and numerical conceptual knowledge 
(Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel & Cohen, 2005). That dysphasic children show superior performance 
when working with Arabic digits (Butterworth, 2005) lends further evidence to the 
conclusion that linguistic and mathematical cognition are indeed distinct capabilities.  
Therefore, the totality of mathematics, as a social discipline, may certainly be 
contingent upon certain social practices, such as language. However, contrary to a hierarchy 
with mathematical cognitive ability built upon a linguistic foundation, parallel co-
development within the individual – originating in the capacity for conceptual metaphor – 
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seems more probable (Sfard, 1997). Mathematical cognition, like linguistic ability, is thus 
likely to be founded directly upon perceptual skill (Lakoff & Núñez, 1997; Sfard, 1997; 
Holyoak, 2005). 
2.3.2 Education 
Teaching mathematics necessitates more than simply relaying mathematical ideas and 
formulae. To learn mathematics effectively, the mathematical cognitive process requires 
appropriate stimulation. This insight has been widely acknowledged at least since the 1950s. 
Previously, mathematics teaching in the Western world was in accordance with 
Humanist and Utilitarian principles. Mathematics education thus involved the transmission of 
mathematical facts, emphasising rote learning (Ernest, 1991). Evaluation was strictly 
according to the final answers on assessment tests, with no consideration for cognitive 
processes. Such a curriculum limits intellectual growth in its neglect of abstract concepts, 
which are the building blocks of higher-level mathematics (Davis & Maher, 1997). 
Influenced by the developmental theories of Piaget and the social constructivism of 
Vygotsky, Western educators later adopted a more progressive approach. The psychology 
based on these theories suggests, in simple terms, that mathematic ability develops through 
environmental experience and social interaction. Consequently, the focus of mathematics 
education shifted towards the provision of appropriate environmental and social experiences, 
suitable for promoting active and independent mathematical enquiry by the learner. The 
teacher’s role is primarily to facilitate the learners’ investigations, encouraging them to 
devise and record their own solutions (Ernest, 1991). Assessment is informal and criteria-
based, in an attempt to reveal the interplay of knowledge, motivation, and context (Alexander 
et al., 1997). 
Such a progressive educational strategy is, however, in contradiction with the 
pervasive absolutist view of mathematics. It may be due to the resultant tension that, in 
practice, mathematics education still tends toward the previous content-driven methodology 
(see Sections 4.7 and 7.2; Núñez, 2007). This is a disastrous consequence when considering 
the premise of the progressive philosophy, which predicts the mode and quality of education, 
and prevailing classroom mathematical discourse, as having a severe impact on mathematic 
ability. 
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In addition, the misperception of mathematics as symbol manipulation and as a form 
of formal deductive logic has eclipsed its problem-solving aspect. The associated 
apprehension and construction of mathematical patterns and relationships cannot be assessed 
in terms of memorised facts and algorithms. Problem-solving situations yield a form of 
assessment that is ultimately more accurate (English, 1997b; Wheatley, 1997). In support of 
this view, Alexander et al. (1997) have linked the pattern perception and association of basic 
mathematical reasoning to the performance components of Sternberg’s componential theory 
of analogical reasoning, an aspect of his triarchic theory of intelligence. The crux of 
Sternberg’s (2005) theory is that intelligence is not the accumulation of factual knowledge, 
but is, rather, related to successful environmental coping, through problem solving. 
2.3.3 Intelligence 
Pesenti (2005) has suggested that because not all intelligent people are good at 
mathematics, a dissociation exists, requiring the separate consideration of these two 
constructs. Yet, there is evidence (Siegler & Booth, 2005) that children’s mathematic ability 
both positively and significantly correlates with IQ measures. 
This disparity may be a result of the broad, and manifold, traditional notions of 
intelligence. Spearman (cited in Sternberg, 2005; Van Eeden & De Beer, 2005) was the first 
proponent of a single intelligence factor g, but he simultaneously identified diverse s factors, 
specific to particular activities. Moreover, Cattell and Horn (cited in Sternberg, 2005) later 
split factor g into fluid and crystallized intelligence, each reflected in myriad mental abilities. 
Thurstone (cited in Sternberg, 2005; Van Eeden & De Beer, 2005) went on to propose a 
seven-factor theory of intelligence. Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (cited in 
Sternberg, 2005; Van Eeden & De Beer, 2005) originally included seven separate 
intelligences, and has since expanded to include even more. 
Notably, though, mathematic ability features in each of these theories of intelligence, 
and their accompanying tests, providing psychometric evidence of a connection between 
mathematics and intelligence, as measured by IQ tests. In fact, mathematic ability, as 
problem solving, seems to be so entwined with the Western notion of intelligence that it 
becomes difficult to isolate either without detracting from the original constructs. In addition, 
many tests of intelligence also contain a visual perceptual component, often referred to as 
‘nonverbal’ IQ. This would seem to lend credibility to the view that IQ is not necessarily a 
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confounding effect in studies specifically investigating the relationship between mathematic 
ability and visual perceptual skill. In fact, the recognition that several cognitive resources 
contribute to measures of intelligence – including that of visuo-spatial abilities (Kyttälä & 
Lehto, 2008) – necessarily puts into question the validity of controlling for IQ. 
The neurobiological hypothesis (cited in Di Blasi, Elia, Buono, Ramakers & Di 
Nuovo, 2007) also closely links perceptual and intellectual abilities. Visuo-spatial 
information-processing is accordingly not only a visual perceptual construct, but it also 
underlies the Performance IQ score. Loikith (1997) consequently stressed the impossibility of 
separating perception from intelligence. Kulp et al. (2004) similarly reasoned that poor visual 
discrimination will lead not only to perceptual inefficiency, but will also affect information-
processing, thereby influencing visual memory, problem solving, and IQ. Vernon (1970) has 
concurred that the speed of information-processing, which is partially dependent upon visual 
perception, forms an integral part of general intelligence. 
There is thus a connection between visual perception and intelligence, in addition to 
that to be found between mathematics and intelligence. The coincidence with intelligence, of 
both mathematic ability and visual perceptual skill, indicates a potential relationship between 
the two constructs. 
2.3.4 Working Memory 
Working memory is central to active cognition. A broad literature survey undertaken 
by LeFevre, DeStefano, Coleman, and Shanahan (2005) reveals much acclaim for a close 
connection between mathematics and working memory. However, empirical research is 
sparse. Mathematics involves a wide range of cognitive abilities, which makes it difficult to 
assess the extent of influence of working memory. Of the few recent studies available, most 
(including those of Wilson & Swanson, 2001; Reuhkala, 2001; Holmes, Adams & Hamilton, 
2008; Kyttälä & Lehto, 2008) acknowledged the importance of all three components of 
Baddeley’s model of working memory: the phonological loop, the visual-spatial sketchpad, 
and the central executive. Correlational research, though, emphasises the role of the visual-
spatial sketchpad, in its support of mental rotation (LeFevre et al., 2005). 
Mental rotation is a crucial ability for the processes of mathematics. It is also an 
aspect of the visual perceptual component skills of form constancy, figure-ground, and visual 
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memory. This commonality further supports an association between mathematic ability and 
visual perceptual skill. 
2.3.5 Visuo-Spatial Abilities 
Visual perceptual skill underpins the lower-level visuo-spatial abilities, such as object 
recognition and location. Visual perceptual skill also exerts a supplementary influence on 
higher-level visuo-spatial cognition, which involves visual or spatial representations, either 
perceived or imagined, together with the mental operations performed on them (Tversky, 
2005a). This is in accordance with the theory (Kosslyn, Thompson & Alpert, 1997) that 
vision and visual imagery form part of the same system. The difference between the two is 
that vision involves predominantly bottom-up processing, whereas imagery occurs as a result 
of input to associative memory, initiating top-down processing. Mental rotation and other 
image transformations exemplify visuo-spatial cognitive abilities. 
The value of internal visualisation or external diagrams in mathematics, and problem 
solving in general, is common knowledge to most people through their personal experience. 
It is also widely upheld within the scientific community (English, 1997a; Presmeg, 1997b; 
Reisberg & Heuer, 2005; Newcombe & Learmonth, 2005). However, contemporary theories  
reveal that visuo-spatial abilities are more than a mere superfluous aid to mathematical 
cognition; rather, they are of deeper epistemic importance (Presmeg, 1997a; Sfard, 1997; 
Wheatley, 1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Hegarty & Waller, 2005; Giaquinto, 2007). The 
growing recognition of this fact is a natural concomitance with the realisation that 
mathematics is not entirely a deductive discipline, the emphasis accordingly shifting towards 
imagistic, analogical, and metaphorical reasoning. Presmeg’s (1997b) definition of a visual 
image as “a mental construct depicting visual or spatial information” (p. 303) is generic 
enough to include all abstract patterns, which are the pertinent domain of mathematics. 
In his text entitled Visual Thinking in Mathematics, Giaquinto (2007) has posited that 
abstract general truths can be inductively discerned through specific images, and therefore 
visualisation is a pertinent means of discovery. By way of explanation, he has suggested that 
the representations in associative memory activated by visualisation are more than simple 
pictorial images; they are perceptual concepts. The phenomenal, or experienced, image is 
therefore loaded with extracted and schematized information relating to the concept, thus 
allowing inference, generalisation, and analogy, which are the bases of abstraction. 
41 
 
According to Giaquinto’s (2007) position, the role of visuo-spatial cognition in 
geometry is obvious, due to its spatial nature. Visual perceptual experience creates category 
specifications that characterise the perceptual concepts of shapes. Geometric concepts of 
basic shapes are simply perfect exemplars of these perceptual concepts. Visual imagination, 
which involves the generalisation of experience in memory, then extends geometric 
knowledge. This notion of geometry does not necessitate definitions or logical deduction, and 
is therefore non-analytic, thus it is the antithesis of a conventional view of mathematics. 
Visuo-spatial cognition also plays a significant and diverse role in arithmetic. The 
simple appreciation of a multi-digit numeral relies on several visuo-spatial abilities. These 
include perception of shape and orientation for recognition of the constituent digits, their 
horizontal alignment, and left-right ordering. Besides this accepted peripheral function in 
comprehending numerals, Dehaene (1997) and Giaquinto (2007) have further proposed that 
arithmetical thinking is essentially visual. In the standard addition algorithm, each step except 
one, involves visuo-spatial ability. Likewise, the rule-governed rearrangements, substitutions, 
additions, and deletions of symbols typical of algebra are spatial manipulations, which further 
depend on the spatial arrangement of the input symbol array. In addition, although numbers, 
unlike geometric figures, are not overtly spatial, the mental number line indicates a natural 
association with the visual imagery system and with spatial sense. Neuro-imaging 
corroborates the use of visual imagery in multi-digit calculations, in bilateral inferior 
temporal activation of the ventral visual pathway. Visuo-spatial abilities are therefore crucial 
in number perception, counting, multi-digit number representation, finger addition, 
algorithms for calculation, as well as for digital and analogue arithmetic problem solving 
techniques. 
Furthermore, an entire branch of higher mathematics is, in part, a consequence of 
visualisation. Calculus arose through the inability of geometry or arithmetic to solve certain 
physical quantitative problems, many of which were nonetheless easy to visualise. The 
challenge in calculus, according to Giaquinto (2007), lies in the weak intrinsic connection 
between basic analytical and perceptual concepts, as compared to that found in geometry. 
Assumptions are therefore required to strengthen the link. Giaquinto concludes that analytic 
concepts thereby not only provide formal solutions for visualisable problems, but also extend 
the domain beyond these problems, into the realm of the un-visualisable. This is evidenced by 
differential functions whose curves cannot be visualised. 
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Visualisation can therefore be seen to have instigated the conception of calculus, 
which subsequently surpasses visuo-spatial cognition in its reach and methodology. 
Giaquinto (2007) regarded this complex and tentative connection between the analytical and 
perceptual as paradoxical. However, the supposition of a paradox might reflect a general 
continuation of the misconception of mathematics and mathematical cognition as formal 
symbol manipulation. The apparent paradox arises from the difficulty Giaquinto faces in 
explaining the link between analytical and perceptual concepts. He resorts to relying on 
assumptions to strengthen the link. The result is inadvertently a reversion to formalist 
mathematics (refer to Section 2.1.2). Yet, discussion on foundational mathematical concepts 
explores their development from an experiential visual perceptual base (refer to Section 2.2), 
and the constructivist and situated philosophies extend this perceptual foundation to higher 
mathematics, implicating the conceptual nature of mathematics (refer to Section 2.1.3). It is 
clear from the above discussion, however, that higher mathematics is still commonly 
considered as algorithmic manipulation of symbols founded on formalist assumptions. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
When assessing the discourse on this subject, there appears to be conflict between the 
constructivist belief in the conceptual nature of mathematics and a lingering view of 
mathematics as a logical analytic discipline. This is possibly partly a consequence of the 
influence of traditional theories of cognition in general, as well as those of visual perception 
in particular. A dominant view is that cognitive processing of perceptual input produces an 
output. In terms of mathematical cognition, this view cultivates a formalist impression of 
mathematics. Perception of the visual symbol array provides the input for algorithmic 
cognitive processing, which produces the output symbol array. This model, however, 
undervalues the functions of perception and visualisation, as has been discussed. It is said 
(reference may be made to Section 2.2) that cognitive science conceives of mathematics as 
concerning concepts, which arise through sensory-motor experience. If this is the case, then a 
detailed and precise theory of sensory perception is required in order to comprehend the 
subsequent cognitive conceptual process. Unfortunately, this manner of theory seems to be 
lacking within classical cognitive psychology. 
The discourses of contemporary mathematical cognition have therefore not as yet 
been entirely successful in clarifying what lies behind mathematics and mathematic ability. 
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Mathematical cognition is not an isolated capacity, but simply an instance of cognition in 
general. In any cognitive model, sensory perception is an indispensable component. It is thus 
apparent that the question of a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic 
ability can only be addressed within the framework of a coherent theory, encompassing both 
visual perception and cognition. The following chapter presents an argument that traditional 
cognitive psychology theories provide an insufficient perceptual-cognitive framework for a 
comprehensive theory of mathematical cognition. However, their inadequacies direct the path 
towards such a theory. To this end, the traditional view of perception and its relation to 
cognition is discussed in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 explores an alternative view, with the 
aim of clarifying the apparent link between visual perception and mathematical cognition. 
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CHAPTER 3: Perception and Cognition 
 
The constructivist philosophy of mathematics, in conjunction with 
neuropsychological evidence on foundational numerical cognition, provides the prospect of a 
link between visual perception and mathematics. Yet controversy continues, perhaps due not 
only to previous misconceptions of mathematics, but also of visual perception itself, and of 
cognition in general. 
The discussion of various perspectives on mathematics conducted in Chapter 2 
reveals that there is lack of agreement regarding the fundamental constitution of mathematics. 
Likewise, a summary of perceptual theories in Section 3.1 reveals that visual perception was 
not well comprehended by the discourses of the twentieth century, and it is still not fully 
understood. The outcome of the discussion in Chapter 2 is that a coherent psychological 
theory of perception and cognition is paramount to the confirmation of a relationship between 
visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. However, only relatively recently has a sound 
holistic theory (to be discussed in Chapter 4) found introduction. Previous cognitive theories 
thus provide inadequate explanation for the possible existence of a relationship. In support of 
this claim, the contributions of two dominant cognitive theories of the twentieth century are 
evaluated within this chapter: 
 Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. Piaget (1963, 1969) advanced the broader 
relation between perception and logico-mathematical cognition. This is congruent with a 
proposed relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. However, 
certain crucial failings within the theory have hindered further exploration of the proposed 
perceptual-cognitive relations. 
 Information-processing theory. Although support for information-processing theory is 
waning, it remains prominent. The paradigm offers details of the separate theories of 
perception and cognition. However, it provides insufficiently sound explanation of 
perceptual-cognitive relations, and presents with inherent inadequacies. 
Existing empirical evidence (presented in Section 3.4) compounds the problem of 
determining a definitive relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
The body of evidence yields conflicting results, and its interpretation is often superficial. The 
inherent failings of the prevailing perceptual and cognitive theories have possibly obscured a 
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more reasonable account of the relations between visual perception, cognition, and 
mathematic ability. The particular weakness of perceptual representation is deemed 
especially obstructive to a holistic theory. 
 
3.1 Visual Perception 
There have been many psychological theories of visual perception, each of which has 
made important contributions to the development of our understanding. Still, no theory has 
been able to fully capture the complexity of the process of visual perception. Consequently, a 
definitive operational definition of the skills involved is not yet possible. 
The Gestalt theory of the early twentieth century has proven to be one of the most 
compelling and enduring models by means of which we may explain visual perception. 
Martin (2006) went so far as to have asserted that it provides the foundation for all current 
tests of visual perceptual skill. The major premise of the theory (cited in Matlin, 2002) is that 
“the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (p. 6). The mind organises visual patterns 
according to laws of perceptual organisation, to generate holistic perception. The laws of 
pragnanz, similarity, good continuation, proximity, common fate, and familiarity, originate 
from knowledge gained through experience in the environment (Bruce, Green & Georgeson, 
2003). These valuable insights into perceptual organisation have not diminished, despite the 
lack of support for the theory in terms of what is known of the physiology of the brain.  
Behavioural psychology, prevalent in the early 1900s, is a notable exception that 
contributed little to a theory of visual perception. Behaviourism’s primary concern is 
objectively observable stimulus-response reactions, which mostly involve associative 
learning. All mental concepts, such as sensation and perception, are therefore ignored.  
Subsequent disillusionment with behaviourism facilitated demise of the view of 
perception as simple stimulus-response relationships. Constructivism has since played a 
central role in the psychology of perception. With the exception of Gibson’s theory of direct 
perception, other diverse theories advocate mental construction of perceptual experience. 
Construction typically employs incomplete data from the senses, together with memories, 
which are themselves constructions of the past. This constitutes indirect perception, where 
cognition or cognitive algorithms construct meaning from an imperfect retinal image.  
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Neuroscience, aided by developments in imaging technology, has considerably 
clarified many of the basic processes involved in perception (Bruce et al., 2003; Enns, 2004). 
However, it is becoming obvious that physiology and cognitive architecture alone are 
insufficient as a full explanation of visual perception, since a sensation-based approach is 
unable to explain a sense of its ability to capture spatial and temporal features. Even at the 
lowest perceptual level, for a distorted two-dimensional retinal image to reveal a meaningful 
three-dimensional world, necessitates additional information. 
It has also become apparent that there is more to perception than just visual 
awareness. Object recognition is indeed a complex perceptual problem. It has received much 
attention in theoretical research, as well as in practical applications, such as robotics. This 
focus, however, has perhaps been a factor in the neglect of more crucial aspects of 
perception. Examination of non-primate animal species reflects an important alternative 
function of perception. Bruce et al. (2003) have provided a detailed exposition of an insect’s 
visual system, the primary purpose of which is to provide swift and accurate navigation, to 
the total exclusion of object recognition. It is possible that object awareness may be only a 
peripheral benefit of a highly developed visual perceptual system, with guided action as the 
core function. Guided action is, on balance, an obvious evolutionary advantage. Perceptually 
guided action, in concert with perceptual awareness, may possibly promote knowledge 
acquisition to support higher-level cognition. 
The majority of the diverse array of perceptual theories concur that visual perception 
entails selecting, interpreting, and organising visual sensations into meaningful experiences. 
Moreover, in general, it is currently accepted across them that cognition and knowledge of 
the world obtained through experience, influences, and are influenced by, visual perception 
(Matlin, 2002). It is therefore possible to postulate that there are deep connections between 
vision and cognition. Perceptual experience of the world, particularly through vision, guides 
our thoughts, ideas, and concepts (Piaget, 1969; Sfard, 1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). 
Conversely, cognition often entails visual imagery and imagination (English, 1997a; 
Presmeg, 1997b; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Reisberg & Heuer, 2005; Newcombe & Learmonth, 
2005). In fact, cognition and visual perception utilise many of the same neural centres and 
pathways, albeit in a different manner (Enns, 2004). 
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3.2 Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive Development 
Piaget (1963, 1969) in particular, has written of the fundamental interaction between 
perception and cognition. He viewed intelligence as effectively logico-mathematical thinking, 
and firmly advocated its grounding in sensory-motor activity. His constructivist 
developmental model presents learning as the result of a dynamic interaction between the 
child and the environment. Existing knowledge modifies perceptual input for assimilation, 
which thereby modifies existing knowledge in order to accommodate the perceptual input. To 
initiate the process, Piaget acceded only to phylogenetic general regulatory mechanisms of 
processing environmental inputs, and autonomic reflexes. Perceptual and intellectual 
development thus progress in parallel, influenced by a combination of neural maturation and 
experience. 
Piaget identified a universal sequence of four logical developmental stages, each 
associated with a specific average age range: 
1. Sensori-motor period (0 – 2 years): The only world known is in terms of perceptions 
and actions. The major culminating cognitive development is object permanence. 
2. Pre-operational period (2 – 7 years): A limited capacity for symbolic thought expands 
the known world beyond the immediate perceptual environment. Reasoning is from 
the particular to the particular, which Piaget describes as transductive. 
3. Concrete operational period (7 – 11 years): Imagery and cognition are more 
developed but still constrained to concrete reality. 
4. Formal operational period (adolescence): Abstract and logical thought is now possible 
through inductive, deductive, and inter-propositional reasoning. 
In a detailed discussion of this sequence, Loikith (1997) highlighted how it clearly portrays 
the close alignment between cognitive and perceptual development. This further illustrates 
the impossibility of separating perception from intelligence (refer to Section 2.3.3). The 
grounding of logico-mathematical cognition in sensory-motor actions, leading ultimately to 
abstract mental operations, provides a basis for a sound argument for the relationship between 
visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
Piaget’s cognitive developmental theory has been the most influential theory of 
development of the twentieth century. Its enduring prominence in psychology literature and 
its lingering legacy in education, in spite of current recognition that it is flawed, is testament 
to its final importance. Unresolved flaws, however, frustrate its overall claim to legitimacy, 
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precluding its efficacy here in reasoning for a relationship between perception and 
mathematical cognition. 
Within the general censure, the main criticism directed at the theory is that the 
average age ranges of each stage vastly underestimate developing cognitive ability (Ernest, 
1991; Meyer & Van Ede, 1998; Halford, 2005). For example, recent research suggests the 
likelihood that the basic number sense is a neonatal attribute (refer to Section 2.2.1), a 
concept that, according to cognitive developmental theory, only develops between the ages of 
2 to 7 years. Criticism also extends to Piaget’s notion of intelligence as logico-mathematical 
cognition. Sheets-Johnstone (1990) has maintained that this emphasis on deductive cognition 
is largely a result of Western cultural influences. She argues that Piaget’s limited focus 
neglects the remarkably human feature of creative intelligence. 
A flawed theory, however, does not necessarily imply that it is fundamentally 
incorrect. Many researchers postulate that the miscalculation of the age ranges of the 
developmental stages stems simply from a misunderstanding of the instructions given during 
experimental tasks. Piaget’s core theoretical reasoning may have been sound, with his 
theory’s main limitations arising from his traditional and largely Western notions of cognition 
as the rational inner processing of an independent external world. It is natural, however, for 
scientific and psychological theories to evolve. The incorporation of new evidence and 
insights serve to gradually modify, extend, and refine existing theories, as evidenced by 
Vygotsky’s social theory of mind and Von Glasersfeld’s (1995) radical constructivism, which 
demonstrate such an evolution, where both developed from a foundation of Piagetian 
epistemological assumptions and ideas, with the rejection of many of the problematic aspects. 
Piaget’s theory contains the seeds of embodied cognition (discussed in Chapter 4). To 
this, Von Glasersfeld and Vygotsky added the tentative ideas of cognition as embedded in the 
environment, and in a society. The natural course of further evolution seems likely to have 
involved the progression to a theory of fully situated cognition (explored in Chapter 4). 
However, the severe, and perhaps unduly harsh, criticism of Piaget’s hypotheses retarded this 
process. His revolutionary psychological insights into the holistic functioning of a person as a 
unified whole within the context of the environment, were unfortunately overlooked. Over 
the subsequent half-century, the majority of research interest was thereby diverted, focusing 
attention on the actual processing of information between stimulus and response. 
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3.3 Information-Processing Theory 
Reaction to the Behavioural school of thought, in concert with the advent of the 
digital computer, led to the so-called cognitive revolution in the 1960s. Computational theory 
then dominated cognitive psychology for the next fifty years, and remains prominent. 
Portrayal of the mind as an information-processor accentuates notions such as sensory 
coding, storage, and retrieval of information. Empirically based information-processing 
theories, using computer model simulation, have made important contributions to the 
knowledge of both cognition and perception. 
3.3.1 Visual Perceptual Information-Processing 
Within this paradigm, the author is of the opinion that the most fully developed and 
eminent perceptual theory is that of Marr (1982). His computational theory is constructivist, 
but only in terms of visual perception, with the omission of any reference to knowledge 
construction from sensory perception. 
Marr’s (1982) central concern was the transformation of retinal light patterns into an 
awareness of the visible world. He describes both image and awareness as representations of 
the world. An image, or sensory code, is the representation of the external spatial array of 
various light intensities and hues. Awareness is a symbolic representation of the positions, 
motions, and identities of objects, algorithmically constructed from the image representation. 
According to Marr, the serial modularity of visual processing explicates this construction. 
Each module begins with one representation and converts it into another. The primal sketch, 
representing the two-dimensional pattern of light intensities on the retina, is successively 
transformed through a two and a half-dimensional sketch, incorporating distances and 
orientation, to a final three-dimensional model representation. The three-dimensional 
representation is compared with representations held in memory for object identification and 
awareness. 
The theory is primarily data-driven, aimed at expressing bottom-up algorithmic 
processing. This unidirectional flow of information negates any role for existing knowledge 
in interpreting the visual input. Yet Marr (1982) did not strictly oppose top-down processing. 
He acknowledged the potential contribution of a knowledge base, and accepted the role of 
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general properties, aspects of the natural world that constrain possible variants of the retinal 
image. These properties are not logically true, but are frequently experienced to be true. An 
example is that object surfaces have regular textures. The visual system embodies the 
knowledge of these processing clues, thus at least allowing for the role of unconscious 
inference in visual perception. 
The majority of early computational theories emphasise data-driven bottom-up 
processing, by placing what I argue to be too much importance on the visual stimulus. 
Treisman’s well-known feature integration theory of object recognition (cited in Goldstein, 
2005) reflects an attempt to redress this imbalance. According to this theory, perception 
involves two stages. During the pre-attentive stage, an object is automatically analysed into 
its features. The focused attention stage then combines these features, and perception occurs 
as a result. Although this stage does not strictly entail top-down processing – since there is no 
need for knowledge – meaning and expectations can control attention in some situations. 
In general, information-processing theories of perception involve the construction and 
manipulation of abstract symbolic representations. The nominal function of perceptual 
awareness is the natural accompaniment to these processes. This consequently marginalises 
guided action and knowledge acquisition as functions of perception. 
3.3.2 Arithmetic Information-Processing 
Modularity, similar to that presented in Marr’s perceptual theory, is also presumed to 
exist in the information-processing cognitive architecture believed to support basic arithmetic 
encoding, calculation, and answer production. In their review of recent research, Campbell 
and Epp (2005) have detailed three important opposing models: 
 The abstract code model. Proposed by McClosky (cited in Campbell & Epp, 2005) in 
collaboration with several colleagues, this model is modular in terms of numerical function. It 
identifies separate comprehension, calculation, and response production modules, and 
purports that these sub-systems connect by means of their use of a common abstract code. 
The comprehension module encodes numerical input, irrespective of whether these are digits 
or number words, into the abstract code. This code acts as input to the calculation module, 
which includes memory for number rules and number facts in the same abstract code. The 
output of the calculation module is input to the production module, which converts the 
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abstract code back into digits or number words, as required. The encoding and calculation 
processes are independent, and thus, additive. 
 The triple code model. Dehaene (cited in Campbell & Epp, 2005) alternatively 
proposes a model that is modular with respect to representational code. The transformation of 
input into one of three numerical processing codes depends on the number-processing task. 
The analogue-magnitude code supports estimation, number comparisons, and possibly 
subitizing. The processing of digital operations occurs in visual, Arabic digit code. In contrast 
to the abstract code model, memory of number facts is language-based, utilising auditory-
verbal code. Despite the variously encoded inputs however, the encoding and calculation 
processes are still independent and additive, as in the abstract code model. 
 The encoding-complex hypothesis. Campbell and Clark (cited in Campbell & Epp, 
2005) reject adopting such simple additive cognitive architectures for the explanation of 
number processing. They assert that numerals automatically activate an extensive network of 
associations, including both task-relevant and irrelevant information. This is a result of the 
wide variety of numerical functions, such as number transcoding, comparison, estimation, 
arithmetic fact recall, and so forth. Similar to the triple code model, input activates one or 
more visual, visuo-spatial, verbal, or motoric representational codes. The complexity of 
simultaneous activation of numerous associations and representations dictates interactive – 
rather than additive – communication between the modular systems. Number processing skill 
develops as the interactive module connections become integrated and consolidated. 
From their study into numerical cognition in Chinese-English bilinguals, together 
with a literature review, Campbell and Epp (2004) concluded that the evidence favours an 
explanation that presumes some role for linguistic code in arithmetic fact memory. In 
addition, because presentation format affects calculation, the encoding and calculation 
processes are likely to be interactive, rather than independent and additive. Therefore, the 
encoding-complex hypothesis, possibly in combination with Dehaene’s triple code model, 
presents the most probable scenario. 
True to the information-processing paradigm, all three of these models focus on 
coding, storage, and retrieval of information from a memory store. In doing so, there is a 
concurrent disregard for arithmetic meaning or understanding. Dehaene’s singular focus on 
Arabic digits to the exclusion of other numerical symbol systems, compounds the problem. 
The inference is that arithmetical cognition simply involves a finite set of rote-learned facts 
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and rules. Yet this is not the case. A crucial aspect is the understanding of meaning denoted 
by the symbols, facts, and rules (refer to Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3). A degree of numerical 
meaning through the number sense in fact supports some basic arithmetic prior to instruction 
or formal learning, and therefore in the absence of any stored facts or rules. Mathematical 
cognition, including that of arithmetic, remains unexplained within this framework. 
3.3.3 A Critique of the Information-Processing Paradigm 
Information-processing theories seem to entail an inadequate account of visual 
perception, and ultimately fail to explain why mathematics is meaningful. It may be due to 
these failings that a primary relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic 
ability is obscured, within the information-processing paradigm. 
Among the most common criticisms of this paradigm is the limited focus of 
information-processing theory (Meyer & Van Ede, 1998). Primary interest is given by this 
theory to the way in which the cognitive system processes symbolic information derived from 
a pre-given environment, with no concern for influencing factors. The paradigm 
acknowledges, by virtue of brain structure, the basic, innate capacities required to process 
information. The role of the objective environment is simply the provision of an input to the 
cognitive system. What is lacking is an explanation of the affective role of environmental, 
genetic, personal, and socio-cultural factors in the development and application of cognition. 
In such a case, every human would think the same. The solid computer analogy thus creates 
the impression of passivity. This however contradicts the alleged constructivist philosophy of 
the information-processing paradigm. In the absence of active initiation and construction of 
cognitive procedures and strategies, the possibility of a genuine relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability is groundless, and would be unwarranted. Yet, despite 
being unwarranted, the possibility of a relationship is frequently raised. 
It is argued here that theories within this paradigm prove themselves to be too 
reductionist. Even in the early years of computational research, Minsky (1997) voiced a 
similar opinion. The cognitive system is analysed as an isolated system, within which specific 
cognitive tasks are isolated, progressive modularisation of which promotes further 
reductionism. Fodor’s (1983) entire thesis of cognition actually rests on the principle of 
modularity. Ironically, though, even he later admitted (Fodor, 2000) that “we do not know 
how the cognitive mind works; all we know anything much about is modules” (p. 78). A 
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motor vehicle provides an illuminating analogy. The basis of this transport system is that fuel 
input enables travel from location A to B. The processes between this input and output are 
concealed to an observer. Alone, detailed knowledge of the gear mechanism, or complete 
understanding of the functioning of the pistons, proves insufficient in explaining the resultant 
output. In reality, even a mechanic’s knowledge of the operation of the entire engine still fails 
to validate the output; since the vehicle will not travel anywhere without a cognitive 
consciousness navigating the environment, and dynamically co-ordinating the inner workings 
along the chosen path. Davies (1992) astutely recognised that scientific progress requires 
both the reductionist and holistic approaches to an explanation, in parallel, however, rather 
than in opposition. He suggests that, ideally, holism should subordinate reductionism, while it 
in turn complements the holism. In other words, any scientific model should begin with 
consideration of the system as a whole. Only then, can its parts be described and analysed, 
within the context of the operation of the system in its entirety. 
Information-processing theories may aid in grasping likely processes occurring 
between information input and output, beyond those which physiology might be able to 
explain. However, as a comprehensive theory of perception or cognition, they dismally fail. 
Results in the field of artificial intelligence reflect this position. Although computer models 
successfully simulate particular limited cognitive aspects, there appears to be no clear 
direction in enabling simulations to capture the full range of complex, flexible, intuitive, and 
creative human cognition. Minsky (1997) maintained that all attempts, since Aristotelian 
times, to represent common-sense reasoning by a logistic formal system, fail not by fault of 
the formal system itself, but by the characteristics of logic, which are not flexible enough. 
Bruce et al. (2003) have argued that Marr recognised this inadequacy when he proffered his 
computational theory only as the first level in perception, and explained the necessity for 
physiological and psychophysical input for the actual implementation of the proposed 
algorithms; thereby unifying psychological and physiological explanations of visual 
perception. 
Jackendoff (1987) bluntly commented that “it is completely unclear to me how 
computations, no matter how complex or abstract, can add up to an experience” (p. 18). 
However, his intention was not to renounce computational theory. Rather, building from the 
foundation of Marr’s (1982) theory, he attempted to establish a link between the three-
dimensional model and conceptual categorisation. His aim was to extend the scope from 
simple objects to the full spatial landscape of the perceived world that is essential for 
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navigation. This three-dimensional representation abounds in non-visual elements, such as 
the relations among objects, the co-ordinate axis system, and motion trajectories. The 
problem then is how a theory of perception can tolerate abstract visual information that 
cannot be seen. Part of Jackendoff’s solution is the recognition of the perceptual or 
experiential phenomenological mind, in addition to the computational reasoning mind. 
However, Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, and Varela (1999) argued that this appends a mind-mind 
problem to the existing mind-brain problem. In other words, it exacerbates the Cartesian 
mind-body problem, and ultimately further dissociates visual perception and mathematical 
cognition. 
Criticism may even extend deeper than mere inadequacy. Due, possibly, to the 
tenacious reliance on the computer analogy, information-processing theories are embedded 
with inferences fundamentally incompatible with contemporary cognitive psychology. 
Computers are formal systems, which introduces the formalist assumption that symbol 
manipulation suffices to explain all cognitive processes. However, to presume the simple 
manipulation of symbolic neural representations is to neglect the content of the perceptual 
and cognitive information processed by the brain. The crucial omission is the association of 
meaning to the symbolic representations. For instance, whereas computers manipulate 
meaningless numerical tokens, research previously discussed (reference can be made to 
Section 2.2.4) shows that humans cognitively manipulate numerals, digits concatenated with 
their meaning. The information-processing paradigm thus endorses only a superficial relation 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability, involving digit recognition and 
decoding, leading to a rule-based mathematics. Furthermore, Haugeland (1997) has provided 
the reminder that the notion of formal systems emerged from mathematics (refer to Section 
2.1.2), inspired by arithmetic and algebra. It seems incongruous then to describe 
mathematical cognition in terms of mathematically-based formal systems and algorithms. 
The information-processing paradigm thus displays a number of inadequacies. In 
brief, however, the supposed role of the perceptual process is the transformation of data from 
the senses into inner representations. Cognition involves the algorithmic processing of these 
inner representations. Yet, this conception fails to explain the semantic content of either 
perception or cognition. The purported role of the environment as simply a form of input to 
the senses, ultimately disregards meaningful engagement with the world. 
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3.4 Visual Perceptual Skill and Mathematic Ability 
Incongruously, despite the lack of consensus regarding the intricacies of the pertinent 
constructs, and all cognitive processes in general, it is commonly maintained that visual 
perceptual skill forms the foundation for all learning, and for mathematics and reading in 
particular (Piaget, 1970; Halliwell & Solan, 1972; Rosner, 1982; Leonard, 1986; Wurzburg, 
1994, English, 1997a). 
Rosner (1982) has upheld that vision actually accounts for 80% of all learning. This 
may, however, be construed as a reflection of bias within contemporary text-oriented 
societies. In contrast, Sheets-Johnstone (1990) has advocated the primacy of tactile-
kinaesthetic perception, based on experimental data showing the progression from tactility to 
vision in the course of human sensory development. This is in accord with Berkeley’s (2004) 
assertion that tactile knowledge informs vision. Price (cited in Sheets-Johnstone, 1990) 
however, without denying the evolutionary and developmental value of tactility, has 
accredited the importance of visual learning to the rise of modern science. He believes that 
without vision there could be no science. Swartwout (1974) and Enns (2004) speculated that 
the relative importance of the visual sense can be explained, possibly, by the fact that it 
processes the most remote stimuli of all the senses, expanding the range of our perceptual 
domain. Furthermore, mathematics, like reading, involves decoding visual symbolic 
information. 
Speculative views such as these, however, are inconsequential in the absence of a 
viable perceptual-cognitive interpretative framework. Debate as to the definitive relationship 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability therefore continues, despite empirical 
evidence in support of its existence. 
3.4.1 Empirical Evidence of a Relationship 
Kavale (1982) meanwhile maintained that controversy continues due firstly to the 
difficulties in defining visual perception and its component abilities, as well as to a scarcity of 
longitudinal studies and methodological inconsistencies in current research. Many researchers 
(Larsen & Hammill, 1975; Kavale, 1982; Kulp et al., 2004) have concurred that these 
inconsistencies include controlling for the effects of age, cognitive ability, verbal intelligence, 
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and IQ. The confounding effect of IQ has, in particular, been vociferously argued. This is 
perhaps due to debate concerning the notion of IQ itself, and the practical value of IQ tests. 
The common contention is that children who are more intelligent do better on tests in general, 
resulting in a perceived significant relationship between visual perceptual skill and 
mathematics achievement. However, in a number of studies which controlled for IQ, the 
relationship was maintained (Kavale,1982; Kulp, 1999; Kulp et al., 2004). Moreover, Section 
2.3.3 discloses a theoretical basis for denying the confounding effect of IQ in the relationship 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
A plethora of research attests to some degree of relationship. A number of studies that 
support a positive correlation have focused on a particular aspect of visual perceptual skill. 
Guay and McDaniel (1977) found that high mathematics achievers scored significantly 
higher than low mathematics achievers on four tests of visual spatial abilities. Kulp (1999) 
concluded that visual-motor integration skill significantly relates to academic performance in 
7 to 9 year olds. In a later study, Sortor and Kulp (2003) confirmed that the Beery 
Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI) standard score significantly 
correlated with the Stanford total math score, as did the visual perception and motor co-
ordination standard scores. They further concluded that children with poor mathematics or 
reading achievement ought to have their visual perceptual ability tested. 
Some researchers assert the singular importance of visual memory to academic 
achievement. Kulp, Edwards, and Mitchell (2002) administered the visual memory subtest of 
the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills (TVPS) and the Stanford Achievement Test, to children 
across Grades 2 to 4. The results showed poor visual memory ability, significantly related to 
below-average reading decoding, mathematics, and overall academic under-achievement. 
Another study, by Kulp et al. (2004), with children across Grades 2 to 6, corroborated these 
results. In this study, the authors used a new test of visual memory, in addition to the VMI 
Supplemental Developmental Test of Visual Perception, to assess visual perceptual skill. 
Initial analysis of the results revealed that poor visual perceptual skill is significantly related 
to poor mathematic ability. However, logistic regressions, that included both visual 
discrimination and visual memory, yielded a significant relation for only the new test of 
visual memory. 
Absolute denial of a correlation between visual perceptual skill and academic 
achievement is rare. According to Kulp et al. (2004), where authors are sceptical of a direct 
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relation to mathematics achievement, they at least accept a relation to reading ability, which 
would indirectly affect mathematics performance. An exception is a research review 
conducted by the authors Larsen and Hammill (1975). They reviewed 60 studies that 
explored the relationship of visual discrimination, spatial relations, memory, and auditory-
visual integration to school learning in primary grades. Although the majority of these had 
found significant correlations, Larsen and Hammill claimed that the combined results 
suggested that “measured visual-perceptual skills are not sufficiently related to academic 
achievement to be particularly useful” (p. 287). They admitted, however, that this was not in 
agreement with other investigations that had tested the significance of difference on various 
measures of visual perceptual ability between that of achieving and underachieving children. 
The evidence thus suggests the possibility of a relationship between visual perceptual 
skill and mathematic ability, although its precise nature remains contentious. Besides 
conflicting results among empirical studies, the prevailing interpretative framework may 
further confound clarification of this relationship. 
3.4.2 Interpretation of the Relationship 
Typically, the suspected importance of visual perceptual skill for mathematics is 
limited to little more than symbolic decoding of written mathematical problems. This is 
possibly a consequence of a prevailing formalist mathematical philosophy and information-
processing psychology theory. Evidence of this interpretation is to be found within the 
popular media (Lambert, 2007) as well as within the scientific community, as detailed by 
Kavale (1982): 
 Visual discrimination enables classification of geometric shapes, differentiation 
between acute and obtuse angles, and discrimination between mathematical symbols 
and numerals (e.g. 6 & 9; < & >; + & x; - & /). 
 Figure-ground prevents skipping lines ensuring correct copying and reading of 
number work. It also contributes to understanding detailed diagrams, such as 
geometry problems. 
 Visual closure aids in understanding fractions, and reading mathematics problems in 
full or decomposing them into manageable components. 
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 Spatial relations contribute to correct sequencing of numerals (e.g. 204 & 240), and 
the aligning of vertical sums. It also aids in graph-related activities, and in copying 
numerals. 
 Visual memory enables the reproduction of numerals, as well as efficient error-free 
copying. It is also essential for following a sequence of instructions, or activities, in 
solving a mathematics problem. 
Although these functions denote important practical mathematical skills, they are 
unrelated to the essence of mathematics or to its understanding, more accurately reflecting 
linguistic ability. Linguistic dependence, albeit a recognised adjunct to mathematic ability 
(refer to Section 2.3.1), is insufficient in accounting for mathematical cognition. In 2008, the 
annual South African national education assessments tellingly exposed an average literacy 
level of only 28%, despite average numeracy levels of 43% amongst Grade 3 learners in 
Gauteng Province (Grobbelaar, 2011). Basic mathematic ability therefore appears to entail a 
fundamental natural core, which is more resilient to either the absence or presence of 
education. 
The root of the misinterpretation as to the relevance of visual perceptual skill may lie 
in the common supposition that mathematics is a purely ‘mental’ pursuit. The senses are 
simply input devices. Cognitive processing of the input according to formalist rules then 
produces the output. This however disregards actual meaningful engagement with the 
physical and social world. Cognition in isolation from within a pre-given world demands an 
inner representation of that world as cognitive input. 
 
3.5 Representation 
It is possible to argue that the perennial problem of perceptual representation, 
exacerbated by the inherent inadequacies of the information-processing paradigm, has 
eclipsed the true nature of the relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic 
ability. Representation poses a primary obstacle to the synthesis of perceptual and cognitive 
theories, in general. 
Representation refers to any symbolic descriptions of the world. Common to many 
perceptual theories is the reasonable – though problematic – notion that an internal 
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representation of the world is required for its perception. Since the seventeenth century, when 
Descartes established the principles of geometric optics and ‘discovered’ the retinal image, 
the dilemma arose as to how the brain interprets this representation, without resorting to an 
infinite regress of homunculi. Cognitive psychologists adopted a constructivist philosophy, 
partly in the attempt to solve this mind-body conundrum. 
Yet computational cognitive theories are foundationally representational; since by 
definition, algorithms transform representations. Contemporary information-processing 
theories, especially in the areas of perception, conception, memory, and problem solving, 
portray intelligent behaviour as no more than symbol-manipulation. Haugeland (1997) has 
raised the valid concern that computational formalism purges symbols, or neural 
representations, of all meaning. A computer may manipulate such non-semantic symbols, 
whereas cognition undeniably implies a semantic understanding. 
A number of potential solutions have since arisen to meet the challenges posed by 
symbolic representations of an objective external world. Three of these are of particular 
interest to the present discussion: connectionism, ecological theory, and embodied cognition. 
3.5.1 Connectionism 
Reluctance in renouncing the computer analogy has evolved traditional symbolic 
information-processing into theories involving connectionism and neural networks. 
Traditional information-processing theories, such as that of Marr (1982), describe perception 
as involving the construction and algorithmic manipulation of abstract symbolic 
representations. To eliminate the problematic interpretation of the abstract symbols, 
connectionist models and neural networks instead represent perceptual content by patterns of 
activity in units based on neuronal properties. 
Although connectionist theories still functionally hint at formalism, with that 
philosophy’s inherent cognitive failings, they do nonetheless offer several advantages over 
symbol-processing models (Bruce et al., 2003). Connectionism appears more biologically 
plausible, emulating neuronal structure and function. Rule-based weighting adjustments in 
connectivity, and the resultant varying activation levels, suitably simulate perceptual 
learning. Parallel distributed processing, important for pattern and object classification, 
specifically eradicates a one-to-one correspondence between a neural unit and a percept or 
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concept. Different patterns of activity in the same unit contribute to different concepts, and a 
particular concept is characterised by the parallel activity of many distributed units. 
However, connectionism appears ultimately unsuccessful in its failure to address the 
challenges of symbolic representation. The patterns of activation, although supposedly non-
symbolic, nevertheless represent objects or properties of the world. Fodor and Pylyshyn 
(1988) have argued, as has Rowlands (2010), that this type of retinal-neural mapping still 
necessitates construction and manipulation of representations, albeit at a sub-symbolic level. 
3.5.2 Ecological Theory 
The complete elimination of representations proffers a sensible option, which explains 
the renewed interest in Gibson’s sixty-year-old ecological theory of direct perception. Like 
Piaget (1963, 1969), Gibson (1950) rejected object awareness as the primary function of 
visual perception. This automatically circumvents the need for the construction of 
representations of the external world, despite a contradictory realist orientation to their 
theories. Whereas Piaget’s constructivist egocentric approach focused on the intimate link 
between perception and cognition, Gibson founded his ecological theory of direct perception 
on the inseparability of perception and action. This contrasts with the concept of a central 
executive utilizing perceptual representation, primarily for awareness, in decision-making and 
controlling action. 
Direct perception entails the total absence of representations and mediating cognitive 
processes. The physical properties of the environment determine the structure of light through 
reflection, refraction, and transmission. All necessary perceptual information is thus 
contained within this light structure, which has been termed the optic array. The image 
formed on the retina is not a symbolic representation of the external world, but is purely a 
reproduction of the spatial-temporal pattern of light from a segment of the optic array. 
Invariants are constant properties of the optic array, determined by specific environmental 
properties, by which the optic array unambiguously specifies the world. Unambiguous 
specification excludes the need for cognitive interpretation of visual input. Perception is 
direct, by means of resonation with, or by becoming attuned to, the invariants. 
Gibson (1950) further maintained that the real function of perception is not the 
creation of a conscious percept, but the detection of affordances. Affordances, the values and 
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meanings of objects in the environment, are implicit in the manner of interaction with them. 
Norman (1998), in The Design of Everyday Things, shows how industrial designers capitalise 
on this natural phenomenon. By exploiting natural bodily and environmental constraints, 
good designs are rich in affordances that make explicit the manner of their human operation. 
The control of action forms an important extension to Gibson’s theory. Visual perception is 
the means by which information is detected that is necessary to guide action, and active 
movement produces transformations in the optic array, providing essential information for 
visual perception. Perception and action each constrain the other; being so intimately bound 
as to be in fact inseparable. 
Remarkably, despite Gibson’s predominantly environmental theoretical orientation, 
the concomitant emphasis on active movement discloses a revealing insight. According to 
Gibson, a hierarchy of organs constitutes a perceptual system. The visual perceptual system 
includes photoreceptors that are stimulated, activating the eyes, which are part of a dual 
organ, set in a head that can swivel, and attached to a moveable body. Unfortunately, there is 
little elaboration on this holistic embodied view. In addition, so-called ‘resonating with 
invariants’ (Gibson, 1950) is an expression that imparts little about the neural organisation for 
detection of the invariants. The concern solely with the ecological level of perception 
neglects the physiological level. 
Fodor & Pylyshyn (1981) have criticised Gibson’s theory for the use of the terms 
‘invariants’, ‘affordances’, and ‘directly detected’, which are in fact pivotal to the theory. 
Although they do acknowledge the possibility of direct perception of some simple properties 
of the world, they argue that the unconstrained definitions of these terms render them as 
vague, and therefore meaningless. In a similar vein, Cutting (cited in Bruce et al., 2003) has 
argued that the structurally rich optic array gives rise to gross over-specification of the 
environment. Consequently, an actively directed selective perception is called for. 
Since the late 1990s, neurophysiologic evidence of a partially independent pathway 
linking the early stages of visual processing and control of action, provides some support for 
Gibson’s views. Milner and Goodale (1998) theorised two interacting visual processing 
pathways, originating in the occipital primary visual cortex of the brain. The ventral pathway, 
which extends to the inferior temporal cortex, processes visual awareness information for 
object perception. The dorsal pathway, connected to the posterior parietal cortex, mediates 
visuo-motor control and enables spatial perception. 
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The ecological approach successfully offers an alternative function of perception. 
However, perception for action and perceptual awareness cannot be taken as mutually 
exclusive in humans, as is the case in insects (refer to Section 3.1). Disregarding perceptual 
awareness is problematic for explaining the acquisition of perceptual knowledge used to 
guide action later. In fact, it renders ecological theory as insufficient to cognition in general, 
including mathematical cognition. 
3.5.3 Embodied Cognition 
After only ten years of artificial intelligence research, it became apparent, as stated by 
Dreyfus (1997), that “intelligence and basic sensory-motor human life is inseparable” 
(p. 181). The natural consequence is embodied intelligence. The following chapter presents 
an in-depth discussion on the notion of embodiment. The implication, however, is a direct 
association between cognition and perception of the world. This, ironically, is comparable to 
the basic premise on which Piaget constructed his hypotheses. Fifty years worth of research 
has effectively led full circle back to a previously held psychological theory. Embodied 
cognition expressly negates the need for symbolic representation of an objective world inside 
an inner space called ‘mind’ as a requirement for explaining cognition. 
 
3.6 Conclusion: The Need for a Paradigm Shift 
It is clear that the frame of reference within traditional psychology theory is based on 
a metaphysics that inadequately accounts for both visual perception and mathematical 
cognition. A viable relationship between them is therefore unjustifiable, when working 
exclusively within these existing frameworks. 
With image transformation beginning in retinal neural processes, it is difficult to 
differentiate sensation from perception. Similarly, James Gibson (cited in Loikith, 1997) 
noted that it is not possible to determine where perceiving stops and remembering begins. 
This emphasises the active neural construction of vision. Yet the common human experience 
of visual perception is a seemingly passive inflow of visual sensations. Phenomenologically, 
or experientially, this feels very different to conscious thought. It is possibly due to this 
phenomenal discrepancy that theories that successfully integrate perception and cognition 
have until now been scarce. A consequence of this dearth is the partial theoretical 
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disconnection of perception from cognition, resulting in the notion of perception as merely a 
store of environmental information relayed to higher-order cognitive centres. This notion is 
particularly evident within computational theory, which dominated cognitive psychology for 
approximately fifty years. However, with mounting disillusionment in the information-
processing computer analogy, a further paradigm shift is currently taking place. 
Previous assumptions entail the existence of a world with predetermined properties. 
Perception thus involved recovering these visual properties from an image, through symbolic 
or sub-symbolic representations. The only alternative seemed to be an apparent projected 
reality, as reflected by the internal structure and operation of the visual system, such as that 
proposed by the idealists. Cognitive science has recently introduced a viable compromise 
between these two extremes. Perception is accordingly considered a product of particular 
sensory-motor capabilities embedded in their encompassing biological, psychological and 
environmental context, which enables perceptually-guided action in a world enacted by these 
same processes. 
Further progress seems to require a revolutionary paradigm shift towards an 
alternative metaphysics of the mind. One such current trend in cognitive science is the notion 
of situated cognition, in which the boundaries between mind, body, and environment are 
becoming increasingly blurred. A consequence of the blurring of these boundaries is an 
explanation that provides a direct grounding of cognition in sensory-motor experience. The 
new paradigm clarifies the nature of visual perception and mathematical cognition, thereby 
simultaneously providing a more coherent explanation for a relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability than that proffered by traditional views. 
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CHAPTER 4: Situated Cognition 
 
Situated cognition represents a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science. 
However, its core ideas originated centuries ago. In a more contemporary age, the basic 
principle is found in the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl (cited in Merleau-Ponty, 
1962), propounded in 1913. Among others, Dewey (cited in Gallagher, 2009), Heidegger 
(cited in Gallagher, 2009), Wittgenstein (cited in Gallagher, 2009), and Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) further developed Husserl’s philosophy. Building on this foundation, the incorporation 
of current knowledge from a diverse range of disciplines has given rise to this new cognitive 
science of the mind. Philosophy, education, sociology, linguistics, physics, robotics, biology, 
anthropology, neurology, and cognitive psychology have all contributed to the theory of 
situated cognition. 
Following in the path of prevailing philosophical and scientific views, traditional 
cognitive psychology is based on the assumption that information about the world, obtained 
via the senses, is used to construct knowledge by means of the application of reason. This 
necessitates an internal symbolic representation of the external world. Cognition is taken as 
the manipulation of these symbolic representations according to logical formal rules. 
Concomitantly, during this era, mathematics was commonly believed to similarly involve 
formal symbol manipulation according to the laws of logic (refer to Section 2.1.2). However, 
in neither case is there any indication of the derivation of meaning. Symbolic representation 
is not inherently meaningful. Symbols are meaningful only through interpretation, which 
poses a theoretical problem that proves difficult to resolve (refer to Section 3.5).  
In the twentieth century, Godël’s (cited in Davies, 1992) incompleteness theorem 
eroded belief in the logical foundations of mathematics, which simultaneously cast doubt on 
the equivalent cognitive model. However, proposed cognitive models based on processes 
other than logic, still represented cognition within an objective environment. Circumventing 
the dilemma of representation necessitated the eradication of the notion of an internal-
external duality of the world. Therefore, the concurrent resurgence of interest in 
phenomenology may have been an inevitable consequence. An alternative view developed as 
a result, whereby meaning arises through natural bodily involvement with the world. Such 
embodied cognition, however, does not exist in isolation. Humans, in particular, live as a 
society of language-users. Linguistic expression of common experience in a shared social 
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context extends embodied meaning into the generated socio-historical frame of reference. 
This is the basis of situated cognition, whereby situated sensory-motor interaction with the 
enacted physical and social world grounds the regress of meaning. 
If the situated paradigm proves to be a viable framework for cognition, then it must 
extend to mathematical cognition, which is simply a specific instance in the application of 
cognition. Yet, it is difficult to reconcile the common view of mathematics as absolute, 
infallible and transcendental, with the view of mathematical cognition as relative embodied 
and social experience. Mathematics is not an empirical science, therefore it appears distanced 
from the realm of experience. The situated paradigm, however, clarifies the nature of 
mathematics as metaphorical. Situated sensory-motor activity with the enacted world thus 
grounds mathematical meaning, which develops through its extension into the social context 
by means of language. The suggestion that perceptual-motor activity grounds the regress of 
mathematical meaning allows for the reasonable expectation of a relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
 
4.1 Psychological Contributions 
Situated cognitive theory provides a more coherent paradigm than that of traditional 
theories for understanding visual perception, mathematical cognition, and the nature of 
mathematics. Yet, many classical cognitive psychology theories contain the seeds of situated 
cognition. 
 The principal tenet of Gestalt psychology presages situated cognition, where it holds 
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Gestaltists adequately applied this 
important principle to particular phenomena, but Merleau-Ponty (1962) maintained that their 
contradictory confidence in external objectivity unfortunately limited the theory’s full utility. 
 Piaget’s (1969) constructivist developmental theory pioneered the idea that cognition 
emerges through sensory-motor activity, effectively extending the mind to include the body 
acting in the world. Tversky (2009), a well-known proponent of situated cognition, has stated 
that “thinking can be regarded as action, internalized” (p. 211). Piaget (1970) expressed a 
similar sentiment fifty years ago, where he wrote that “intelligence […] consists in executing 
and coordinating actions, though in an interiorized and reflexive form” (p. 29). A crucial 
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failing, however, is Piaget’s neglect of the environmental contribution and interaction. This 
omission may have been a consequence of the prevailing philosophy involving an 
independent objective world. 
 Von Glasersfeld’s (1995) radical constructivism attempted to redress this failing by 
introducing mutual person-environment causal relations. However, the nature of these causal 
relations still constitutes cognition within a pre-given objective world, rather than cognition 
with the environment, through mutual interaction. 
 Gibson’s (1950) ecological theory of perception similarly failed to fully appreciate the 
cognitive-environmental interaction central to situated cognition. Ecological perception is 
direct perception of an independent environment, which effectively precludes sensory-motor 
enaction of the environment. Nevertheless, Gibson’s theory contains the seeds of situated 
cognition in his notion of environmental affordances; his holistic bodily view of the 
perceptual system; and his then novel approach to perceptual function, namely perception for 
action, rather than for awareness. 
 Information-processing theory and connectionism offer little to a theory of situated 
cognition. However, the situated nature of cognition became apparent through the failure in 
building a successful artificial intelligence model based on these theories. Brooks (1997), a 
roboticist, admitted to the impossibility of identifying the locus of intelligence in any system, 
since it is the dynamic interactions of many components, with each other and with the world, 
which produces intelligence. Consistent with his view, and inspired by embodied cognition, 
Brooks has advocated a bottom-up artificial intelligence design, using subsumption 
architecture. The resultant reactive behaviour-based robotics stands in contrast to the notion 
of a system with a central executive processor. Connectionist advancements towards dynamic 
multi-agent complex systems theory networks with feedback loops have led to a degree of 
non-linear emergence of certain behaviours. This represents a positive direction for situated 
cognition. Clark (2011) pursued a bold attempt to incorporate these advancements into his 
vision of the extended mind. To accomplish this, he extends the network feedback loops from 
the purely neural to include, for example, objects in the world. He terms this scaffolding, 
whereby aspects of the environment literally become a part of cognitive processing. 
Further contribution from the discipline of psychology that is more meaningful to the 
situated perspective rests upon the increasing recognition of critical dynamic cognitive, 
biological, environmental, and social interactions. Clarification of the claims that cognition is 
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embodied, socially embedded, and environmentally extended will serve to consolidate 
situated cognitive theory for the purposes of this study. 
 
4.2 Terminology 
Despite its historical grounding, as a comprehensive science of cognition situated 
theory is still in its infancy. Consequently, it currently lacks a rigid set of construct 
definitions. The terminology utilised appears variable and interchangeable, reflecting an 
overlap of ideas from various disciplines. Key concepts include embodiment, emergence, 
embedment, extension, and enaction. In accordance with Robbins and Aydede’s (2009) 
stance, situated cognition is the overarching concept encompassing all these elements. 
Embodiment is a core concept of the grounding phenomenological philosophy, 
particularly as articulated by Merleau-Ponty (1962). The premise is that the phenomenal 
experience of the body is very different from that of the scientific description. In other words, 
the physiological processes underlying bodily experience are not directly experienced. We do 
not consciously ‘feel’ the light rays entering the eye, being absorbed by the retinal cells, or 
the neurons firing; what is experienced however, is the presence of light. Yet sensory-motor 
experiences are more than purely mental phenomena, since without a physiological body 
there can be no sensation or motor activity. These embodied sensory-motor experiences are 
the primary data for knowledge. Embodied cognition, therefore, depends on experience 
specific to having a body with certain sensory-motor capacities. 
The neuronal network, however, does not function only in the direction from 
perception to action. Mutually linked sensation and motor activity yields cognition as an 
emergent phenomenon. This negates the need for a central executive responsible for 
cognition. A critical aspect of this emergence is that the mental supervenes on the physical, 
allowing an understanding of the relation, without any reductionism. In other words, the 
constituent physiological sensory-motor contributions cannot predict cognition. This 
corresponds with the central Gestaltist tenet where the whole is taken as greater than the sum 
of its parts. Perception, action, and cognition are co-constituted. 
Moreover, Varela et al. (1991) have explained that sensory-motor capacities are not 
only embodied (biologically embedded), but also embedded in a more encompassing 
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psychological, social, cultural, ecological, evolutionary, and physical context. The embodied 
mind is environmentally embedded. Continual perception of, and participation in the world, 
confers meaning. 
Embodiment and embedment imply an extension of cognition from the purely neural 
into the body and the world. Often, the interpretation is simplistically literal, as can be seen 
in: the world as an external memory. An example commonly given is the use of physical 
reminders to assist memory. However, extended cognition implies more than just the world 
as a cognitive tool. In strong opposition to radical constructivism’s cognition within the 
world, extended cognition occurs with the world. The cognitive boundary encompasses the 
environment. 
Varela et al. (1991) have expounded that cognition with the world means that it is not 
simply constrained by the world, but also contributes to the enaction of the world. Through 
dynamic and mutual interaction, cognition shapes, and is shaped by, the environment. 
Situated cognition thus entails an emergent extended mind that is embodied, and 
embedded in a cognitively enacted environment. An important facet of situated cognition is 
the situational context. Although often used interchangeably with the terms environment and 
world, situational context is not intended to be limited to the physical, but is understood to 
include every aspect of the cognitive environment. It necessarily embraces the physical, 
psychological, cultural, and social world; including historical influences, for which radical 
embodied theories are often criticised for overlooking. 
 
4.3 Various Interpretations 
The notion of embodiment significantly influenced the conceptualisation of situated 
cognitive theory. A notable distinction between various theories of embodied cognition is the 
degree to which the contribution of the social dimension is acknowledged. Generally, a 
greater degree of acknowledgement establishes cognition more firmly the result of dynamic 
interaction with the situational context, as opposed to processes occurring exclusively within 
an individual. Specifically, the contribution of language, as a social practice, extends meaning 
into the socio-historical context. Recognition of this has led to theories that extend cognition 
further and deeper into the environment. As a result, the cognitive value of social inventions 
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such as the written word, or pen, paper and computers, in addition to natural environmental 
interaction, became apparent. The concept of cognition as embodied action is understood to 
be tightly bound to histories that are lived, which are themselves bound to natural evolution. 
The enacted world reflects these embodied histories. This is cognition with the world, in 
which it is situated. 
4.3.1 Autopoiesis 
An early embodiment theory dating back to the 1970s can be found in the work of 
Maturana and Varela (1980). It is rooted in Maturana’s (1980) assertion that “living systems 
are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition” (p. 13). The authors 
later coined the term autopoiesis to characterise the organisation of living systems, which 
loosely translates from its original Greek into self-creation. Maturana, a biologist, understood 
the cell as a closed circular system that maintains homeostatis by self-reorganisation in the 
presence of perturbations, or disturbances, external to the system. Maturana and Varela then 
expanded on this notion of molecular autopoiesis, extending it into a hierarchy of dynamic 
systems, where organisms exist as collections of cells, and societies exist as collections of 
organisms. 
In simple terms, a system is autopoietic if its components interact in such a way as to 
produce and maintain themselves and the relationships between them. Such systems are thus 
structure-determined; not pre-determined, since external perturbations can affect the structure 
of the system itself. Therefore, at any given moment, the system is determined by its 
structural organisation in that moment. Structural plasticity of the system, along with that of 
the environment, enables system-environment structural coupling. Structural coupling is a 
crucial feature of autopoiesis that, together with system closure, promotes system autonomy. 
The autopoietic process thus gives rise to an autonomous bounded system that has been 
shaped by its interactions with its environment over time. Equally, interactions with the 
system shape the environment. Increasingly complex autopoietic systems are constituted 
through similar structural coupling between simpler autopoietic systems. Maturana and 
Varela (1980) affirmed that autopoiesis is both necessary and sufficient in order to 
characterise a living system. They state that all associated phenomena, such as conceptual 
cognition, language, and self-consciousness, are subordinate to this process.  
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An implication of autopoiesis is that language is intrinsically non-informative. Instead 
of the transmission of information, language is comprehended as behavioural coordination 
through mutual structural coupling. Congruent structural coupling is a series of circular, 
transactional, and recurrent events between two autopoietic systems. This equates to the 
establishment of a dialogue. Maturana and Varela (1980) explained that this consensual 
domain of communicative interactions is a linguistic domain, which is constitutive of society, 
and the consequent basis for language. It functions to orient the behaviour of the systems with 
each other, through their structures, as determined during their coupling. This perspective 
partially affirms the situated view of language as a social practice, whereby language 
facilitates the dynamic coordination of individual sensory-motor activity within society, in 
accordance with societal concerns (expounded in Section 4.3.3). However, whether the 
linguistic domain is constitutive of society, or alternatively is its derivative, remains 
debatable. 
A more significant implication of autopoiesis is the total absence of cognitive 
representations and objects of knowledge. In simple organisms, autopoietic interactions are 
chemical and physical. The existence of a nervous system expands the domain of interactions 
to include neural states. However, as an autopoietic system, the neural network does not have 
inputs or outputs. It is a closed system, so is not open to representations of the environment. 
The nervous system is structurally coupled to the organism, which is structurally coupled to 
its environment. This hierarchy of systems enables an organism to interact with its own 
neural states. When such an organism enters a consensual linguistic domain with another 
organism, it can therefore also interact with its own linguistic states. This is an occurrence of 
the system functioning as an observer, by generating a self-linguistic domain, which supports 
self-conscious, or reflective, behaviour. The cognitive domain is the consequence of such a 
hierarchy of structurally-coupled interactions. Knowledge is relative to this cognitive domain, 
and is attained through successful autopoiesis. Absolute knowledge is therefore not possible. 
Critics focus mostly on the self-referential nature of autopoietic systems. In addition, 
there is no notion of intentionality. An autopoietic existence is purposeless, determined 
exclusively by the changing systemic structure in the face of perturbations, until loss of 
organisation results in death of the system. However, Beer (1980) has noted that in the 
hierarchy of systems, an autopoietic system may be considered as if it were allopoietic within 
the context of a more encompassing autopoietic system. In contrast to an autopoietic system, 
an allopoietic system produces and maintains something other than the system itself. 
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Nevertheless, divergence in Maturana’s and Varela’s subsequent work poses the question as 
to whether the original theory of autopoiesis may require revision. Maturana remained 
doubtful as to whether a society constitutes a true biological living system, while Varela’s 
(Varela et al., 1991) later work reflected autopoiesis as a sufficient, but not necessary, 
condition for autonomy. Thompson (2007) is in support of this view and further developed 
these ideas. 
4.3.2 Embodiment 
Not all embodied theories are as radical as that of Maturana and Varela (1980). The 
essence of embodiment is that basic sensory and motor skills are innate. They exist by virtue 
of an animal having evolved to interact successfully with the world in which it is situated. 
Mammalian evolution further gave rise to a nervous system that effectively interconnects 
sensation and motor activity in such a way that dynamic interaction with the structured world 
extends these basic skills to a higher level of functioning. This simply reflects an extension of 
basic innate pattern perception to pattern perception of a higher order, both of which utilise 
the same neural pathways. This is cognitive emergence, which promotes comprehension of 
the enacted world, the meaning of which rests in direct embodied experience. Roy et al. 
(1999) have explained that the notion of an experienced body, as sustained by embodied 
theory, is a fusion of subjectivity and objective givens, in a body that has the capacity for 
both sensitivity and sensibility. Consequently, the body is not only an object in the world, but 
also the agency whereby the enacted world comes into being. This is contrary to Cartesian 
duality. 
The embodied cognitive facility that emerges through sensory-motor experience is 
abstraction. All high level cognition rests upon this emergent cognitive foundation. The 
degree of abstraction attained determines the level of cognition achievable in a species. In 
keeping with the basic premise of the four levels of abstraction as identified by Devlin (refer 
to Section 2.2.6), a possible revision of his descriptions may be beneficial here. 
1. The lowest level of abstraction is shared by most animal species. Arising from basic 
sensory-motor pattern perception, the differentiation, and simple categorisation of 
patterns, or objects, in the immediate perceptual environment that directly affect 
survival, reflects minimal abstraction. 
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2. As categorisation is furthered and refined, patterns develop within and among the 
categories. Conceptualisation is the perception, or recognition, of these category 
patterns. Such concrete conceptualisation extends cognition beyond the immediate 
perceptual environment. 
3. Conceptualisation continues and pattern perception involving concepts results in a 
level of abstraction that supports symbolic representation of patterns or objects. This 
level of abstraction is unique to humans. 
Each of these three levels involves some form of analogy and metaphor, since it is perceived 
that something is like something else. These perceptual correspondences arise naturally 
through a particular manner of sensory-motor action with the world, and may thus be 
considered as embodied. They thus give rise to embodied concepts. Sheets-Johnstone (1990) 
referred to such non-linguistic concepts as corporeal concepts, and asserted that they are in no 
way inferior to linguistic concepts. Embodied conceptual metaphor can thus be considered a 
perceptual cognitive mechanism. 
The symbolic representation evident in the third level of abstraction is nominal. For 
example, a simple representational object, notch, or grunt. The capacity for symbolic 
representation is, however, a pivotal cognitive acquisition for the development of more 
complex cognition, since it supports the development of language, which makes the fourth 
level of abstraction possible. 
4. Language promotes concept definition and sharing within a society, linguistic 
metaphors, and general cognitive reflection, expression, and discussion. This elevates 
conceptualisation and abstract cognition to ever-increasing levels of complexity, 
which distances it from the perceptual world. 
However, rather than language per se, it is instead the context of a society of human 
language-users that enables the development of abstraction. 
In addition to innate sensory-motor neural interconnections, Sheets-Johnstone (1990) 
attributes the seminal cognitive symbolic function to the fact that humans are social creatures, 
and are uniquely bipedal. She explains how the nature of hominid walking produces mutually 
reinforcing three-dimensional, tactile-kinaesthetic binary correspondences – mainly through 
the binate symmetry of the body – which reinforces the perception of one-to-one 
correspondences, the basis for symbolism. With reference to symbolic and abstract 
numerosity, in particular, she then presents a complex theory of how this human experience 
of the binate nature of existence in the world gave rise to the decimal system. In part, she 
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postulates that an upright posture frees the hands and the body, which promotes counting by 
symbolic correspondence with the fingers, and other body parts. Sheets-Johnstone thus 
concluded that socialisation and bipedalism provide a unique and beneficial mode of 
interaction with the world, which facilitates the emergence of a greater degree of abstraction 
in humans, as compared to that of other mammals. 
Facilitated by language, individual embodied cognitions mutually interact, directing 
attentions to embodied experiences relative to the norms of cultural practices. A higher level 
of cognition thus emerges, as the enacted world is elevated to a more general, or abstract, 
plane. The added meaning rests in the shared social context of embodied experiences. The 
fourth level of abstraction is therefore a consequence of cognition that is embedded within a 
society. 
4.3.3 Societal Embedment 
In harmony with the essential features of embodiment described above, the radical 
autopoeietic theory of Maturana and Varela (refer to Section 4.3.1) has raised an important 
consideration. The individual, although significant, is also but one component in the 
encompassing system of its society. In an extension of Gibson’s insights (refer to Section 
3.5.2), it may then be said that the visual perceptual system includes photoreceptors that are 
stimulated, activating the eyes, which are part of a dual organ, set in a head that can swivel, 
and attached to a moveable body, which is a member of a society, situated in an enacted 
world. This reveals that perception, initiated on the individual level, has the potential to 
become a global concern. The core notion of embodied cognition grounds the regress of 
meaning in sensory-motor activity with the enacted world. Situated cognitive theory extends 
this meaning onto a societal level. 
The notion of situated cognition emphasises dynamic mutual interaction with the 
situational context. Humans are social creatures, and live in the context of a society of 
language-users. This aspect of the human world therefore cannot be ignored, nor can its 
importance be under-estimated. Preservation of the society, secondary only to reflexive 
individual survival, instils its members with common concerns, which dictate particular 
sensory-motor interactions with the world. Language enables the dynamic co-ordination of 
these interactions within the society. As neural co-ordination of sensation and motor activity 
gives rise to the comprehension of the meaningful world, so language is the metaphorical 
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‘nervous system’, in the sense that it interconnects members of a given society. The 
development of meaning within societies is therefore contingent upon effective 
communication between its members, for which language, based in embodied symbolic 
abstraction, is a necessary condition. Linguistic expression and discussion of individual 
sensory-motor experience imbues it with additional meaning, by extending the frame of 
reference to the societal level. Embodied meaning is thus extended by means of social 
conceptual metaphor, which may be considered a linguistic cognitive mechanism. 
An animal does not repeatedly re-conceptualise commonly encountered aspects of the 
world. Rather, certain embodied concepts become experientially entrenched. Similarly, 
language facilitates societal conceptual inculcation, through common conceptual usage and 
sharing. Social conceptual reproduction is a feature of this process, whereby concepts are 
linguistically conveyed, in lieu of individual, direct experience. A socio-historical aspect of 
cognition is thereby introduced, since previously formed human concepts and abstractions are 
imparted throughout subsequent generations. Social reproduction eliminates the necessity for 
individual recreation of every concept, or metaphoric abstraction, from its sensory-motor 
foundation. It facilitates the development of abstract cognition, since further abstractions are 
based on those already conceived throughout history. Linguistic social conceptualisation and 
conceptual reproduction therefore supplement perceptual embodied conceptualisation. 
A common socio-historical frame of reference is thus derived through language, 
elevating the development of meaning to the social contextual level. The added meaningful 
dimension, however, is simply the extension of the level of abstraction beyond that which is 
obviously embodied. It is possible that the efficacy of language in facilitating abstraction 
conceals foundational direct experiences. Social conceptual reproduction and social 
abstraction through linguistic conceptual metaphor do not detract from the embodied origins 
of conceptualisation, as sensory-motor interaction with the world still firmly grounds the 
ultimate regress of meaning. 
The meaningful enacted world exists by virtue of our perception, conception, and 
abstraction, not by our naming of it. An embodied concept is meaningful prior to its linguistic 
expression, and further linguistic social abstraction relates to the comprehension of the pre-
verbal concept. A simple example illustrates this position. We can achieve a pre-verbal 
embodied concept of hardness, as can most animals, by our particular interaction with the 
world. Linguistic expression, conceptualisation, and abstraction may allow further 
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comprehension of the concept hard. However, in no way does this detract from the meaning 
inherent in the embodied concept. A simple sentence such as ‘maths is hard’, is built upon a 
host of embodied and social conceptualisations and abstractions. In the context of the 
example, though, the gist of its meaning may be traced back to the direct embodied 
experience of hard. In essence, it means, ‘the abstraction that is mathematics is 
metaphorically impenetrable to cognitive conception, like hard things are physically 
impenetrable to the body’. In addition, Presmeg (1997b) has reported that the social 
conceptual abstractions created by many eminent scientists originate in perceptual 
conceptualisation. Einstein allegedly described his creative process as imagistic ‘flashes of 
insight’ that apparently appeared at random. The pattern imagery he described depicted the 
interplay between concrete perceptual visualisation and abstract symmetry. Only after he had 
conceived of a core abstraction, was a theory linguistically developed, and thereby shared. 
Therefore, even in the absence of direct experience, the meaning inherent in linguistic social 
conceptualisation is nevertheless grounded in the sensory-motor potential of its recreation. 
Embodied experience with the world thus grounds the regress of meaning. However, 
effective communication within human society crucially elevates embodied abstract 
cognition to a higher level. Comprehension of the meaningful enacted physical and social 
world is thus achieved through direct embodied experience, and in conjunction with language 
in a society, both of which eliminate the need for mental representation. The social aspect of 
the world is therefore as important as the physical aspect, to the holistic theory of situated 
cognition. 
4.3.4 The Amalgamated Mind 
Rowlands (2010) has been a firm advocate of the new cognitive science. However, he 
promulgates the alternative term amalgamated mind as an apt description for cognition 
composed of the amalgam of neural, bodily, and environmental structures and processes. 
In a creative revision of Gibson’s theories, Rowlands (2009) has defined cognition, in 
part, as the manipulation and exploitation of external structures. These actions supplement the 
diminished role of ‘representation’. Unlike Gibson, and contrary to the premise of situated 
cognition, he does not wholly repudiate representation. This is a tendentious attempt, by 
Rowlands’ own admission, to entice traditionalists into acceptance of the new paradigm. 
Although, his notion of representation is certainly vastly dissimilar to the concept 
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traditionally held (refer to Section 3.5). He cleverly connects representation and action by 
arguing that acting is a form of representing. Rowlands contended that manipulative and 
exploitative action transforms information present within external structures, making it 
available for direct detection, and thus negating the unqualified need for representation 
construction and storage. 
Although the amalgamated mind theory supports all the key concepts of situated 
cognition, it prioritises embodiment and extension. Rowlands (2010) has reasoned that these 
two parallel concepts entail definitive cognitive constitution, whereas embedded cognition 
entails only the weaker assertion of environmental dependence. Moreover, he argues that 
neither embedment nor enaction are in contradiction of Cartesianism, and in fact may easily 
be assimilated into traditional cognitive theories. 
The elimination of brain-body and body-environment causal interactions seems to be 
a particularly problematic notion, since even within the sphere of situated cognition theorists 
often exhibit difficulty in assimilating this idea. Eliasmith (2009) argued for the validity of 
his proposed Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) by claiming that it assists in 
understanding high-level cognition, and “is consistent with traditional boundaries among 
brain, body, and world” (p. 150). Bechtel (2009) advocated a bounded brain-body, although 
he does accede to this boundary being permeable to the environment. These instances of 
resistance to embodiment and extension appear to support Rowland’s (2010) view that these 
two concepts particularly challenge entrenched Cartesian dualism and classical cognitive 
science. 
4.3.5 Environmental Extension 
Clark’s treatise (2011) presented compelling argument for the extension of the 
cognitive boundary into the environment. However, his tenacious conviction in a 
connectionist and representational mode of cognitive processing betrays an unfortunate 
degree of reductionism. Consequently, much of his valuable input is lost in discussion about 
where in the environment the cognitive boundary lies. In other words, he considers which 
objects, and the interactions with them, may properly be taken as an integral part of cognitive 
activity. This attempt to distinguish the cognitive domain from the world being conceived 
reflects a futile search for the locus of intelligence, and reveals the fundamental 
incompatibility between information-theoretic cognition and situated cognition. 
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In situated cognition, there is no ‘locus of intelligence’ and there is no determinate 
boundary, as presumed in Cartesian dualism. Implicit in the phrase ‘the cognitive boundary 
encompasses the environment’ (refer to Section 4.2) is the belief in a holistic brain-body-
world system. Cognition is an emergent property by virtue of the dynamic interactions within 
this system. The exclusion of any aspect of the system would render cognition redundant. 
Moreover, for all practical purposes, the aspects of the system are inseparable, since we are a 
part of the world, and the world is a part of us. Cognition occurs with the world, in its 
entirety. 
 
4.4 Implications 
Initial resistance to any new scientific paradigm is the norm. Acceptance usually 
occurs as a process over time. Scientific progress is a consequence of society, which might 
equally be one of the factors that slow this progress down. Analysis of this statement 
coincidentally also demonstrates the extension of meaning into the societal dimension, and 
highlights the influence of social tradition and linguistic inculcation. 
A new paradigm is often associated with new concepts, as well as with the re-
conceptualisation of existing concepts. Ideally, therefore, it should present with its own 
conceptual terminology. This is in harmony with Sfard’s (1997) assertion that new 
knowledge involves the “creation of a new discourse” (p. 358). However, scientific concepts 
and terms are abstractions. Cognitive comprehension of the abstract is dependent upon a 
process of mapping onto previously formed concepts. The generation of a new socially 
accepted lexicon is indicative of the completion of abstraction, and simultaneously renders 
the mapping as covert. Novel concepts may be easier to assimilate, since the mapping is no 
more than a comparison of limited features, entailing a similar previous concept and its 
expansion. Re-conceptualisation, however, involves a novel linguistic description for a 
concept already accepted through social inculcation. A new process of abstraction is required 
in order to alter the associated habitual meaning within the societal frame of reference. 
During this process, the intended new meaning and the established meaning are in cognitive 
competition. 
An attempt to explain the implications of situated cognition exposes the difficulty of 
re-conceptualisation. Scientific, philosophical, and social progress has rendered many 
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concepts common to traditional cognitive theories obsolete, in terms of their socially 
established meanings. For example, the concept of subjectivity, as traditionally conceived, 
should not hold currency since the abolishment of the notion of duality of the world. 
Similarly, the concepts of intelligence, rationality, and knowledge, in terms of their 
previously established meanings, are redundant when it comes to situated cognition. In fact, 
the concept of a ‘concept’ is itself misleading. However, comprehension of the new paradigm 
lies in the mapping process of abstraction. Therefore, the use of traditional terms is necessary 
until a revised, meaningful terminology appropriate to the current discourse is introduced. 
4.4.1 Intelligence 
The situated perspective of cognition elucidates why it is so difficult to define 
intelligence. In the absence of a central executive processor, sensory-motor capabilities are an 
essential component of intelligence. The difficulty then, presumably, lies in distinguishing 
between what is intelligence, and what is environmental interaction. Yet, this matter becomes 
superfluous, with the realisation that any intelligence, to be successful or useful, must be 
situated in a world. Intelligence is the result of dynamic sensory-motor interaction with the 
world. Simultaneously, the world is partly constituted through this sensory-motor activity. 
This view of situated intelligence is captured in Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) observation that 
although sensory perception underlies intelligence, intelligence cannot be reduced to 
perception. It means that the relationship is not characterised by cause-and-effect linearity, 
but rather involves a dynamic circularity. A firm distinction between intelligence and 
environmental interaction is, therefore, nonsensical. Intelligence is an emergent phenomenon, 
which consequently supervenes on the physical. All knowledge thus originates in sensory-
motor experience. 
To appreciate this statement fully, consider the futility in attempting to describe the 
perceived colour blue to a congenitally blind person. Experience of the colour blue is 
essential to the knowledge of it. Active, situated perception is the only basis for true 
knowledge. 
4.4.2 Knowledge 
Situated cognition successfully negates the need for representations, since the world, 
both external and bodily, grounds the regress of meaning. There is no need to represent a 
79 
 
world in which we are already situated. In the words of Brooks (1997), “the world is its own 
best model” (p. 416). As both Gibson (1950) and Rowlands (2009) have suggested, meaning 
is presented in the structure of the world, and is directly detected through embodied 
involvement with the world (refer to Sections 3.5.2 and 4.3.4). In concert with this, co-
operative reference to embodied activity, achieved through the social-linguistic aspect of the 
human world, metaphorically distances cognition from direct bodily experience. This 
promotes cognitive reflection, which adds contextual meaning to existing experiential 
meaning. A meaningful world thus constitutes part of our existence. 
Knowledge is therefore not constituted by objective facts, but arises conceptually, 
through dynamic interactive construction, and social reproduction. Clancy (2009) and 
Millikan (2009) have agreed that this dynamic constraint renders knowledge fallible; but non-
arbitrary, and not wholly subjective or culturally specific. It is fallible since it is relative to 
experience, which can be ambiguous, as evidenced by perceptual illusions. It is non-arbitrary 
by virtue of the distinctive interactions supported by the particular bodily and external world 
context. It is not wholly subjective or culturally specific, due to the commonalities of human 
bodily interaction with the world, and thus to the shared cultural concerns of societies 
composed of such interaction. 
4.4.3 Concepts 
The conceptual system supports knowledge (Medin & Rips, 2005). Conceptualisation 
is an important component of the theory of situated cognition. Substantial research in 
cognitive linguistics has significantly contributed to an understanding of concrete 
conceptualisation (English, 1997a; Sfard, 1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 1997, 2005). However, 
further research is required in order to comprehend abstract conceptualisation more fully. 
Traditional semantic memory theories of the conceptual system, such as Collins and 
Quillian’s network model (cited in Barsalou, 2009) and other feature set models, view 
concepts as detached databases of category specifications. In contrast, Millikan (2009) has 
alternatively described situated conceptualisation as an ability to interact successfully with 
the world. Petitot (1999) has described this as a process whereby cognitive interest governs 
conceptual development. Cognitive interest may reflect that of the individual, or it may 
reflect interests from the broader context of a society. There is thus no fixed, universal set of 
perceptual specifications, as has been traditionally suggested. Instead, the facility to respond 
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to certain perceptual properties, as they manifest through sensory-motor interaction with the 
environment, determines conceptual content. This perspective provides new insight into the 
perceptual constancies, explicating, for example, the capacity to recognise a shape under a 
wide range of viewing conditions. Situated perception results in situated conceptualisation. 
Categorisation captures the uniqueness of each perceptual experience, transforming 
and enriching it, through its incorporation into the meaningful abstract conceptual edifice. 
Núñez (2008) attributed the meaning within this structure to cognitive mechanisms, such as 
conceptual metaphor, which govern its inferential organisation. In fact, he argued that 
categorisation is actually the application of metaphor. Although categorisation is one of the 
most fundamental cognitive activities, category recognition does not reside solely within the 
brain. Categorisation is a facility that emerges from mutual embodied interaction with the 
world, in accordance with particular sensory-motor interconnectivity. It is therefore an 
evolutionary-derived interactive ability, perfected through situated perceptual development 
and experience. Categorisation thus contributes to conceptual development. 
As a result, conceptual development is not simply the collection of a larger set of 
category specifications. Rather, as described by Millikan (2009), it is the development of the 
ability to assimilate new, dynamic perceptual information accurately and efficiently, creating 
a richer conceptual system. This culminates in the progressive evolution of abstract 
relational conceptualisation. In any relational structure, as Hiebert and LeFevre (1986) 
recognised, the linking relationships are of as much consequence as the nodes themselves. In 
contrast to the traditional notion of a concept as an inner representation or specification, 
situated conceptualisation is thus a dynamic process, focused on relationships, which are 
conceptual patterns. These patterns may present in the embodied or social frame of reference. 
They may involve perceptions or abstractions, images or language, or any combination of 
these. Conceptualisation begins with perception, or recognition, of a conceptual pattern. 
Assimilation of the perceived or socially reproduced relationship is the cognitive 
comprehension of a ‘concept’. 
Experientially and socially entrenched concepts, or conceptualisations, play an 
important role throughout cognition. Barsalou (2009) elaborated: 
 Concepts facilitate probable predictions, enhancing cognitive processing speed, 
through inferential induction. For example, concepts support efficient visual 
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perceptual processing of familiar scenes, by way of figure-ground segregation and 
filling-in, which is a form of visual closure. 
 In problem solving, concepts provide analogical and metaphorical content essential 
for deductive reasoning. 
The information abstracted by analogy and metaphor remains tightly coupled to the founding 
situated concrete concept. Barsalou affirms that this critically situates abstract concepts and, 
by extension, it situates rationality (Millikan, 2009). 
4.4.4 Rationality 
Situated rationality emerges through the interactive cognitive adaptation to the 
structural properties of an enacted environment (Brighton & Todd, 2009). This is contrary to 
the traditional view of a disembodied logic as the governing principle of rational thought. 
A world exists in which, and aligned with, cognition evolved so as to distinguish 
certain parameters and patterns present. Sensory-motor activity enables cognitive perception 
of these patterns. Perception and further sensory-motor interaction with the world – in tandem 
with the foundational cognitive ability for categorisation (pattern perception of a higher-
order) – initiate conceptualisation. Perception and conception mutually advance, resulting in 
the enactment of a cognitively comprehendible environment. This unique coupling, where the 
mind exploits and complements the structurally rich environment, enables simple mental 
mechanisms to achieve high-level cognition. Rationality is the dynamic interaction between 
sensory-motor perception, conception, and the meaningful environment. 
In simple terms, although not strictly a linear relationship, situated sensory-motor 
activity enables perception, which leads to concrete embodied conception. Further conception 
realises a level of abstraction to support language development, which promotes conceptual 
generalisation into the broader context of the meaningful social environment. Assisted by 
linguistic social conceptual metaphor, conception attains a level regarded as truly abstract. 
Mathematical cognition, the epitome of abstract rationality, therefore originates in perceptual 
ability. In the insightful words of Merleau-Ponty (1964a), “we never cease living in the world 
of perception, but we go beyond it in critical thought – almost to the point of forgetting the 
contribution of perception to our idea of truth” (p. 3). 
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4.5 Situated Visual Perception 
With a new appreciation of the perceptual underpinning of cognition afforded by the 
situated paradigm, a firm grasp on visual perception and its concomitant skills is imperative. 
Brooks (1997) believed that the design of a successful artificial intelligent system is simple, if 
only the essence of acting and reacting is made available. He construes this essence as the 
ability to move and sense in a dynamic environment. Brooks’ view appears to be a practical 
application of Maturana’s (1980) theory on the biology of cognition. Maturana reasoned that 
for an organism to be successfully mobile, it requires sense abilities for environmental 
interaction and orientation. More advanced cognitive organisms have developed nervous 
systems in order to connect and co-ordinate motor and sensory perceptual skills. Visual 
perceptual skill is thus a necessary basis for the development of intelligence. Yet, this poses 
even more of a design challenge, since not only is there no explicit representation of the 
world, but there is an equally frustrating lack of an identifiable location of the ‘output’ of 
visual perception. 
For similar reasons, a definitive operational definition of visual perception remains 
elusive. The problem, according to Merleau-Ponty (1964b), is fundamental, namely that there 
is no physical causality in perception. Perception is not stimulus-produced, but rather results 
from the behaviour of the perceiver in the presence of dynamic stimuli. It is, therefore, 
impossible to decompose a perception to a set of basic sensations. In familiar terms, the 
whole proves greater than the sum of its parts. Merleau-Ponty (1962) further highlighted an 
ostensibly insurmountable ambiguity that exists in the study of perception. Perception is 
primary to cognition; however, it is only through cognition that perception is made manifest. 
This cognitive immersion in perception prohibits detached objective perceptual investigation, 
and favours a more phenomenological approach. Scientific thinking removes us from the 
perceptual experience, severing the link between the physical world and the embodied mind. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in providing a concise definition, situated cognitive 
theory understands that situated visual perception is neither the idealist projection of an 
internal system, nor the realist recovery of external properties. Rather, visual perceptual skill 
entails substantially more within the situated paradigm than has been suggested by previously 
accepted definitions. Rosner (1982) defined visual perceptual skill as “the ability to identify 
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the task-pertinent concrete features of a visual array” (p. 288). A more apt description, 
however, may be that visual perceptual skill is the dynamic interactive ability to co-ordinate 
and render visual-motor activity with an enacted environment. 
4.5.1 Colour Perception 
Varela et al. (1991) have provided a detailed discussion of colour perception, as a 
representative microcosm of cognitive science, in an attempt to explain their embodied 
enactive approach. Likewise, the relatively concrete nature of colour perception aids in 
grasping the complex concept of situated visual perception. 
There is no disputing that retinal cells absorb certain wavelengths of radiation. Varela 
et al. (1991) have suggested that this may possibly occur in accordance with Hurvich and 
Jameson’s opponent-process theory, despite debate as to the exact physiology involved. 
Nevertheless, common human brain-body structure ensures a common enacted environment. 
Hence, a different common anatomy would yield a vastly different enacted world of colour. 
The bee’s visual system, for example, detects ultra-violet radiation, and therefore a ‘white’ 
daisy appears fluorescent violet to the bee. In essence, radiation physically exists in the 
external, but colour does not. As an even more concrete analogy, sweetness is not a property 
of honey; it is purely our experience of honey. 
In addition, surface reflected radiation does not faithfully correspond to colour 
perceived, as manifested by the phenomena of approximate colour constancy and chromatic 
induction. Perceived colour is therefore context-dependent. Kay and Berlin (cited in Varela et 
al., 1991) further found that the experience of colour is not only perceptual, but also 
cognitive. They claim that among the many colours linguistically named – eleven, covering 
the entire visible spectrum – are perceptually universal. The balance is culturally specific. 
Colour is thus an emergent property of neuronal activity, constituted by virtue of the structure 
and function of the body, and the physical and social world.  
The case of colour effectively demonstrates the coalescence of perceptual embodied 
conceptualisation and linguistic social conceptualisation. The appreciation of colour therefore 
depends on the biological evolution of the body, and its interaction with the enacted world, 
including the physical and social aspects in which it is embedded, and extended. 
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4.5.2 Perceptual Context 
The bodily sense organs detect external patterns, a process open to central neural 
influences that add non-physical contextual meaning to the patterns. The perceptual world is 
thus constructed in collusion with the physical world. 
The particular way in which the body interacts with the environment determines 
sensory stimulation by the external patterns. Visual perception is the process of interpretation 
of the visual patterns. This is not a conscious intellectual analysis, however, but simply the 
apprehension of meaning inherent in the physical and contextual patterns. It is a primitive 
capability, attained from having evolved in the world, and developed through experience. The 
inherent meaning is not transcendent; it does not lie beyond perception. The body and its 
behaviour endow the sensory stimuli with added significance. This view is redolent of 
Gibson’s concept of affordances. Simply put, an overhang is ‘seen’, but is perceived as 
shelter. 
Contextual significance, however, extends far beyond this simple example. In a 
dynamic and elusive visual world, situational context shapes visual perception, determining 
the potential meaning actually apprehended. The perceptual world thus admits a degree of 
ambiguity intolerable to scientific thinking. The Muller-Lyer illusion (Figure 4.1, reproduced 
from Merleau-Ponty, 1962) provides an impressive example. 
Figure 4.1 
Muller-Lyer Illusion 
 
The perception – and inherent meaning – of two lines is altered by the addition of contextual 
arrowheads; this despite the fact that the lines prove to be equal when measured. It is from 
this perceptual basis that situated knowledge (including that of mathematics) is rendered 
fallible, yet non-arbitrary. 
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4.5.3 Perception and Action 
Due to bodily movement and a dynamic world, external patterns detected and 
perceived are not static. The eyeball, in particular, is in constant motion. Visual perception is 
therefore experienced in action, as previously suggested by Gibson (refer to Section 3.5.2). 
This is a more intimate link than a mere causal relationship between perception and 
movement. Embodied sensory-motor coupling dictates a particular sensitivity to the physical 
world, through which the perceptual environment is enacted. Varela et al.’s (1991) enactive 
approach to perception and the sensori-motor model of visual perception, developed by 
O’Regan and Noë (2002), both reflect this position. The retina is seen to simply be the probe 
that interfaces with the environment. As such, it cannot, and does not, provide an internal 
representation of the external. Nor is there any reason for it to do so, since objects are not 
perceived by the visual recovery of external properties. The perceptual paradox is that a 
perceived object exists only in perception, with visual perception being the dynamic visual-
motor interaction between the body, mind, and world. Object perception is thus realised 
through visually guided action. Guided action, imperative to survival, is therefore argued to 
be the true, original, and primary function of visual perception. 
4.5.4 Visuo-Spatial Perception 
Visual perception for the primary purpose of action, rather than for object 
identification, endows visuo-spatial perception with special significance; since, by its nature, 
movement involves a spatial component. Merleau-Ponty (1962) also unequivocally advocated 
the importance of spatiality in his statement, “spatial existence is the primary condition of all 
living perception” (p. 126). Every visual percept, and in fact every sensation, is spatial. 
Just as visual perception is situated, so is spatiality. Space is not the realistic, 
objective setting in which things are positioned, but is rather egocentrically experienced, as 
the potential action of the body. Movement, directionality, and ultimately space and even 
spatial form, are relative – that is – in relation to a pivotal embodied perspective. As early as 
1905, Poincaré (cited in Myin & O’Regan, 2009) embraced the connection between visuo-
spatial perception and action, in his explanation that the potential movements in reaching an 
object, constitute its position. The notion of three-dimensional space is therefore inferred 
from sensory-motor possibilities. Heidegger (cited in Gallagher, 2009) presented a similar 
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conception of situated spatiality, from which its apparent objectivity is subsequently derived, 
through metaphor. 
Paradoxically, spatial conception derives from sensory-motor action, and yet equally 
enables it. By virtue of this mutual dynamic coupling, visuo-spatial perception is not only 
essential for physical survival, but also forms a foundation for the emergence of higher 
cognition (Gattis, 2001; Montello, 2005). Tversky (2009) identified three notable cognitively 
constructed situated spaces: 
1. Space of the body supports conceptual development, by encouraging the inference of 
functional categorisation, from categorisation based on perceptual similarities. 
2. Space around the body, the space of actual, or potential, perception and action, 
institutes the conception of directional axes, through the asymmetries of the body and 
through gravitation. 
3. Space of navigation extends beyond the limits of the immediate visual perceptual 
field. This necessitates its cognitive construction from separate, situated perceptions, 
which introduces systematic perceptual errors. These distortions are apparent in 
perceived space, and are carried through, via metaphor, into abstract space. The 
asymmetry of the mental number line provides a patent example. 
In general, these perceptual spaces, through metaphorical mapping, provide for abstract 
conceptual cognition. Natural and spontaneous correspondences between visuo-spatial 
perceptual and abstract concepts, possible only in a non-random structured world, support 
situated cognition. This is evidenced in the revealing peculiarities of language use, gestures, 
symbolisms, and visualisations (Lakoff & Núñez, 1997; Sfard, 1997; Gattis, 2001; Kita, 
Danziger & Stolz, 2001; Tversy, 2005a). Visuo-spatial cognitive abilities, such as mental 
transformations, are simply common experiential perceptual-motor actions applied to the 
abstract, which provides a spatial basis for imagination and creativity. The body and the 
world, therefore, do not limit imagination; they enable it. 
Abstract spatial cognition is thus shaped by both visual perception of, and interaction 
with, the enacted world. It is a product of embodied and social conceptualisation. Embodied 
experience is encompassed within the more general, or abstract, social realm, by means of 
language. Abstract cognition therefore emerges through being embodied, embedded in, and 
extended into the enacted physical and social world. Abstract cognition is situated. 
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4.5.5 Visual Perception and Temporality 
Expanding on the importance of three-dimensional visuo-spatial perception, a fourth 
dimension may be argued as equally critical. Just as motor activity is spatial by nature, so do 
movement and change naturally introduce an element of time. Cognitive psychology already 
robustly affirms embodied spatial relativity (refer to Section 4.5.4). In comparison, 
temporality has received minimal attention, although progress in the development of a 
comprehensive cognitive science has regenerated interest in it. 
Gentner (2001) attributed the embodied relativity of time to the metaphorical mapping 
of the observable spatial domain onto the abstract domain of time. The temporal structure 
thus constituted by space-time metaphors is therefore relational. Núñez (2008) alternatively 
maintained that temporality, like spatiality, is a fundamental component of our experience. 
Yet, he also contends that the only possible human conceptualisation of time is in the 
abstract. This is due to the lack of a dedicated sensory system to perceive it directly, 
analogous to the visual system, for example. 
Linguistic expressions and embodied spontaneous gesture, believed to be evidence of 
the inferential structure underlying the metaphorical mapping, indicate that time is commonly 
conceived in the spatial form of a future in front of us and the past behind us. This social 
conception manifests in linguistic expressions such as ‘moving forward into the future’. 
However, in a study of the Andean Aymara culture, Núñez (2008), in collaboration with 
Sweetser, argued for this conception as cultural, rather than universal. These authors 
originally attributed the reversed Aymaran conception to a temporal, rather than an ego, 
reference point. However, they later concluded that the reversal was instead a consequence of 
the spatial-temporal mapping relating to visual perception, rather than to movement, of the 
ego. In effect, what lies behind an observer is outside their visual field and is thus unknown, 
as the future is unknown. Similarly, the knowable past maps to the front of the observer, 
which is a visually knowable space. The existence of these various culturally specific, 
opposing, yet internally consistent, metaphorical mappings highlights the relativity of the 
cognitive conception of time in the enacted environment. It is reminiscent of the varying 
cultural orientations in the conception of the spatial number line (refer to Section 2.2.4). 
Irrespective of the particular reference point or cultural spatial orientation, Núñez (2008) 
inferred the general conceptual temporal metaphor to be “time events are things in saggital 
uni-dimensional space” (p. 338). 
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The phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (1962), from which 
situated cognitive theory partly grew, probes temporality at a deeper and more fundamental 
level. Metaphorical spatial-temporal mapping may well explain human social 
conceptualisation of time, which critically permits reflection on, and linguistic 
communication about, time. These abilities are imperative for social coordination. Yet, this 
philosophy claims that a basic sense of temporality, inherent in most animal species and 
analogous to the number sense, is a primitive, embodied cognitive phenomenon. It thus 
supervenes on situated sensory-motor experience, of which temporality is a fundamental 
dimension, as Núñez (2008) maintained (see above). This is the result of a natural and 
inseparable association between motion and both space and time, since movement from A to 
B occurs in time. Temporality, as a dimension of the enacted world (like colour), is therefore 
relative, rather than transcendentally universal. Phenomenologically, a sense of temporality 
cognitively emerges from spatial actions, while temporality is equally essential to the 
structure of spatial actions. Such dynamic coupling is characteristic of situated cognition. 
Gallagher (2009) has interpreted Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness as showing 
that experience is not momentary. Rather, the cohesion of the just past to the just about to be 
forms a temporally extended flow. Time therefore exists in the past, present, and future 
relations of an embodied cognition with the enacted environment. Thompson’s (2007) simple 
example of walking past a tree provides clarification. Despite the continually different 
perspectives of the tree, it is still known to be the same tree. Perceptual synthesis thus 
involves a temporal synthesis. Therefore, just as visual perceptions and sensations are 
essentially spatial (refer to Section 4.5.4), Merleau-Ponty (1962) equally asserted that spatial 
objects are also temporal. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) further suggested that this retentional-protentional temporal 
structure crucially enables cognition within the enacted spatial environment. Therefore, 
temporality is as essential to cognition as is spatiality (refer to Section 4.5.4). This is situated 
cognition; situated not only spatially, but also temporally. 
4.5.6 Cognitive Consequences 
Within the situated cognitive paradigm visual perceptual skill may tentatively be 
defined as the dynamic interactive ability to co-ordinate and render visual-motor activity in 
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an enacted environment (refer to p. 82). Due to the nature of motor activity, visual perceptual 
skill thus defined necessarily incorporates visuo-spatial and visuo-temporal elements.  
However, situated visual perception is clearly not an isolated phenomenon. Through 
its primitive function of guided action, and the evolutionary development of its cognitive 
structures, visual perception gives rise to the emergence of knowledge, namely 
conceptualisation. The abstract symbolic function therefore relies on the visual. This is not a 
reduction of knowledge to sensation; vision is not its cause. Abstract concepts are integrated 
with concrete perceptual concepts until the abstract emerges as a means in itself. This is a 
process, as Merleau-Ponty (1964b) describes, whereby visual perception assists “at the birth 
of knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible” (p. 25). 
Situated abstract cognition thus emerges through the dynamic sensory-motor 
interaction with the enacted world. Originally, sensory-motor experience was presumed to be 
predominantly spatial. In contrast, within the space-time fabric of the enacted world, sensory-
motor experience equally incorporates a temporal element. By extension, both visuo-spatial 
and temporal elements are integral to abstract cognition. However, at this stage in the 
development of situated theory, the focus has been constrained to three-dimensional visuo-
spatial perception. Nevertheless, the implication is that situated dynamic sensory-motor 
activity grounds abstract mathematical objects, concepts, and cognition. This is evidence for 
the plausibility of a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
 
4.6 Situated Mathematics 
The situated cognitive science paradigm clarifies the nature of mathematics and 
mathematical cognition, namely what mathematics is and how we do it. Situated mathematics 
is an embodied social abstraction. It is therefore grounded in situated sensory-motor activity. 
Mathematical cognition is the comprehension, or conceptualisation, and utilisation of abstract 
mathematical objects. It is an instance of general abstract cognition, which emerges through 
dynamic mutual interaction with the enacted physical and social world, in which it is 
embedded and extended. 
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4.6.1 The Nature of Situated Mathematics 
The nature of situated mathematical objects and their relationships is contrary to all 
other prevailing contemporary mathematical philosophies. Mathematics does not objectively 
exist in the world, nor is it a set of disconnected abstract symbols and formalist rules. 
Mathematics is a mental creation. It is not, however, an arbitrary creation within the world, as 
propounded by constructivist and other postmodern philosophies. Mathematics is cognitively 
created with the world. Physical and social evolution, culture, structure and function of the 
body and the brain, along with everyday environmental interaction, contribute to its 
formulation and development. Mathematics is thus an emergent phenomenon of situated 
cognition. From this perspective, the mathematical objects that constitute mathematics are 
cognitive abstractions. 
Unique human biology and mutual human-environmental interaction inherently 
constrain conceptualisation. It is this mutual interaction that crucially differentiates situated 
and constructivist philosophies. It elevates abstract conceptualisation beyond concept 
construction as simply a matter of social convention. In other words, situated experience 
determines basic conceptual mathematical content, and foundational mathematical cognition, 
such as perceptual subitization. As an evolving discipline, however, mathematics is equally a 
consequence of the socio-historical aspect of the human environment. Over time, individuals 
express and share relevant situated experience, and conceptualisation thereof, through 
language and cultural mathematical symbols, themselves a consequence of certain situated 
social practices. As a result, the abstracted linguistic concepts are communal, and 
incorporated into the public domain of mathematics. In addition, cultural and societal 
concerns direct the evolutionary path of mathematical progression. Lakoff and Núñez (2000) 
have described mathematics as “the greatest product of the collective human imagination” 
(p. 377). 
As a product of the imagination – a creative concept or cognitive phenomenon – 
mathematics is largely grounded in sensory-motor activity, visuo-spatial perception in 
particular (refer to Section 4.5.4; Sternberg, Lubart, Kaufman & Pretz, 2005). This entails an 
important consequence for the nature of mathematics: it is fallible. Just as perceptual 
experience can be contradictory, epitomised by visual illusions, so too can the cognitive 
conceptualisations arising from it. Mathematics is continually evolving, often discrediting its 
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own previous ‘truths’. This is not a declaration of the speciousness of mathematics. Rather, it 
properly highlights the embodied, social relativity and abstract status of mathematics. 
Classical Newtonian mathematical laws of motion offer a prime example. Conceived 
of in order to describe the observable macroscopic world, they have stood the scientific 
community in good stead. In fact, their scientific value persists in spite of having been proven 
within the context of very fast moving microscopic particles, to be only approximations. 
Mathematical laws are created simply to enable the comprehension of empirically 
experienced regularities of the world. Brunschvicg (cited in Merleau-Ponty, 1964b) has put it 
concisely that “the law is not truer than the fact; the law is conceived exclusively to make the 
fact intelligible” (p. 20). 
Mathematics is, therefore, not universal or transcendent. Yet, mathematics is also not 
a wholly ‘subjective’ or culturally specific creation. Common human brain-body structure, 
physical and social environmental interaction, as well as shared cultural concerns, ensure that 
mathematics is non-arbitrary (Lakoff & Núñez, 1997; Sfard, 1997). General cognitive 
mechanisms, such as those listed by Lakoff and Núñez (2000), which include categorisation, 
spatial-relations schemas, conceptual metaphors, and subitizing, produce mathematics. Núñez 
(2008) has asserted that mathematical truth is intrinsic to the inferential organisation of 
metaphorical mappings, and the apparent objectivity of mathematics arises through the 
combined and co-operative use of these mechanisms within a society. The only mathematics 
is human-situated mathematics. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of mathematics in the world is a result of the interactive 
connection between situated cognition and the enacted environment. That is, a result of the 
fact that cognition is biologically and environmentally embedded and extended. Mutually 
interconnected sensory and motor neural capacities are inherited through evolution in the 
world. These support a basic number sense and primitive spatial relations. More advanced 
mathematics arises through general cognitive mechanisms, already evolved as suitably 
effective in the world as we experience it. Mathematical concepts, through conceptual 
metaphor, have thus been created in the perceived world – the enacted environment – in order 
to explicate this world, as it is perceived. Situated mathematics is metaphorical. 
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4.6.2 Situated Mathematical cognition 
The situated perspective asserts that from a base of innate sensory-motor capacities, 
which supports the basic number sense, all mathematics is experientially learned. It is not 
‘discovered’ in the external world. Experiential learning involves conceptual metaphor, 
which may be embodied or social, perceptual or linguistic. Social conceptual reproduction 
aids conceptualisation (refer to Section 4.3.3). Mathematics is thus created and sustained by a 
society of human, embodied language-users. The emergent cognitive capacity for metaphor 
rests upon the simultaneous recognition of structural similarities and differences (Presmeg, 
1997a), a by-product of basic pattern perception, which relies heavily on visual perceptual 
skill. 
Sawyer and Greeno (2009) claimed that a number of studies analysing everyday 
problem solving support the argument that logico-mathematical reasoning is better 
understood as emerging from person-environment interactions, rather than as a product of 
mental symbol manipulation. In particular, Lave’s (cited in Sawyer & Greeno, 2009) analysis 
of the reasoning displayed by grocery shoppers revealed that the traditional conception of the 
‘problem space’, as a representation of a task, is not a stable cognitive structure. It is 
therefore not amenable to problem solving as traditionally conceived of, in terms of a logical 
search from the initial state, through a series of sub-goals, towards the final goal. Instead, the 
implication was that the problem space was dynamically co-constructed by the shopper, the 
physical environment, other sources of information, and other people in the situation. Sawyer 
and Greeno thus concluded that learning is always situated. 
Learning involves the acquisition of new, or the enhancement of existing skills and 
knowledge. To this end, a seminal cognitive capacity is categorisation, dependent upon the 
proficient assimilation of dynamic perceptual information, leading to richer 
conceptualisation. A rich conceptual base offers greater diversity from which to draw, to 
support effective metaphor and analogy instantiation, thereby facilitating further learning and 
reasoning (Davis & Maher, 1997; English, 1997b). Analogy, the comparison of existing 
source and target concepts, is an effective adjunct to reasoning (Novick & Bassok, 2005). 
Metaphor, on the other hand, is a constitutive part of the process of conceptualisation. 
Metaphors create meaning by mapping a known source domain to a new contextual domain, 
generating a novel target concept (Sfard, 1997). 
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The field of cognitive linguistics provides substantial evidence that metaphorical 
mapping is the basis of ordinary cognition and language (Davis, 1984; English, 1997a; Sfard, 
1997; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). Abstract concepts are conceptualised in concrete terms, 
vestiges of which are evidenced in certain quirks of language use and gesture (refer to 
Section 4.5.4). Mathematics, which utilises general cognitive structures, thus originates 
analogous to all abstract concepts in the metaphorical mapping of its grounding sensory-
motor inferences. Further systematic, non-arbitrary metaphorical mapping, among the 
abstract concepts themselves, promotes mathematics beyond its direct sensory-motor 
grounding. The layering of metaphors explicates the hierarchical nature of mathematical 
concepts, where the more indirect the grounding, the more abstract the mathematics. 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000) defined conceptual metaphor as “a neurally embodied 
fundamental cognitive mechanism” that allows the use of “the inferential structure of one 
domain to reason about another” (p. 351). It is the inherent preservation of inferential 
structure between metaphorical correspondences, originating in concrete experiential 
concepts, which imbues mathematical objects with their apparent objective reality. Johnson 
(cited in Lakoff & Núñez, 2000) justified metaphorical mapping via the process of cognitive 
conflation. Simultaneous activation of two distinct, experientially unconnected brain regions 
potentially causes cross-domain neural links to develop. This often naturally and 
automatically results in conceptual metaphor. 
Habitual use of a conceptual metaphor, whether at the individual or the societal level, 
renders it covert. This is a necessary pre-condition for abstraction completion, whereby the 
concept attains its own identity (Sfard, 1997). Bruner (cited in Sfard, 1997) has provided a 
simple metaphor for this process as it pertains to mathematics, thus: 
Metaphors are crutches to help us get up the abstract mountain. Once up, we throw 
them away (even hide them) in favour of a formal, logically consistent theory […] 
The formal models that emerge are shared […] and prescribe ways of life for their 
users. The metaphors that aided in this achievement are usually forgotten 
(pp. 347-348). 
In other words, over time, societal establishment of mathematical concepts and a cultural 
notational system, permit mathematical reasoning without recourse to experiential 
substantiation. The transfer of mathematical ideas thus becomes socially mediated. So, 
learning formal mathematics is, in effect, simply the unconscious use of conceptual 
metaphorical blends. However, gesture studies (cited in Núñez, 2007) in the field of cognitive 
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linguistics show that even dead metaphorical expressions, which have long been lexicalised 
and rendered covert, are spontaneously enacted during speech. This serves as evidence that 
the metaphorical conception of situated experience is essentially constitutive of overlying 
abstractions and, by extension, of abstract cognition such as that of mathematics. 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000) have pioneered a comprehensive theory of mathematical 
cognition, firmly entrenched within the situated paradigm. Beginning with the fundamental 
cognitive capacities and basic arithmetic, the theory extends to a clear portrayal of the 
development of the full gamut of mathematical concepts, symbolic logic, and their 
relationships. The conceptual complexity of deceptively innocuous concepts, such as zero 
and equal, is uncovered, whereas complex mathematical concepts, such as infinity, limits, 
and calculus, are reduced to simple layers of metaphorical mappings. For example, Núñez 
(2007) has contended that, socio-historically, the relative difficulty with the concept of zero 
stems from the fact that nothing, or the empty set, is not directly perceivable, in the same way 
that one thing is. They do accede, however, that their innovations may require some 
refinement. 
4.6.3 Sensory-Motor Grounding of Mathematical Cognition 
The cornerstone of Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) theory of mathematical cognition lies 
in the core, situated sensory and motor cognitive schemas, in which the inferential structure 
of the most basic sensory and motor experiences are made manifest. 
 Cognitive image schemas arise from the primitive spatial relations concept, which is 
dependent on visuo-spatial perception. Image schemas are exceptional in that they are both 
perceptual and conceptual in nature, providing a link between vision and cognition. By virtue 
of their image-schematic structure, complex image schemas display an inherent spatial logic, 
since the logical inference preserved in metaphorical mapping to the abstract is, in fact, a 
spatial inference. They may therefore be used directly in spatial reasoning, which is an 
essential component of mathematical reasoning (English, 1997a; Presmeg, 1997b). 
The principle image schema in mathematical cognition is the Container schema, a gestalt 
composed of a boundary, an interior, and an exterior. Núñez (2008) has speculated that this 
schema arises by virtue of the neural topography of the retina, with its centre-surround visual 
receptive fields and gating circuitry. Sheets-Johnstone (1990) has alternatively attributed such 
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a schema to the experience of having a body that contains bounded internal cavities. The 
spatial logic of this cognitive conceptualisation of a physical container is metaphorically 
applied in the concept categories are containers, facilitating a natural understanding of Venn 
diagrams and Boolean logic. 
 Cognitive aspect schemas relate to motor control, with inferences metaphorically 
conveyed to the structure of events. The principle schema concerned with motion is the 
Source-Path-Goal schema. In mathematics, the conceptualisation of the number line, 
directed graphs, and functions in a Cartesian plane as motion along a path are evidence of the 
logic of this schema. 
Emergent cognitive mechanisms, such as conceptual metaphor, extend these schemas 
of basic sensory-motor experience to the abstract. For example, preserving the Container 
image schema structure, numbers are conceptualised as collections. The extension of innate 
perceptual subitization to arithmetic is therefore achieved, through the capacity for 
conceptual metaphor. Key to this process is the fact that conceptual metaphors convey, and 
preserve, the inferential structure of cognitive schemas. 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000) have theorised that the entire abstract mathematical edifice 
rests upon four critical grounding metaphors, which are: 
1. Arithmetic is Object Collection: the most basic grounding metaphor. It arises 
naturally from regular use of subitizing, innate arithmetic, while interacting with small 
collections of objects. Basic arithmetic operations neurally link to the physical actions 
of adding objects to, and taking objects away from, the collections. 
2. Arithmetic is Object Construction: a more specific metaphor that carries the 
inferences of the Object Collection metaphor. It is the conceptualisation of numbers as 
wholes, while at once composed of other numbers. 
3. Measuring Stick metaphor: a metaphorical blend (which may account for the 
deviation from the linguistic metaphoric format). It is a blend of physical segments 
and the abstract numbers specifying their lengths. Segments are particular object 
constructions. 
4. Arithmetic is Motion Along a Path: a natural metaphorical correlate to the 
Measuring Stick metaphor, where the path of motion forms a physical segment. This 
metaphor provides a natural extension to negative numbers. 
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Each of these metaphors emerges, through the embodied cognitive comprehension of 
the enacted world, from the ordinary experience of collecting, constructing, manipulating, 
and moving. Subsequently, the domain is gradually extended via conceptual blending and 
linking. For example, the Arithmetic is Object Collection metaphor entails only addition and 
subtraction. Blending numbers with this metaphor extends it to permit multiplication and 
division. Lakoff and Núñez (1997) have submitted that the number line, being an amalgam of 
numbers and points on a line, is a product of the arithmetic is geometry blend. This 
metaphorical blend also functions as a linking metaphor that enables the spatial 
conceptualisation of arithmetic. 
Accompanying these cognitive processes, natural metaphorical entailments arise from 
basic truths of the grounding domain, an adjunct of the stable and structured world we 
inhabit. These entailments become mathematical truths that constitute the laws of arithmetic, 
which are consequently not axiomatic. For example, a basic truth of the Object Collection 
metaphor is that the experience of adding collection A to B is equivalent to the experience of 
adding collection B to A. The natural metaphorical entailment of this is the mathematical 
truth that numerical addition is commutative. Arithmetic is thus extended beyond that which 
is innate, while preserving its basic innate properties. Symbolising capacity maps numerical 
concepts to the cultural mathematical notational system, and the common cognitive 
mechanism of conceptual metonymy generalises arithmetic, to allow for algebra. 
Higher mathematics constitutes a similar concept to that of metaphorical basic 
arithmetic, except in this case, metaphor is built upon metaphor. In addition, each branch of 
mathematics is metaphorically linked to other branches. Lakoff and Núñez (2000) explicitly 
detailed the metaphorical linking and blending underlying nearly all complex mathematical 
concepts, an accomplishment that dispels the enigma of mathematics. They claim that the 
flawless metaphorical grounding contributes to misinterpretation of the metaphorical nature 
of the abstract mathematical edifice. 
Arithmetic taken exclusively as symbol manipulation dissociates it from higher 
mathematics. Arithmetic involving conceptualisation, on the other hand, divulges the 
hierarchical nature of mathematics. The grounding metaphors are simply a mapping from 
everyday experience onto abstract concepts, which constitute arithmetic. This process is so 
natural and spontaneous, that it requires very little instruction. Higher mathematics is simply 
the conceptual extension, the increasing abstraction, of arithmetic. Linking metaphors 
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connect arithmetic to other branches of mathematics. This is still a simple process, although 
being less grounded, it requires more explicit instruction, and yields concepts that are more 
abstract. Within this context, mathematical instruction ideally involves social conceptual 
reproduction. 
 
4.7 Implications for Mathematics Education 
In terms of situated cognitive theory, mathematics emerges from a base of 
foundational cognitive abilities. Then, in conjunction with normal cognitive development, it 
is education which extends these foundational abilities to higher levels (refer to Sections 2.2 
and 4.6.3). 
With this idea in mind, the 2012 South African Annual National Assessments for 
mathematics depicts an interesting scenario. The following table shows the national averages 
per grade, as reported by Jansen (2012). 
Table 4.1 
National Assessments for Mathematics (SA 2012) 
 Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 9 
Ave % 68% 57% 41% 37% 30% 27% 13% 
 
In Grade 1, the mathematics is presumably basic enough to be accomplished mostly 
intuitively, by virtue of foundational cognitive abilities. This grade obtained a reasonable 
national average of 68%. The mathematics in successive grades must surely require 
progressively higher levels of cognition, the development of which is in part the 
responsibility of formal education. Therefore, the concomitant steady decline in national 
average may be construed as evidence for something amiss in the broader landscape of 
mathematics education in the country. 
Research (cited in Bernstein et al., 2013) by the Centre for Development and 
Enterprise (CDE) has shown that mathematics education in South Africa is among the worst 
in the world. Bernstein et al. (2013) claimed that this is partly a consequence of poor 
mathematics teaching in South African public schools. In particular, the CDE study revealed 
that Grade 6 mathematics teachers in South Africa were the least competent when compared 
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with teachers in eight other countries (Jansen, 2013). Bernstein et al. (2013) reported that 
poor mathematics teaching in primary schools was considered the greatest contributor to poor 
scholastic mathematics performance in general. The South African government has 
apparently begun to realise the necessity of urgent intervention to address this crisis in 
education. However, there is no clear plan of action yet. 
According to situated theory, education for the extension of foundational cognitive 
abilities entails situated learning, through embodied experience, and social conceptualisation 
and reproduction (refer to Sections 4.3.3 and 4.6.2). Alone, rote learning of formal 
mathematical facts and formulae can therefore be considered insufficient to a proper 
mathematics education. This is not to say that previously established mathematical truths are 
not beneficial. They are in fact vital to the continued expansion of mathematics. However, in 
tandem with this type of rote learning, a simultaneous attempt at explaining the derivation of 
these truths is argued as indispensable. In other words, Bruner’s (cited in Sfard, 1997) 
metaphorical crutches, used to assist getting up the abstract mountain, must be retrieved 
(refer to Section 4.6.2). This could involve teaching strategies such as providing appropriate 
learning experiences, and social conceptual reproduction. The following examples clarify 
these ideas: 
 Rote learning of formal mathematics. 
Meaningless rote mathematics learning is epitomised by the arithmetic rules for 
complex addition, subtraction, multiplication, and long division. The following provides a 
rough example of the addition algorithm: 
To add 119 + 7, write the first figure, and then vertically align the second figure 
beneath the first, right side justified. Add the units’ column: 9 + 7 = 16. Write the 
right-hand digit in the units’ column, and carry the left-hand digit to the tens’ column. 
Add the tens’ column: 1 + 1 carried over = 2. Write the answer in the tens’ column. 
Add the hundreds’ column: 1 + nothing = 1. Write the answer in the hundreds’ 
column. Thus, the answer is 126. 
(Note: The step involving 9 + 7 = 16 may be accomplished through finger counting, 
although rote learning of the addition tables presents a likely alternative.) 
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These rules are not difficult to memorise, and can be applied to sums of virtually any 
complexity. Their undisputed value therefore lies in their versatile application. However, 
these algorithmic rules represent mere cognitive shortcuts. Learning such formal mathematics 
is an imperative, practical skill, particularly for those times when an electronic calculator is 
unavailable. However, following a learned sequence of steps is insufficient in the promotion 
of situated mathematical cognition. Teaching the rules in isolation, divorced from cognitive 
comprehension of the underlying mathematical ideas, is counter-productive from the situated 
perspective, where conceptual understanding of each level of mathematics develops the 
abstract building blocks necessary for exploring ever-higher reaches of mathematics. 
Recognition of the conceptualisation of addition often manifests in alternative and 
more natural strategies for arriving at the correct answer. One such strategy is: 
To add 119 + 7, let ‘7’ give 1 to ‘119’, then 120 + 6 equals 126. 
Intuitively, by virtue of the base-10 number system and the syntax of linguistic number 
words, 120 + 6 = 126 seems less cognitively demanding than 119 + 7 = 126. In fact, expert 
calculators often report that their speed and efficiency of calculation is attributable to these 
types of strategies. Regrettably, it is impossible to convert such an addition procedure to an 
uncomplicated universal algorithm. Not only is it restricted to certain maths problems, but 
this particular example also pertains only to certain languages. Various other languages 
feature vastly different number word syntax, which nevertheless support different unique 
strategies. Yet the ability to convert the sum spontaneously in such a manner is an indication 
of superior, situated mathematical cognition. The level of abstraction clearly endorses the 
numbers as distinct entities, in their freedom to give and receive pieces of themselves, which 
rests on a clear understanding of the relationships between separate number entities. 
Moreover, it implicitly shows the conceptualisation of numbers as wholes, yet composed of 
various combinations of other numbers. This is a crucial foundational mathematical concept, 
described by Lakoff and Núñez (2000) as the Arithmetic is Object Construction grounding 
metaphor (refer to Section 4.6.3). 
 Appropriate learning experiences. 
Davis and Maher’s (1997) ‘pebbles-in-a-bag’ classroom activity poses a good 
example of what constitutes appropriate situated learning experiences. Beginning with a bag 
of pebbles, the learners then put another five pebbles into the bag. Generally, the class 
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unanimously agrees that there are now five more pebbles than before. They then remove six 
pebbles from the bag. Again, there is consensus that there is now one pebble less than the 
original amount. All the while, the teacher notes the pebble movements on the board. The 
learners have no trouble comprehending these obvious conclusions, but it is only after 
ensuring this comprehension that the formal notation of 5 − 6 = −1 is introduced. This 
conceptual introduction of negative integers is essentially the exploitation and extension of 
Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) Arithmetic is Object Collection grounding metaphor (refer to 
Section 4.6.3). 
 Social conceptual reproduction. 
To show the possibilities of conceptual reproduction in mathematics teaching, Núñez 
(2007) provides the example of the multiplication of two negative numbers, which yields a 
positive product. He claims that this is too often taught as a mathematical fact, devoid of any 
meaningful explanation. Although a formal mathematical proof exists, it is equally divorced 
from human reality. The algebraic proof is, in any case, too complex for the level of 
mathematics at which the fact is first learned and required. In actuality, though, embodied 
direction is the conceptual basis for the fact. It is an extension of the grounding metaphor of 
Arithmetic is Motion Along a Path (refer to Section 4.6.3). Various orientations and forward 
and backward steps along a number line can therefore explain it, simply and meaningfully. 
Such conceptual reconstruction promotes proper abstraction and enhances mathematical 
understanding. This type of teaching, together with appropriate learning experiences, has the 
added advantage of re-connecting mathematics with everyday experiences, potentially 
improving learners’ interest and motivation. 
In all three of the above examples, mathematics teaching invoked Lakoff and Núñez’s 
(2000) grounding metaphors. This shows the potential for the practical application of their 
high-level theory of the origins of mathematical concepts. Poynter and Tall (2005) have 
wholly embraced the relation of Lakoff and Núñez’s theory to practical mathematical 
teaching. They offer a broader view by integrating the development of mathematical concepts 
with human conceptual development. In their view, cognitive development proceeds from 
perception and action, and leads to abstract conceptions through reflection. Focusing on this 
development, they theorise that the shift from a procedural action to object conception is 
particularly problematic for a child to master. A deficiency in this shift results in learning 
how to do mathematics, without the associated understanding. They suggest that a slight 
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alteration in attention is required, to focus on the embodied effect of the action. They believe 
that this will foster mathematical learning that is conceptual, rather than procedural. 
Ideally, therefore, mathematics teaching should encompass both factual and 
conceptual learning, accomplished with teachers facilitating a degree of conscious conceptual 
reconstruction for learners (Sfard, 1997). The benefit of this would be the promotion of 
proper abstraction, and enhanced mathematical understanding. Devising a syllabus based on 
situated metaphorical mathematics, including conceptual metaphors rather than solely pre-
given axiomatic mathematical facts, has the added potential to relieve the current tension 
between an absolutist view of mathematics and the progressive education ideology (refer to 
Section 2.3.2). These insights raise reservations as to whether mathematics is intrinsically 
difficult to learn, or whether teaching methods are simply inappropriate. 
If the prediction of situated cognitive theory that a relationship exists between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability proves to be true, then it would be imperative, on 
school entry, to ensure that learners possess adequate visual perceptual skill for ensuing 
abstract cognitive development. Building from a base of innate sensory-motor abilities, 
perceptual skill is experientially learned (refer to Sections 1.1, 3.2 and 4.5). Like all cognitive 
skills, appropriate learning experiences must therefore be effective in enhancing visual 
perceptual skill (Halpern & Collaer, 2005). After attaining an adequate level of visual 
perceptual skill, the focus should then shift to the application of this skill in learning 
mathematics. This is a crucial point, which perhaps requires more emphasis in the didactics 
of mathematics. 
Under the influence of the current theoretical paradigm, Kavale (1982) may be 
considered to have been remiss in his exclusion of this significance of learning through visual 
perceptual experience in his list of reasons pertaining to the continued controversy over the 
relationship between mathematic ability and visual perceptual skill (refer to Section 3.4.1). 
The claim can be made that adequate visual perceptual skill, possessed by the majority of 
normally developed children, is insufficient. It can be argued that, in addition, learners need 
to be taught how to use this skill in their mathematics learning. That is, learners need to know 
how to effectively implement imagery and metaphor in mathematical learning and problem 
solving. 
In support of the claim that the mere possession of the necessary visual perceptual 
skills is insufficient for conceptual learning in mathematics, Presmeg’s (1997b) personal 
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teaching experience in a South African high school provides substantiation. Two particular 
learners, shown to have superior visual perceptual skill, regularly scored over 80% for 
mathematics under her imagistic and visuo-spatial mode of tuition. When the author left the 
school, the replacement teacher unfortunately taught mathematics algebraically and non-
visually. Thereafter, both learners failed mathematics. Possession of the cognitive tools is 
superfluous without appropriate guidance and teaching. 
According to Lakoff and Núñez (2000), abstract mathematical cognition is 
particularly dependent upon the visuo-motor and visuo-spatial experiences of collecting, 
constructing, manipulating, and moving. An early mathematics class, therefore, should 
resemble ‘supervised mayhem’, with the learners counting, collecting, constructing, 
manipulating, and moving, preferably in a wide-open space. With solid sensory-motor 
grounding, mathematics education thereafter entails exposition of successive metaphorical 
layers. This demands the continued utilisation of visual perceptual skill, to enable the 
abstraction required for further metaphoric creation, and comprehension of existing social 
metaphoric conceptualisations. 
In summary, mathematics education with a focus on rote learning of arithmetic tables, 
formulae, and algorithms amounts to teaching exclusively how to do mathematics, but is 
deficient in the requisite associated understanding. This disregards both progressive 
educational psychology (refer to Section 2.3.2) and the cognitive science view of situated 
mathematics and cognition. The situated cognitive paradigm grounds mathematical cognition 
in sensory-motor activity. Consequently, the current cognitive scientific emphasis in the 
development of foundational mathematical cognition, rests on the ability to move, 
manipulate, collect, and construct. It is therefore fundamentally incongruous for mathematics 
to be rote-learned from a textbook, sitting at a desk. This is particularly relevant in primary 
school mathematics learning, before extensive metaphorical layering substantially distances 
the mathematics from its sensory-motor foundations. 
 
4.8 Summation 
Situated theory presents a holistic theory that reveals an intimate connection between 
perception and cognition. Situated cognitive scientific insights, in concert with 
neuropsychological data on innate visuo-motor capacities, thus lend theoretical plausibility to 
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the hypothesis of an intimate relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic 
ability. 
Substantial evidence (refer to Sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.5) reveals an indisputable degree of 
foundational mathematical cognition, in which the highly evolved visual system plays a 
pivotal role. Visual discrimination, visual memory, visual-motor integration, and spatial 
relations are crucial visual perceptual component skills that enable the innate number sense, 
and its extension to arithmetic and beyond. Spatial relations are particularly critical. This may 
possibly be due to the inherent cognitive number-space association, evidenced by the spatial 
nature of the mental number line, which is the natural conceptualisation of number. The 
correlation between spatial abilities and mathematic ability has been widely published 
(Dehaene, 1997; Guay & McDaniel, 1997; Wheatley, 1997; Bryant & Squire, 2001; Fias & 
Fischer, 2005; Halpern & Collaer, 2005; Hegarty & Waller, 2005). 
Dehaene (1997) and Giaquinto (2007) have both been cited (refer to Section 2.3.5) as 
acknowledging the essential visuo-spatial nature of arithmetical cognition, exceeding that of 
superficial numerical decoding. However, they then revert to a formalist rule-based 
arithmetic in their explanation. Overall, Giaquinto has presented an insightful theory on the 
role of visualisation as a pertinent means of mathematical discovery; within which lies a 
paradox. The assessment of mathematical philosophies presented in Section 2.1 reaches the 
conclusion that mathematics is not discovered, but is cognitively constructed. Furthermore, 
although his theory aptly rests on phenomenal perceptual concepts, Giaquinto later reduces 
these to lists of ‘category specifications’ reminiscent of the information-processing theories 
of the conceptual system. A philosophical shift from entrenched Cartesian dualism, 
information-processing, and formalism, may benefit many existing theories of visual 
perception and mathematical cognition. 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000) appear to have accomplished this shift, with their tentative 
theory of mathematical cognition, situated within the situated cognitive scientific paradigm. 
The theoretical crux is that mathematical conception is metaphorical, and based on 
perception. Their theory thus discloses a firm relationship between visual perceptual skill and 
mathematical cognition. Operation of the visual system is not restricted to vision; it includes 
mental imagery, and therefore contributes to abstract conceptualisation. Additionally, the 
prefrontal cortex neurally links the visual system to the motor system, allowing the bodily 
utilisation of cognitive motor schemas in order to trace cognitive image schemas. This 
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provides the sensory-motor grounding, and basic inferential structure from which 
mathematics originates, and derives its meaning. A base of neuropsychologically confirmed 
innate sensory-motor skills support numerosity and perceptual subitization, from which 
Lakoff and Núñez provide a convincing argument that all mathematics is constructed through 
conceptual metaphor, with increasing abstraction as metaphor is layered upon metaphor. 
Findings related to the mental number line provide evidence for the metaphorical 
nature of mathematics. Originally believed to be the result of number-detecting neurons, due 
to its spontaneity in development, neurophysiologic evidence (cited in Fias & Fischer, 2005) 
has since shown the absence of any such topographical neuronal map. The mental number 
line is better conceived as a basic conceptual metaphor, capturing and preserving the inherent 
spatiality of number. Further up the mathematical hierarchy, calculus also clearly reveals the 
metaphorical nature of mathematics. Kaput (cited in Núñez, 2007) explained that basic 
calculus attains its meaning through a number of motion metaphors, which patently manifest 
in the notation and social discourse vocabulary associated with calculus. Unfortunately, the 
formal mathematical definitions capture only limited aspects of the metaphorical concepts. 
Núñez (2007) contended that limitations such as this may contribute to the naïve disregard for 
the underlying meaningful metaphors accompanying formal mathematics learning. The 
disconnection of formal definitions from human-situated motion may account for the 
ostensible counter-intuitiveness of calculus. 
The metaphorical mathematics of Lakoff and Núñez (2000) fosters appreciation for 
Dehaene’s (1997) and Devlin’s (2000) insistences for the necessity of proper abstraction of 
number beyond that of the basic number sense, in successful higher mathematics (refer to 
Section 2.2.6). Sound metaphorical abstraction of number provides an essential foundation, a 
metaphorical grounding metaphor, on which to base the next hierarchical layer of metaphor: 
the linking metaphors, connecting higher mathematics to arithmetic. Indeed, each of Devlin’s 
levels of abstraction may be comparable to conceptual metaphorical layering (refer to 
Sections 2.2.6 and 4.3.2). The lowest level equates to Lakoff and Núñez’s grounding 
metaphors, with levels two and three each incorporating an additional metaphorical layer, the 
kind of abstraction possibly sufficient to allow basic arithmetical cognition. The final level, 
representative of mathematical cognition, equates to an entire metaphorical network, 
including layers, links and blends. 
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Despite the shortcomings in their theories, both Piaget’s (1963, 1969) and Giaquinto’s 
(2007) ideas also resonate with those of Lakoff and Núñez (2000), providing further 
theoretical support for Lakoff and Núñez’s theory of mathematical cognition. 
 Piaget’s belief (refer to Section 3.2) in the grounding of abstract mental operations in 
embodied sensory-motor actions, albeit within an objective world, may nevertheless be 
regarded as a prototype for Lakoff and Núñez’s theory of the same, but which is embedded 
within an enacted environment. Despite concern over the timeline, Piaget’s theoretical 
account of self-constructed mathematical conceptual knowledge passes consecutively through 
Devlin’s (2000) levels of abstraction, which are comparable to the development of Lakoff 
and Núñez’s network of conceptual metaphor. 
 In Giaquinto’s theory of the epistemologically visual nature of mathematical 
cognition (refer to Section 2.3.5), as opposed to pure logic, he posits that abstract general 
truths can be discerned through specific visual images. Giaquinto described this process as 
occurring ‘via inference, generalisation, and analogy’, although he may reasonably have 
substituted via metaphor. The ‘weak intrinsic connection’ he draws between analytical and 
perceptual concepts – which he claims poses the challenge in calculus – is analogous to 
calculus being more metaphorical and abstract than geometry. Giaquinto’s reasoning, albeit 
expressed in an alternative terminology, is thus in line with that of Lakoff and Núñez. 
 
Giaquinto’s (2007) concern, however, over abstract concepts, which he termed 
analytic concepts, extending the calculus domain to the unvisualisable, is unfounded, since 
this is precisely the purpose of conceptual metaphor. Visual perceptual concepts provide the 
basis for conceptual metaphor, which may be layered ad infinitum in the development of 
abstract concepts. This often metaphorically distances abstract concepts from their visual 
perceptual base, rendering this base unrecognisable, yet preserving the original visual 
inferences. The root of Giaquinto’s confusion may lie in the nature of mathematics itself. 
Situated mathematics does not exist in the physical world. It is an abstract cognitive 
creation, and therefore cannot be observed. However, nor is it a formal analytical creation 
resting on a set of assumptions. It is a creative abstract conceptual construction of a situated 
cognition. Specifically, it is created by abstracting general patterns from concrete sensory-
motor instantiations. Situated sensory-motor experience therefore grounds the meaning of 
mathematics. Visual perception, which is directly connected to motor activity, is a major 
component of sensory-motor experience. If mathematics is grounded in visual perception, it 
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sensibly follows that the same neural structures, and their concomitant cognitive functions, 
are involved in actual mathematical cognitive activity. This authenticates the plausibility of 
an intimate relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. 
The fundamental natures of situated visual perception and situated mathematical 
cognition are comparable. Neither visual perceptual properties, such as colour, nor 
mathematical objects, namely numbers, exist externally; they are instead a product of situated 
cognition. There are a limited number of perceptually universal colours, the balance being 
culturally specific. Similarly, from the limited embodied sense of numerosity, mathematics is 
socially created according to cultural concerns. Visual perception is experienced in action, 
with object discrimination and position composed through potential action. Likewise, the 
motor metaphorical actions of collecting, constructing, manipulating, and moving, establish 
mathematical cognition. Visual perceptual skill is the dynamic and interactive co-ordination 
of situated sensory-motor activity with the enacted environment. This same sensory-motor 
activity grounds the regress of mathematical meaning. This common relation to action 
naturally endows both visual perception and mathematical cognition with a strong spatial 
component. 
Situated theory consistently emphasises visuo-spatial perception, supported by the 
spatial relations visual perceptual component skill. In particular, perceptual space, via 
metaphor, provides for abstract conceptual cognition, the epitome of mathematical cognition 
(refer to Section 4.5.4). This, together with the inherent spatiality associated with the 
primitive number sense, suggests the possibility of a relative importance for spatial relations 
in mathematical cognition. Nevertheless, the theory of situated cognition equally implies the 
broader relation between visual perception and mathematical cognition. The situated 
cognitive paradigm therefore provides a coherent alternative to traditional cognitive theories. 
The holistic and dynamic brain-body-world conception eradicates the Cartesian duality of the 
world, and its associated limitations. Situated theory clarifies the natures of visual perception, 
cognition, and mathematics, offering a viable explanation for a possible relation among them. 
Sharing more than a mere causal relationship, situated visual perception and mathematical 
cognition are co-constituted emergent cognitive capacities, through embodied sensory-motor 
activity embedded in, and extended into the enacted physical and social environment. 
A relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability is therefore a 
reasonable expectation, from the perspective of situated cognition. In further exploration of 
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this relationship, a small investigation was undertaken to test the hypothesis that visual 
perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. Determining 
the relative contribution of visual perceptual component skills is expected to reveal the 
comparative significance of spatial relations.  
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CHAPTER 5: Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Conceptualisation 
The plausibility of arguments from current cognitive theory, combined with empirical 
and developmental evidence intimates a link between perceptual skills, predominantly visual, 
to all types of learning, through conceptual development. This is particularly evident since 
the advent of situated cognitive theory. The existence of the more specific relationship 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability may be inferred from this broader link. 
To explore this possibility further, an empirical investigation was designed to test the 
hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics 
achievement. In the context of the poor status of scholastic mathematics achievement across 
all grades in South African schools, this specific hypothesis was selected over the broader 
relation of visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. For clarification, and to assist in 
developing practical strategies to enhance mathematics education, the relative contributions 
of various visual perceptual component skills were also determined. 
In the absence of agreement on construct definitions, for the purposes of this 
exploratory investigation, visual perceptual skill was conceptualised in terms of assessment 
of the set of component skills that constitute visual perception as measured by the third 
edition of the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills (TVPS-3). This instrument specifies seven 
component skills essential for visual perceptual identification and spatial perception, 
including visual discrimination; visual memory; spatial relations; form constancy; sequential 
memory; figure-ground; and visual closure. Scholastic mathematics achievement was 
operationalised as the performance on a grade-appropriate mathematics test. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
Investigation into the veracity of the hypothesis required a one-group correlational 
study. The visual perceptual skill and mathematics achievement of a representative sample of 
Grade 6 learners were assessed. This implied the collection of primary, empirical, numerical 
data, rendering the study as quantitative. The significance of correlation between the visual 
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perceptual component skills, overall composite skill, and scholastic mathematics 
achievement, was determined. 
The focus of the hypothesis on scholastic mathematics achievement, rather than pure 
mathematic ability per se, suggested a natural classroom setting for the data collection. Such 
a natural setting had the advantage of decreasing experimenter and laboratory effects, and 
increasing the generalisability of the results. While this design does allow for statistical 
analyses of the results, the main limitation of a natural setting is the lack of control of 
extraneous factors (Mouton, 2001). Usually, care to control context effects is called for in this 
type of design. However, the classroom context, and its effect, seemed to be an important 
factor in the measurement of scholastic mathematics achievement, particularly within the 
situated cognitive theoretical framework. 
The study may be further categorised as fundamental exploratory research, in its aim 
of providing empirical support for the hypothesis derived from recent cognitive theory. It is 
hoped that this may subsequently assist in improving practical educational methodologies. 
 
5.3 Sampling 
5.3.1 Technique and Criteria 
A natural correlational design generally calls for simple random sampling. However, 
due to the sheer scale of the possible research population of schoolchildren, this was deemed 
impractical. Convenience sampling, restricted to a defined area, was thus utilised. Every 
effort was taken to eliminate experimenter bias, thus improving the accuracy of sample 
representativeness. 
Based on the principle of quota sampling (Van Vuuren & Maree, 1999), two 
important sub-groups of the population were identified: those of high and low socio-
economic status, respectively. It was taken that economic status would possibly influence the 
life-style of the participants, and the quality of education received, thereby potentially 
affecting the measurable variables. To ensure representative diversity, non-random samples 
were selected from each sub-group. 
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The non-random selection of samples involved first approaching all the English and 
dual medium primary schools in the Stellenbosch area of South Africa, to request permission 
to conduct the study in their school. The idea was to select two government schools; one 
situated in a wealthy area, and the other in a previously disadvantaged area. This was seen to 
ensure an unbiased mix in terms of gender, racial, cultural, and socio-economic factors. 
However, when only one school showed interest, the sample area had to be widened to 
include Somerset West. Ultimately, the sample consisted exclusively of the only two schools 
within this area that granted permission for the request, plus a sister-school in the Southern 
suburbs of Cape Town. One was a government school in a previously disadvantaged area, 
and the two sister-schools were private schools in affluent areas. Fortunately, the number of 
participants from these three schools was, roughly equally, divided between the two sub-
groups based on socio-economic status. Since there was a minimal active role in deciding 
sample inclusion, negligible bias was introduced. Hence, there was no danger of invalidating 
probability statistics. 
All three schools were co-educational. Therefore, it was reasonable to suppose that 
the proportion of male and female learners were already representative of their respective 
sub-populations. In addition, all three schools were dual medium, offering classes in either 
English or Afrikaans. One active selection criterion was to include only the learners from the 
English stream, since I was not sufficiently confident to conduct the study in any other 
language. Yet, this could be construed as an advantage, in the elimination of language as a 
variable. To curb further bias, all English stream Grade 6 learners were invited to participate 
in the study. All the parents of those invited agreed to allow their child to participate (see 
Section 5.5). 
Despite this support from parents, the target of between 100 to 150 participants was 
not reached. In these dual medium schools, there was invariably only one English class per 
grade, and these classes were exceptionally small. A sample of only 70 participants was 
achieved. This however fell within the size range of previous similar studies. Although the 
more recent studies of the twenty-first century, cited in Section 3.4.1, comprised between 100 
and 200 participants, the 221 older studies incorporated in Larsen and Hammill’s (1975) 
review and Kavale’s (1982) meta-analysis, ranged from as low as 20 participants. 
Furthermore, a sample size of 70 was well in excess of the required 20 observations 
necessary for the statistical significance testing utilised in this study. It was also in line with 
the acceptable ratio of participants to independent variables recommended for multiple 
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regression analysis. Generally, approximately 10 times more participants than independent 
variables, is considered acceptable (Statsoft, 2011). 
Only one grade, Grade 6, was elected from which to select participants to ensure that 
all participants were of an equivalent educational level. A range of grades would have 
necessitated the compilation of several mathematics tests of varying levels. The difficulty in 
ensuring inter-test equivalence posed a potential threat to validity. Grade 6 was partly an 
arbitrary designation, but several reasons supported the decision: 
 Mathematics becomes increasingly abstract in secondary school, and is therefore 
more dependent on explicit instruction (refer to Sections 4.6 and 4.7), potentially 
confounding a possible relationship with visual perceptual skill. 
 The human brain physically matures between 11 and 13 years of age (Louw, Van Ede 
& Ferns, 1998), facilitating the transition from primarily concrete to increasingly abstract 
cognition. This is a crucial period, therefore, in mathematical cognition. It is conceivable that 
it is at this critical juncture that a child first begins to lag mathematically. I was loath, 
however, to disrupt Grade 7 classes, which is an important foundational grade for secondary 
school, and Grade 6 was chosen as a suitable alternative. 
 All the empirical studies cited in Section 3.4.1 were conducted with participants from 
primary school or kindergarten. Of the 60 studies reviewed by Larsen and Hammill (1975) 
15% included Grade 6. Guay and McDaniel’s (1977) study incorporated Grades 2 through 7. 
The average age of the balance of the studies was only slightly lower than the present study, 
ranging from around 8 years to just under 11 years of age. Growth of any body of comparable 
empirical evidence enables more robust conclusions to be drawn. 
It was decided not to implement a vision screening for the identification of those 
participants with visual disorders, thereby ensuring their inclusion in the study. Indeed, sub-
optimal visual acuity would adversely affect the visual perceptual skill assessment, through 
its direct negative effect on visual discrimination, which is the most basic underlying visual 
perceptual component skill. However, the naturalistic and scholastic focus of the study 
demanded participants’ habitual visual acuity during testing. Low mathematics achievement 
due to poor visual acuity, or visual discrimination, presents an important correlate for the 
purpose of this study. The elimination of candidates with vision problems would effectively 
equate to the selection of a biased sample of participants with superior visual perceptual skill.  
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In consideration of the above, the sampling methods were considered to adequately 
address the two main concerns of sample selection: representativeness, and size, with the 
introduction of very little bias. 
5.3.2 Sample Profile 
The sample consisted of 70 Grade 6 learners from the greater Cape Town area, of 
which 32 were male and 38 were female. The age of the participants ranged from 10 years 7 
months to 13 years 8 months, with an average age of 11 years 8 months. The government 
school provided 34 of the participants, classified as low socio-economic status, to the study. 
The two private sister-schools contributed 21 and 15 participants, respectively, totalling 36 
for the high socio-economic sub-group. The home languages of the participants were 
unknown, but the sample was obtained wholly from the English streams of bilingual schools. 
Remedial extra-maths lessons, based on the school curriculum, were attended by a total of 10 
learners, 6 of whom were classified as low socio-economic, and 4 as high socio-economic. 
This equated to 14.3% of the sample, distributed unevenly across all the schools, with the 
majority attending the public government school. 
 
5.4 Measurement 
5.4.1 Visual Perceptual Skill 
The commercially available TVPS-3 was utilised to assess participants’ visual 
perceptual strengths and weaknesses. This was the most suitable of the perceptual tests that I 
could ethically and competently utilise. 
 The TVPS-3 
The TVPS-3 is a revision of a test originally authored by Dr. Gardner (see Martin, 
2006). It is an untimed test, intended for administering to individuals between the ages of 4 
years and 18 years 11 months. Development and standardisation of the test, reliability and 
validity issues, and test norms are detailed in the test manual (Martin, 2006). 
In general, the TVPS-3 is considered internally and temporally consistent. The values 
of coefficient α, the Spearman-Brown coefficient, and the test-retest correlation, are all equal 
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to 0.96, with the TVPS-3 relatively free from error (95% CI = 1.88) and comprising highly 
homogenous content. Although test validity requires continuous re-evaluation, at the time of 
publication the TVPS-3 displayed moderately strong content validity, criterion-related 
validity, and construct validity. Correlation with the visual subtest of the Developmental Test 
of Visual-Motor Integration produced a coefficient of 0.67. 
Although visual perceptual component skills are not independent, seven skills are 
functionally described and assessed by the TVPS-3: 
1. Visual Discrimination: While a design is displayed, the child must choose the 
matching design from a series of designs. 
2. Visual Memory: A design is shown for five seconds. From memory, the child must 
then choose the matching design from a series of designs. 
3. Spatial Relations: A series of designs is displayed, and the child must choose the one 
that is partly or wholly different in detail or rotation. 
4. Form Constancy: While a design is displayed, the child must find the same design, 
although it may be larger, smaller or rotated, within a series of designs. 
5. Sequential Memory: A design sequence is shown for five seconds. From memory, 
the child must then choose the matching sequence from a series of sequences. 
6. Figure-Ground: While a design is displayed, the child must find the same design 
within a series of complex background designs. 
7. Visual Closure: While a design is displayed, the child must choose the matching 
design from a series of incomplete designs. 
The test comprises two example items and 16 tasks for each sub-skill, with a multiple choice 
answer format. No basals are imposed, but a subtest ceiling is set as three consecutive 
incorrect answers. All task designs are black and white, and arranged in order of difficulty. 
The chronological age of the child is calculated, and used to convert the subtest raw 
scores to scaled scores. These range in value from 1 to 19, with a mean of 10 and standard 
deviation of 3. The overall score and the basic, sequencing, and complex index scores are 
derived from the sum of the subtest scaled scores. These are presented as standard scores, 
with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. 
The purported advantages of the TVPS-3 are the flexible response mode, the clarity of 
the black on white test designs, and the non-language related tasks (Martin, 2006), which 
afford all children equal opportunity. The neutral test patterns also exclude a cultural bias. 
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The test is as motor-free as possible, so as not to confound the visual perceptual measure. 
However, the omission of visual-motor integration precludes a comprehensive assessment 
claim. 
 Administering the Test 
For the purpose of this study, the test administration verbal instructions and scoring 
procedures, as per the test manual (Martin, 2006), were followed. However, four important 
test considerations were violated: 
 The test was not administered individually, as prescribed. Instead, it was administered 
simultaneously to all participants within each school, as a group. 
 The group setting necessitated participants writing their answers down, as opposed to 
the suggested verbal or pointing communication mode. 
 The test manual sets subtest ceilings at three consecutive items answered incorrectly, 
after which the test moves on to the next subtest. However, practical constraints in 
determining subtest ceilings, a consequence of group testing, demanded that each 
group complete the entire test. 
 The specified test environment is to be quiet, comfortable, and free of any 
distractions, including other people. The normal classroom situation in which the test 
was administered represents the antithesis of this description. 
A child learns and practices mathematics in a classroom, with its attendant 
disruptions. Furthermore, slower learners are forced to keep pace with the class. If visual 
perceptual skill is a factor of mathematic ability, and so contributes to learning mathematics, 
then it is the visual perceptual skill available within this context that is of importance. The 
TVPS-3 was thus administered collectively at each school, in the classroom. The test plates 
were projected onto a screen, and the participants wrote down the number associated with the 
correct multiple-choice option. When approximately half the class had completed a task, the 
rest of the learners were encouraged to guess at an answer, after which the next task was 
presented. This procedure emulated a contextual environment similar to that of a typical 
mathematics class. 
Disregard for the precise test conditions would undeniably affect the reliability and 
validity of the resulting measure. However, for this study, the assessment of the participants’ 
habitual cognitive resources, within the natural classroom environment was of greater import 
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than pure visual perceptual ability. Furthermore, the adaptations to the test instructions 
generated testing conditions similar to that of the subsequent mathematics assessment. In this 
case, the TVPS-3 test-retest reliability would be low, yet it would simultaneously 
demonstrate high construct validity. 
5.4.2 Scholastic Mathematics Achievement 
Performance on a grade-appropriate mathematics test served as a measure of 
scholastic mathematics achievement. The use of an available standard mathematics 
achievement test was rejected, because of their reputation for an emphasis on computational 
skill (Wheatley, 1997). 
The difficulty in garnering unmitigated support for the study, from the majority of the 
schools approached, hindered the acquisition of actual class maths tests, from which to form 
an integrated unbiased grade-appropriate test. Their overt lack of enthusiasm in allowing 
access to their learners was a deterrent to requesting a copy of a maths test. A standard 
mathematics test was therefore created, in accordance with the national curriculum 
guidelines. This proved beneficial as the guideline criteria ensured that the test conformed to 
clearly identified standards of ability. A copy of the mathematics test is appended as A1. 
The Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) system, in place in 2010, identified certain 
skills, or learning outcomes, which needed to be mastered in each grade. Since data collection 
took place early in the academic year, the mathematics test created was based on the learning 
outcomes pertaining to the Grade 5 mathematics syllabus. This ensured that all the 
participants had theoretically covered the relevant class work. Mandy Facer (2008), in the 
Oxford Blitz Maths series, describes the learning outcomes appropriate for Grade 5 as 
follows: 
 Numbers, operations and relationships: Recognise, describe and represent numbers 
and their relationships, and to count, estimate, calculate and check with competence 
and confidence in solving problems. 
 Patterns, functions, and algebra: Recognise, describe and represent patterns and 
relationships, as well as to solve problems using algebraic language and skills. 
 Space and shape: Describe and represent characteristics and relationships between 
two-dimensional shapes and three-dimensional objects in a variety of orientations and 
positions. 
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 Measurement: Use appropriate measuring units, instruments and formulae in a 
variety of contexts. 
 Data handling: Collect, summarise, display and critically analyse data in order to 
draw conclusions and make predictions, and to interpret and determine chance 
variation (p. 7). 
Questions comprising the mathematics test were adapted from a broad spectrum of the 
practice activities presented in Oxford Blitz Maths Grade 5 (Facer, 2008). The first 11 
questions involved number and pattern recognition and representation, counting, common 
and decimal fractions, and basic arithmetic calculation. Question 12 required solving number 
sentences in algebraic language. Questions 13 to 16 concerned estimation and measuring, 
which necessitated an understanding of measuring units and three-dimensional objects. 
Questions 17 to 23 were ‘story sums’, epitomising contextual problem solving. Question 24 
presented a graph for interpretation, an aspect of data handling. The total mark allocation for 
the test was 101. 
The Oxford Blitz Maths series of books were designed for both teachers and parents to 
assist a child in mastering the mathematics required for the South African school curriculum. 
The teacher of one class involved in the study admitted to routinely relying on this series in 
his teaching. The recognition, by educators as well as the Department of Basic Education, of 
the Oxford Blitz Maths series served to attest that the derived mathematics test was reliable, 
stable and valid. There was therefore no further reliability and validity testing, save pilot 
testing with two Grade 6 children, in order to gauge their reaction and performance. Validity 
of the test was confirmed by the teachers’ assertions that their learners’ test scores were 
closely aligned with their typical performance in class maths tests. 
 
5.5 Data Collection 
The first step in collecting the data was the identification of potential participatory 
schools. A letter (Appendix A4) requesting their participation was delivered to viable 
schools, between March 2009 and February 2010, within an ever-increasing area. 
Appointments were made with those willing to assist. A week before the scheduled test date, 
a letter of consent (Appendix A5) was sent home with suitable learners, for their parents. 
Should permission be granted, the letter was to be signed, and returned the day before 
assessment. 
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As a courtesy to all those involved, the results of the assessments were made available 
to both the school and parents of the learners involved. School principals received the letter 
appended as A6, together with their learners’ mathematics test results and original TVPS-3 
scoring sheets. Simplified visual perceptual skills evaluation forms (Appendix A7) were sent 
to the parents. The participants each received a rainbow pencil to thank them for their effort. 
The testing was devoid of any physical or psychological harm to the participants. The 
required tasks were similar to activities they perform in the normal school context. 
Furthermore, confidentiality of the names of the participants, as well as the schools involved, 
was maintained. There were no ethical violations. 
5.5.1 Context 
I administered and scored all tests myself, in order to minimise experimenter effects. 
At each school, both tests were conducted on the same day, in the morning when the learners 
were mentally fresh. The TVPS-3 was administered first and then the mathematics test 
thereafter, with a 10 to 15 minute break between them to prevent mental fatigue. During the 
break, the participants were encouraged to run around outside. The TVPS-3 took between 40 
and 50 minutes to complete, and one hour was given for the completion of the mathematics 
test. 
Testing took place at School 1, the low socio-economic sub-group, on 26 January 
2010, from 9 am. The classroom did not have provision for a projector and screen, so the 
learners were provided desks and chairs in the library. The teacher was not present. The 
majority of the class was unruly and disinterested. Unfortunately, they were not allowed to 
leave the venue, so between the tests, we expended some energy by dancing and stretching. 
School 2 was visited on 28 January 2010 at 8 am. The classroom had state of the art 
projection equipment, and the teacher was so excited about the study that he also completed 
the mathematics test. He asked to borrow their papers, once I had finished marking them, so 
that he could go through them with his learners, as a supplementary maths lesson. 
With the unexpectedly small class size at School 2, it was necessary to source further 
participants towards the high socio-economic sub-group. I was referred to their sister-school. 
Testing at School 3 therefore took place a little later, on 9 March 2010, from 9 am. The 
teacher was present, and the class displayed a high level of discipline. As the children 
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completed the mathematics test, they either selected a reading book from the bookshelf in the 
classroom, or quietly did other schoolwork, while waiting for the rest of the class to finish. 
This appeared to be standard practice. 
5.5.2 Collection Procedure 
 Visual perceptual skill 
The TVPS-3 was administered, contrary to test instructions (refer to Section 5.4.1), to 
each class as a group. The test plates were projected onto a screen, maintaining the 
advantageous black on white clarity, but introducing a distance vision component, which is 
an important facet in a classroom situation. All verbal instructions given to the participants 
were issued as per the test manual. 
Pointing to the correct option, however, was not a possible response mode within the 
group setting. In addition, the authentic response forms provided with the TVPS-3 reveal the 
correct answers. Therefore, an alternative answer sheet was designed (Appendix A3), on 
which the participants had to write down the number associated with the correct multiple-
choice option. This introduced a motor component, contrary to the aims of the TVPS-3, but 
was deemed advantageous in simulating a natural mathematics class context. 
Another deviation from the test instructions was the completion of the entire test. 
Normally, the ceiling system is utilised in order to curb the child’s wasted effort and 
frustration in test items beyond their level of competence. However, within a group, 
composed of varying levels of competencies, there could be no immediate awareness of when 
subtest ceilings were reached. However, since each participant had to complete the entire test, 
there was consequently no bias. 
The responses were later transcribed onto genuine TVPS-3 scoring forms, and scored 
as per the instruction manual, with the application of subtest ceilings. For the purpose of the 
parents’ simplified evaluation forms only, the visual perceptual skill subtest and overall 
scores were categorised, based on the associated TVPS-3 percentile rank. A percentile rank 
of between 38 and 62 was categorised as average. Below average and above average 
corresponded with 16 to 37 and 63 to 84, respectively. A percentile rank of below 16 was 
categorised as inferior, and above 84 as superior. 
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 Mathematics achievement 
The participants were given one hour to complete the mathematics test. The test 
incorporated a cover page, so that participants could begin only when told to do so. Many 
finished within the hour, and were encouraged to check their work and re-attempt those 
questions that they had omitted. At the end of the hour, all participants were instructed to 
stop, and put down their pencils. 
It was explained, before beginning, that the test did not become progressively more 
difficult. They should, therefore, do what they could first, leaving anything with which they 
were struggling. If they had time at the end, they could revisit any problematic questions. 
They were also shown the blank pages opposite each typed page of the test, and encouraged 
to use this space for any jotting or ‘working out’ which may have been necessary to assist 
them in solving the problems. I explained that I would be interested in seeing how they 
arrived at their answers. These instructions were re-iterated throughout the duration of the 
test. Despite the constant reminder, participants were still frequently observed to 
surreptitiously erase their jottings. 
The mathematics test was marked as per the schedule appended as A2. Detailed mark 
allocation instructions were devised to enhance reliability. The test actually totalled 101, but 
for the sake of simplicity, participants’ totals out of 101 were treated as their percentage 
achievement score. 
 
5.6 Data Capturing 
After scoring the TVPS-3, and marking the mathematics tests, the results were 
carefully tabulated on a Microsoft EXCEL© (2007) spreadsheet. 
The participants had filled in their name, date of birth, and school name on the TVPS-
3 response forms. The date of birth provided was used to calculate each participant’s age in 
months. All this information was preserved during the transcription onto genuine TVPS-3 
scoring forms. Likewise, the cover page of the mathematics test included the following 
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information: participants’ name, gender, school name, and whether they had ever attended 
extra-maths lessons. The categorical data options were assigned a numerical code. 
Consequently, the TVPS-3 scoring forms and the mathematics test manuscripts 
together enabled the construction of a comprehensive data table. The original data table thus 
incorporated fifteen columns: name, age, gender, extra-maths lesson attendance, school, 
socio-economic status, raw math percentage, overall visual perceptual skill (VPS) score, and 
a column for each of the seven visual perceptual skill subtest scores. The test manuscripts 
were ordered alphabetically within each school group, and the data entered into the table in 
that order. This facilitated the subsequent verification of the data entered. Once the accuracy 
of the data was ensured, the column listing the participants’ names was amended to a case 
number. 
To assist with the choice and understanding of statistical analyses, the data was 
clarified by means of a data specification sheet, appended as A8. During the course of the 
data analysis, a decision was taken to standardise and scale the raw math test results. Hence, a 
scaled math score column was added to the data table, and the additional data specified. 
Having the data captured on an EXCEL© spreadsheet was advantageous, because 
statistical analyses were possible with no further data transcription. Analysis was either 
executed within EXCEL© or, where an alternative statistical package was utilised, EXCEL© 
compatibility permitted direct importation of the data table. This served to minimise possible 
transcription errors. 
 
5.7 Data Analysis 
Before investigating the correlation between visual perceptual skill and scholastic 
mathematics achievement, the data was described and it was determined whether any other 
known variables had a bearing on the test results. The MoonStats CC (© 2001, 2002) 
software package was used for the basic descriptive statistics, the Pearson’s product-moment 
correlations, and the t tests. It was selected for its user-friendly interface and clarity of output. 
However, it does not extend to statistical analyses that are more complex, such as ANOVA, 
and multiple regression analysis, which were therefore accomplished using EXCEL© (2007). 
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5.7.1 Data Description 
Basic statistics elucidated the sample constitution, and provided a summary depiction 
of the data collected. 
Frequency counts were carried out for each category of the nominal categorical school 
group variable and the nominal dichotomous variables of gender, extra-maths lesson 
attendance, and socio-economic status. The nature of the sample was further described by 
cross-tabulation with the test results. 
Participants’ age was the only sample variable continuous in nature. The mean and 
range were calculated, and the data from a grouped frequency count was plotted on a graph to 
show the distribution of the age variable. Skewness and kurtosis were calculated to assess the 
degree of normality. 
The mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum descriptive statistics were 
calculated for each of the test results. For each test, the data from a grouped frequency count 
plotted on a graph, aided visualisation of the distribution of the results. Again, skewness and 
kurtosis were calculated to assess the degree of normality. 
5.7.2 Influence of Known Extraneous Variables 
To enhance the validity of subsequent statistical analyses of the test data, it was 
determined whether any of the known sample variables affected the test results. 
 Dichotomous variables 
There were three categorical sample variables of concern. Gender and socio-economic 
status were tested for significance against both sets of test results. Extra-maths lesson 
attendance was tested only against the mathematics test results, since there was no reason to 
suppose any influence on the visual perceptual skill measurement. 
The categories of the nominal dichotomous independent variables were themselves 
also independent, due to random sample selection. The dependent variables of raw math and 
overall VPS scores consisted of ratio and interval data respectively. The particular 
configuration of the variables and data involved, prescribed the use of the 2-sample 
independent t test. Five t tests were thus performed. In each case, the t test, with its associated 
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probability value, determined whether the difference between the two categories’ mean test 
results were of statistical significance. Since directionality was not an issue, all the t tests 
were treated as 2-tailed, and the p values therefore read as presented, and unmodified. To add 
meaning to the data, Cohen’s d indicated the effect size of significant relations. 
 Categorical variable 
It was subsequently decided to perform a one-way analysis of variance for the raw 
math variable, over the nominal categorical school variable. This involved comparing the 
mean mathematics test percentages of the three schools. To facilitate the test, descriptive 
statistics for the raw math results were calculated for each school. 
In testing for a significant difference amongst the three means, the F test yielded the 
ratio of the ‘between groups’ estimate to the ‘within groups’ estimate. The effect size was 
computed by means of eta squared. The Multiple Range Tests then determined which group 
means were significantly different from which others, by applying a multiple comparison 
procedure based on Fischer’s least significant difference of 95%. With this method, there was 
only a 5% risk of mistaken significance of difference between each pair of means. 
 Continuous variable 
The sample age variable was also of concern. The continuous nature of both the 
sample variable and the test variables sanctioned Pearson’s product-moment correlation for 
determination of the association. The strength of influence was indicated by the resultant r 
value. The preceding sign of the correlation co-efficient r signified the direction of the 
correlation, these both being either positive or negative. The associated p value indicated 
whether the correlation was statistically significant within the wider population. Two separate 
correlations, the independent age variable versus each dependent test result, were performed 
at the 5% probability level. 
5.7.3 Standardisation 
The statistical testing to this point prompted the standardisation of the raw math test 
results, before proceeding with the hypothesis testing. 
Standardisation normalised each individual raw math test percentage, within each 
school group, through their transformation to z scores. Consequently, each participant’s 
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mathematics test percentage was expressed in terms of the number of standard deviations that 
their score deviated from that of the mean of their particular school. The conversion yielded a 
standard normal distribution, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
For ease of data visualisation and comparison, the z scores were reconverted to a 
common scaled score. The scaling was based on the mean of the three schools’ mean 
mathematics test percentages, and their mean standard deviation. This produced a scale with 
a range of possible values from 1 to 99. 
Standardisation permitted just comparison of the mathematics test results, despite the 
significantly different means and ranges across schools. Ancillary to this process was the 
effective elimination of the socio-economic status variable. The entire standardisation 
process, with its simple formulae, was executed directly on the Excel© (2007) data sheet. The 
new scaled math variable was added to the data specification sheet, and described in terms of 
its mean; standard deviation; minimum; maximum; and frequency distribution. The 
participants’ scaled math scores were thereafter utilised as the measure of their scholastic 
mathematics achievement. 
5.7.4 Testing the Hypothesis 
The principal concern of the study was whether or not visual perceptual skill 
positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. This was determined by 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation. Secondary to this was the assessment of the relative 
contributions of the seven visual perceptual sub-skills, by means of a multiple regression 
analysis, and a correlation matrix. 
 Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
For the purposes of statistical analysis, two mutually exclusive hypotheses were 
formulated: 
Null hypothesis (H0): There is no relationship between visual perceptual skill and 
scholastic mathematics achievement. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Visual perceptual skill positively correlates with 
scholastic mathematics achievement. 
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The continuous nature of both sets of data dictated the use of Pearson’s product-
moment co-efficient in order to calculate the strength and direction of the correlation between 
the independent overall VPS variable and the dependent scaled math variable. One-sided 
testing on Pearson’s correlation was performed for significance. The statistical hypothesis 
would be H1: r > 0, since a positive correlation is predicted. The effect size of the correlation 
was indicated by r squared. 
 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Supplementary information regarding the relative contributions of the various visual 
perceptual sub-skills to scholastic mathematics achievement was afforded by means of a 
multiple regression analysis. 
The seven independent visual perceptual subtest scores, in addition to the dependent 
scaled math scores, were all interval measures, and therefore amenable to multiple regression. 
What posed a concern was the number of independent variables in relation to the small 
sample size. However, it is advised (Statsoft, 2011) that the minimum number of participants 
be five times that of the number of independent variables; although a higher ratio is preferred, 
for a stable replicable regression. A ratio of 10:1, as submitted by this study, is considered 
acceptable, especially for descriptive or exploratory research such as exemplified by the 
present study. Co-linearity – correlations amongst the independent variables – was also a 
threat to stability; particularly since the visual perceptual sub-skills are merely functionally 
described elements of a wider composite complex facility. Although, an accurate prediction 
formula was superfluous, as sovereign causality is not supported within the situated cognition 
theoretical framework. 
The regression generated an R value, the measure of correlation between the observed 
and predicted scaled math scores. An F test determined the statistical significance of the 
multiple correlation co-efficient R, and R squared indicated the proportion of variance. 
However, this value tends toward over-estimation, due to optimal weighting of highly 
correlated independent variables. Adjusted R squared accounted for the number of 
participants, and is thus more realistically applicable to the population.  
The strength of the correlation between each visual perceptual subtest and the scaled 
math scores was ascertained through their respective ß regression co-efficients, measured in 
standard deviations. The results of the TVPS-3 subtests were all expressed as scaled scores 
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with a mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3, so the ß values were directly comparable. 
Their significance was established by t tests at the 95% confidence level. Previous statistical 
testing substantiated a directional positive correlation, yet the statistical software default is to 
report p values as two-tailed. Hence, the reported probabilities were halved to confirm 
significance at p < .05. 
 Correlation Matrix 
Since inter-correlations amongst the independent variables were a potential threat to 
the accuracy of the regression analysis, a correlation matrix was plotted to assess the degree 
of co-linearity. In addition, it established the individual correlations between each visual 
perceptual subtest and the scaled math score, with the balance of the set ignored. 
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
The research design, sampling, and general methodology adhered to accepted 
principles of psychological research. Overall, the data collected was believed to be of good 
quality. Experimenter bias was minimised, there was no missing data, and the data capturing 
procedures instilled a high level of confidence in the prevention of transcription and coding 
errors. The statistical analyses performed were considered appropriate for the data. 
These considerations promote the production of sound results, which would provide 
steadfast empirical evidence for, or against, the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill 
positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. This, in turn, would assist in 
clarifying the broader relation between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. The 
results are presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6: Results 
 
6.1 Data Description 
6.1.1 Sample Data 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of participants over the categorical variables, and 
describes the nature of the sample by cross-tabulation with the test results. The labels are 
further explicated in the data specification sheet (Appendix A8). 
Table 6.1 
Sample Description 
Variable Category n Raw Math Overall VPS 
   M SD M SD 
Gender 1 (male) 32 37.19 11.76 98.97 11.99 
 2 (female) 38 52.66 18.03 100.82 12.55 
EML 1 (no) 60 45.87 16.67 100.70 11.73 
 2 (yes) 10 43.90 21.20 95.60 14.90 
S-E 1 (low) 34 37.40 11.74 99.41 11.76 
 2 (high) 36 52.92 18.35 100.50 12.82 
School 1 (School 1) 34 37.69 12.30 99.41 11.76 
 2 (School 2) 21 58.31 17.40 102.67 12.76 
 3 (School 3) 15 45.37 17.45 97.47 12.72 
 
Although not strictly a necessity for statistical testing, the instances of both gender and socio-
economic status (S-E) represented a fairly even dichotomous split. The male to female ratio 
equated to 46:54, which deviates slightly from an exact split, but was representative of the 
population because of the sampling methods. Extra-maths lessons (EML) were attended by 
14.3% of the sample, with the majority from School 1, and thus within the low socio-
economic group. The small size of this EML sub-group posed a potential obstacle to 
subsequent t testing utilising the EML variable, should the variances prove unequal. 
The age of the participants ranged from 10 years 7 months to 13 years 8 months, with 
a mean of 11 years 8 months. A grouped frequency count plotted on a graph (Figure 6.1) 
shows the distribution to be approximately normal, with a positive skew (0.7). However, the 
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large number of participants near the mean age resulted in a leptokurtic curve (kurtosis = 
0.98). 
Figure 6.1 
 
 
6.1.2 Test Data 
The test results are summarised in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Test Results 
Test Variable N M SD Min Max 
Overall VPS 70 99.97 12.24 72 133 
Raw Math 70 45.38 17.26 11 94 
 
Overall VPS is the standard score as measured by the TVPS-3, and raw math is the 
percentage score achieved on the mathematics test. For both sets of data, grouped frequency 
counts were plotted on a graph (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). This aided visualisation of the 
distribution of the results. Skewness and kurtosis were calculated to determine the degree of 
normality. 
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Figure 6.2 
 
 
Figure 6.3 
 
 
The distribution of the overall VPS standard scores across the sample (Figure 6.2) 
demonstrates a near perfect normal distribution (skewness = 0.10; kurtosis = 0.17). In 
contrast, the distribution of the raw math percentages (Figure 6.3) was bimodal and positively 
skewed (0.45). Kurtosis was calculated to be -0.20. A bimodal distribution often implies the 
superimposition of two normal distributions. However, separate plotting of the distributions 
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of the raw math percentages for each pair of the dichotomous variables revealed no evidence 
of such a superimposition. 
 
6.2 Influence of Known Extraneous Variables 
6.2.1 Dichotomous Variables 
Five 2-sample independent 2-tailed t tests were performed, the results of which are 
summarised in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 
Summary t Test Results of Extraneous Variables 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Test No. t p df 
Gender Raw Math t1 
-0.77 0.445 68 
Overall VPS t2 -0.53 0.601 68 
EML Raw Math t3 1.42 0.160 68 
S-E 
Raw Math t4 -4.24 0.000 60 
Overall VPS t5 -0.37 0.713 68 
Note: The values reported for tests t1, t2, t3, and t5 are those based on the assumption of 
equal variance between the two categories, since the associated F tests proved not significant. 
In contrast, the t4 values assume unequal variance (F = 2.44, p = 0.006). 
The small number of participants in category 2 of the EML variable did not affect the test t3 
(refer to Section 6.1.1), since the variances between the two categories were assumed to be 
equal (see above Note for Table 6.3). The actual difference between the means of the two 
EML categories (refer to Table 6.1) was, in any case, very small ( |M1 – M2| = 1.97). 
Tests t1, t2, t3, and t5 all produced p values greater than 0.05, which suggested that 
there was no statistically significant difference between the means of each of their two 
categories. In other words, neither gender nor socio-economic status influenced the overall 
VPS scores. Similarly, neither gender nor extra-maths lesson attendance impacted on the raw 
math percentages. Gender and extra-maths lesson attendance were therefore entirely non-
influential variables. 
The only test that produced a significant result, with p ≤ .01, was t4, which analysed 
the effect of socio-economic status on the mathematics test results. Such a p value indicated 
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that the raw math means of the two S-E categories were statistically significantly different at 
the 1% level, suggesting a greater than 99% probability of a similar difference within the 
population. Low socio-economic status (M = 37.40, SD = 11.74) yielded significantly lower 
raw math percentages than high socio-economic status (M = 52.92, SD = 18.35). The effect 
size of the statistically significant difference of 15.52 between the mean raw math 
percentages of the two S-E categories was calculated by means of the following formula: 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑛′𝑠 𝑑 = |𝑀1−𝑀2|
𝑠p
  
This yielded a value of 1.03, which meant that the difference between the two categories was 
far greater than would be expected from random variance in the data. The statistical 
significance and effect size was large enough for the relationship to prove significant even 
when allowing for a Bonferroni correction. 
6.2.2 Categorical Variable 
Section 6.2.1 revealed that socio-economic status had a large and significant effect on 
the mathematics test results, while it had no significant effect on the visual perceptual skill 
measurement. With this in mind, it was tentatively surmised that the impact on the 
mathematics results was not directly related to socio-economic status, but rather a derivative 
of a bias in the quality of education apparent between the schools. This rationale for the 
negative bias within the low socio-economic group was supported by the subjective 
observations, within each school, of both the teachers’ and learners’ relative attitudes and 
behaviour. 
Potential corroboration of this conjecture involved the performance of a one-way 
analysis of variance, to determine the extent of influence of the categorical school variable on 
the raw math percentages. This tested for any significant difference amongst the means 
(column 3 of Table 6.4) of the three schools. 
Table 6.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Raw Math Results of the 3 Schools Groups 
School n M SD Min Max Range 
1 34 37.69 12.30 17.5 67.0 49.5 
2 21 58.31 17.40 25.0 94.0 69.0 
3 15 45.37 17.45 11.0 76.0 65.0 
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The results, presented in Table 6.5, proved significant at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 6.5 
ANOVA table for Raw Math by School 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Between groups 5519.24 2 2759.62 12.08 0.000 
Within groups 15309.00 67 228.49 
Total 20828.20 69 
 
The effect size was calculated by means of the following formula: 
𝜂2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
There was thus a statistically significant difference between the schools’ mean raw math 
percentages, F(2,67) = 12.08; p = 0.000, although the size of the effect (𝜂2 = 0.27) proved to 
be rather small. 
The Multiple Range Tests further determined exactly which school means differed 
from which others. In Table 6.6, the third column shows the estimated difference between 
each pair of means. 
Table 6.6 
Multiple Range Tests for Raw Math by School 
Contrast Significant Difference +/-Limits 
1 - 2 yes -20.62 8.37 
1 - 3 no -7.68 9.35 
2 - 3 yes 12.94 10.20 
 
Only the contrast between School 1 and 2, and between School 2 and 3 exhibited statistically 
significant differences at the 95% confidence level. This exposed School 1 and School 3 as an 
homogenous group, contrary to their original classification into distinct socio-economic 
categories. It may have been this distinction between School 1 and 3 versus School 2 that 
resulted in the bimodal distribution of the raw math percentages (refer to Section 6.1.2). 
132 
 
Schools 2 and 3 represented the high socio-economic group, and School 1 comprised 
the low socio-economic group. Yet, mathematics scores from School 2 were significantly 
higher than were those from both the other two schools. This indicates the probability that the 
differences in the mathematics test results may not be related specifically to socio-economic 
status. Other factors, such as attitudes, discipline, available technologies, and teaching 
methods, might be of consequence. Nearly 30% of the variance may be attributed to such bias 
in the quality of education. 
6.2.3 Continuous Variable 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations were used to investigate the possible 
influence of the age variable on each of the test results. Both the correlation between age and 
overall VPS score (r = -0.18, p = 0.14), and that between age and raw math (r = -0.20, 
p = 0.09) proved not significant. Age, therefore, was not statistically relevant to either of the 
test results. 
 
6.3 Standardised Measure of Mathematics Achievement 
The only influence of known extraneous variables was that of socio-economic status 
and school group, on the raw math percentages. The one-way ANOVA performed (refer to 
Section 6.2.2) highlighted the effects of a possible educational quality bias amongst the 
schools. Consequently, to fortify the validity of ensuing hypothesis testing, this bias was 
neutralised by standardising the mathematics test results. 
The raw math percentages were standardised through their transformation to z scores, 
characterised by the corresponding school group’s raw math mean and standard deviation in 
the formula, 
𝑧 =  𝑋−𝑀
𝑠
 . 
The z scores were then reconverted to a common scaled score, based on the raw math mean 
and standard deviation across all three schools. Each individual score was calculated by 
means of the following formula: 
X = z * s + M . 
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The new scaled math variable (M = 47, SD = 15.29) ranged from a minimum of 16 to a 
maximum of 86, and its distribution is portrayed in Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4 
 
The distribution of the scaled math scores was less skewed than that of the raw math results 
(skewness = 0.18, as opposed to 0.45 for the raw math distribution; kurtosis = -0.31). It was 
also noticeably less bimodal, which seems to confirm that it was the educational bias amongst 
the schools that resulted in the bimodality of the raw math distribution (refer to Sections 6.1.2 
and 6.2.2). 
 
6.4 Testing the Hypothesis 
6.4.1 Pearson’s Product-moment Correlation 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation co-efficient was used to test the statistical 
hypotheses: 
H0: r = 0; H1: r > 0. 
A moderately strong positive correlation was shown to exist between the overall VPS and 
scaled math scores, r = 0.38, p = 0.001 (2-tailed). The conversion to a one-tailed correlation, 
to accommodate the directional alternative hypothesis, effectively halved the probability 
value, p < .001. The correlation was therefore statistically significant at the 1% level. 
However, the effect, due to sample size, was small (r2 = 0.14). 
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This meant that a greater than 99% probability existed that the sample result was not 
achieved by chance, but indicative of an occurrence, albeit it small, in the wider population. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis (H0) was rejected in favour of H1. It was thus concluded 
that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. 
6.4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
A multiple regression described the relationship between the visual perceptual sub-
skills, as measured by the seven TVPS-3 subtests (the independent variables), and scholastic 
mathematics achievement represented by the scaled math scores (the dependent variable). It 
revealed four unusual residuals, with studentized values between two and three. However, 
two of these were positive which offset the two that were negative. A general under or over 
prediction was thus refuted. A mean absolute error of 10.68 was recorded. 
The relationship proved significant (R = 0.48, F(7,62) = 2.62, p = 0.019), with 23% of 
the variance (R2 = 0.23) in scholastic mathematics achievement, within the sample, 
attributable to the visual perceptual sub-skills. The adjusted R squared value, more applicable 
to the population, equated to 14%. The individual subtest contributions are summarised in 
Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 
Individual Parameters of Independent Regression Variables 
Variable Co-efficient Std. Error t  p (1-tailed) 
DIS: visual discrimination 0.79 0.52 1.51 0.068 
MEM: visual memory 1.11 0.58 1.91 0.030 
SPA: spatial relations 0.17 0.64 0.26 0.397 
CON: form constancy 0.68 0.50 1.36 0.090 
SEQ: sequential memory 0.72 0.59 1.22 0.114 
FGR: figure-ground -0.16 0.53 -0.31 0.380 
CLO: visual closure -0.84 0.56 -1.49 0.071 
The only t test of significance was that involving visual memory (ß = 1.11, p = 0.03). 
This means that visual memory significantly contributes to scholastic mathematics 
achievement, beyond that already accounted for by the other six visual perceptual sub-skills. 
Figure-ground and visual closure both displayed negative correlations. 
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6.4.3 Correlation Matrix 
It was possible, however, that high co-linearity of the independent variables affected 
the regression results (refer to Section 5.7.4). A correlation matrix, Table 6.8, was therefore 
produced to investigate the extent of correlations amongst the visual perceptual sub-skills. It 
also determined the correlation between each sub-skill and the scaled math score, while 
ignoring the influence of the other independent variables. 
Table 6.8 
Correlation Matrix 
 Scaled Math DIS MEM SPA CON SEQ FGR CLO 
Scaled 
Math 
        
DIS 0.31**        
MEM 0.33** 0.38**       
SPA 0.26* 0.33** 0.29*      
CON 0.29* 0.32** 0.33** 0.36**     
SEQ 0.28* 0.30* 0.26* 0.33** 0.27*    
FGR 0.16 0.34** 0.30* 0.27* 0.47** 0.38**   
CLO 0.08 0.42** 0.49** 0.10 0.34** 0.22 0.45**  
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The correlation matrix showed that the independent variables were highly inter-correlated. Of 
particular importance was the fact that there were no negative correlations. Since high co-
linearity existed, individual correlations between each visual perceptual sub-skill and the 
scaled math score clarified the results provided by the regression analysis. 
Visual discrimination (DIS), the basis for all the other sub-skills, and visual memory 
(MEM) most significantly correlated with the scaled math score. Spatial relations (SPA), 
form constancy (CON), and sequential memory (SEQ) significantly correlated, to a lesser 
degree. Figure-gound (FGR) and visual closure (CLO) were not significantly correlated with 
the scaled math variable. However, FGR and CLO were shown to significantly correlate with 
other visual perceptual component skills, and may therefore be regarded as not independent 
of them. The negative correlations displayed by FGR and CLO in the regression analysis are 
likely to have been the result of these inter-correlations. Highly inter-correlated independent 
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variables make it difficult to determine which variables are actually influencing the 
dependent variable. 
In general, spatial relations (SPA), form constancy (CON), sequential memory (SEQ), 
figure-ground (FGR), and visual closure (CLO) all significantly correlated with visual 
discrimination (DIS) – the most basic underlying component skill – and visual memory 
(MEM). Therefore, the balance of the component skills may be considered as not 
independent of the two important sub-skills of visual discrimination and visual memory. 
 
6.5 Key Findings 
The study sample consisted of 70 participants, with an average age of 11 years 8 
months. The sample variables of gender, extra-maths lesson attendance (EML), and age, all 
proved irrelevant to both sets of test data. Socio-economic status (S-E) also had no effect on 
the overall VPS score. The overall VPS scores were approximately normally distributed, 
whereas the raw math distribution was positively skewed and bimodal. 
There was a significant difference, with a large effect, between the low S-E and the 
high S-E groups’ raw math scores. However, an ANOVA test revealed School 2 (high S-E) to 
have obtained statistically significantly higher raw math percentages than either School 1 
(low S-E) or School 3 (high S-E). These results cast doubt on the validity of socio-economic 
status as a variable. Subsequently, the standardisation of the raw math percentages essentially 
removed the covariance contributed by socio-economic status, and nullified socio-economic 
status as a viable variable. Based on the data, this seems to be a reasonable statement. 
However, further comprehensive research, with more representative samples of data, will be 
needed to clarify this. 
The standardised scores were converted to scaled math scores, the distribution of 
which was less skewed, and less bimodal than that of the raw math percentages. The scaled 
math scores were hereafter used as the measure of scholastic mathematics achievement. 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation between the overall VPS scores and scaled 
math scores proved statistically significant. The null hypothesis was thus rejected in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis, namely that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with 
scholastic mathematics achievement. A multiple regression analysis involving the seven 
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TVPS-3 subtests revealed that visual memory was the only visual perceptual sub-skill to 
contribute significantly to scholastic mathematics achievement, beyond that contributed by 
the entire set. However, the significance of the regression analysis was minimised by a 
correlation matrix that showed high co-linearity amongst the visual perceptual subtests. 
Independently, visual discrimination and visual memory most significantly contribute to 
scholastic mathematics achievement; however, the other five component skills are not 
independent of these two important component skills. 
In conclusion, the results support the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively 
correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. This constitutes empirical evidence in 
support of the broader relation between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability, as 
implicated by situated cognitive theory. Spatial relations, however, proved less consequential 
than the theory had predicted. The following chapter will consider the significance of the 
results in more detail, and reflect on limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER 7: Discussion 
 
In terms of the original goals and hypotheses of the study, statistical analyses 
performed on the data were a partial success. The results provided some clarification as to the 
relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. Specifically, the analysis 
supported the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic 
mathematics achievement. In addition, the relative contribution of a set of component visual 
perceptual sub-skills was determined, although this proved contrary to the particular 
prediction of the situated cognition theoretical framework. 
 
7.1 Theoretical Significance of the Results 
The empirical evidence supports the possibility of a relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability. In the preceding theoretical discussion, the claim was 
made that the theory of situated cognition is best suited to explain this relationship. As 
substantiation, the significance of certain key results is considered in terms of this theoretical 
paradigm. 
7.1.1 Educational Context 
Prior to the hypothesis testing, a one-way ANOVA revealed that the quality of 
mathematics education received was an influential variable on the mathematics test results. 
While socio-cultural factors may undoubtedly contribute to scholastic mathematics 
achievement, statistical testing of the nominal sample variables against the test results 
indicated that educational differences are of greater significance than life-style experiences 
relevant to socio-economic status. In addition, since the schools supposedly follow a common 
national syllabus, the differences in the quality of education must relate more to context than 
to content. To a limited extent, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 6.4 depict the 
consequences. 
The teacher at School 2 holds a PhD in mathematics education. It is likely that he may 
have transmitted the passion for his subject, confirmed by his eager participation in the 
testing, to his learners. Their achievement of the greatest mean, and highest maximum, raw 
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math results can be seen to reflect this possibility. School 3, with an experienced, dedicated 
teacher, and a disciplined class, achieved an average mean raw math result. On the other 
hand, in School 1, the young teacher was absent and the class was ill-disciplined and 
disruptive. This school obtained the lowest mean raw math results and the lowest maximum 
score. Even prior to formally analysing the data, it was intuited that a moderate achiever 
within this kind of educational context, may indeed possess the potential for outstanding 
achievement under more favourable circumstances. Standardisation of the raw math scores 
corroborated this suspicion. The highest raw math score achieved in School 1 was 67, and in 
School 2, a result of 94 was obtained. These equate to scaled math scores of 86 and 79, 
respectively. After countering for the inequality in educational context, the top achiever in 
School 1, with a mediocre raw result of 67, obtained the highest score across the entire 
sample. 
Furthermore, a curious result was the small range, and low standard deviation of raw 
math scores exhibited by School 1, in comparison to the other schools (see Table 6.4). 
Considering the number of participants within this sub-group, almost half the entire sample, a 
greater spread of mathematic ability would perhaps have been expected. There is a possibility 
that this incongruity may also be a consequence of educational context. The more favourable 
learning environment and manner of teaching provided in Schools 2 and 3 might have been 
conducive to encouraging those learners with an interest in mathematics to reach their full 
potential, and excel; thereby inducing a wider range of results. 
These observations are in accordance with the importance of the situational context of 
situated cognition (refer to Section 4.2). Moreover, they underscore the diverse and 
multitudinous aspects of the cognitive environment. Factors such as the encumbrance of 
ambient noise; the behaviour of classmates; motivation provided by teachers; teaching style; 
peer pressure and attitudes towards maths, and school life in general, are only but a few of the 
contributory aspects. An embodied cognition embedded in, and extended into the 
environment, is partially a product of every aspect of the learning situation, both past and 
present. 
7.1.2 The Visual Perceptual Component Skills 
The situated cognitive paradigm predicts the special significance of the spatial 
relations visual perceptual component skill to mathematic ability. This derives from the 
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sensory-motor grounding of mathematics, since movement is spatial by nature. A well-
developed sense of three-dimensional spatial relations, derived from concrete object 
constructions and other motor activities, enables mathematic conceptualisation. 
Contrary to this prediction, a regression analysis performed (refer to Section 6.4.2), 
along with a correlation matrix (Table 6.8), disclose visual memory as the foremost 
contributor to the positive correlation between visual perceptual skill and scholastic 
mathematics achievement. Many previous comparable studies have also yielded similar 
results (refer to Section 3.4.1). The nature of the results is a credible reflection of the vestiges 
of formalist mathematics, where algorithmic mathematics is rote learned. 
The prominence of the visual memory component skill suggests this educational focus 
on rote learning, since rote learning is memorising, usually involving visual and auditory 
stimuli. Naturally, the other six component skills are not superfluous, since they are simply 
functionally described inter-dependent elements of the complex visual perceptual facility, as 
stated in the TVPS-3 manual (Martin, 2006), and as reflected in the correlation matrix (refer 
to Section 6.4.3). Nevertheless, in a predominantly rote-learning style, they are useful only in 
so far as to perceive the stimuli to be visually memorised. Although Dehaene (1997) and 
Giaquinto (2007) have posited that algorithmic arithmetic is visuo-spatial in nature (refer to 
Section 2.3.5), this is a very limited two-dimensional spatiality. The cognitive burden in 
remembering the sequence of steps and rules in an algorithm far outweighs that of the simple 
spatial relations involved in each step. It may be this type of rote mathematical learning, and 
the over-reliance on visual memory, which quite conceivably leads to subsequent 
mathematical stagnation. It does not support the development of conceptual mathematical 
cognition essential to the novel problem solving of higher mathematics (refer to Section 4.7). 
Situated mathematics, grounded in sensory-motor activity, is metaphorical. The 
metaphorical, or conceptual, nature of mathematics, and the analogical reasoning required for 
novel problem solving depends upon the ability to perceive similarities and differences. 
Generally, this entails deep structural similarities and differences, in addition to that of 
merely visual features. However, emergent cognition grounded in sensory-motor capabilities 
extrapolates concrete perceptual concepts to the abstract. This means that the cognitive 
facility for metaphor and analogy originates in the differentiation of perceptual surface 
features, which gives rise to conceptual development. This in turn, promotes the perception of 
structural feature similarities and differences (refer to Section 4.6.2). Further experiential 
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interaction with the world advances perception and conception co-development (refer to 
Section 4.4.4). Conceptual differentiation thus represents the development of pre-existing 
skills, rather than the creation of novel cognitive aptitudes. As such, the cognitive facility for 
conceptual metaphor, as the cornerstone of situated mathematics, is contingent upon those 
same skills that enable the perception of visual similarities and differences. 
Visual memory certainly plays a role in this perception. As the correlation matrix 
shows, none of the visual perceptual component skills are independent of visual memory. 
However, all seven of the TVPS-3 subtests explicitly require either the matching of designs 
or discerning design differences. Visual discrimination, form constancy, figure-ground, visual 
closure, and spatial relations as well as visual and sequential memory are therefore all 
presupposed in situated mathematical cognition. 
7.1.3 Composite Visual Perceptual Skill 
The recognition of the importance of all the visual perceptual component skills may 
initially seem to contradict the situated theory of mathematical cognition. However, despite 
the relative importance bestowed upon spatial relations, situated cognition is a holistic theory. 
In contrast to the reductionism of previous paradigms, there is a wariness of reducing 
any cognitive activity to a set of distinctly defined abilities. In terms of the theory, there is 
little benefit in dividing visual perceptual skill into arbitrary functionalities. Notwithstanding 
the tenacious conviction in reductionism in the past, this is not in fact an innovative insight. 
As early as 1961, Frostig (cited in Martin, 2006) showed that the subtest scores of the 
Developmental Test of Visual Perception are highly inter-correlated. Similarly, the present 
study revealed high co-linearity amongst the seven visual perceptual sub-skills (refer to 
Section 6.4.3). In the TVPS-3 manual, Martin (2006) admitted to the artificiality of the 
definition of component skills. 
Spatial relations better describes the perception of a perceptual property of the enacted 
world, such as colour. It is not an isolated skill. In order to perceive spatial relations (SPA), 
objects need to be visually discriminated (DIS), even when fragmented (CLO) or 
disorganised (CON), and distinguished from their irrelevant background (FGR), and previous 
visual information may need to be recalled (MEM, SEQ). Likewise, the execution of each 
individual component skill necessitates the participation of other component skills. The seven 
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functionally described visual perceptual component skills are in fact dynamically inter-
dependent and functionally inseparable. 
 
7.2 Consequences for the Didactics of Mathematics 
In general, the study supports the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively 
correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. This lends credibility to the existence of 
a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability, which seems best 
explained by situated cognitive theory (refer to Chapter 4). This encourages consideration of 
the didactics of mathematics in terms of situated theory. Situated theory suggests that in 
mathematics education, especially of a foundational level, formal mathematics can serve only 
as a necessary but secondary adjunct, if rote learning devoid of understanding is to be 
avoided (refer to Section 4.7). A viable cognitive science of mathematics, such as that of 
situated theory, on which to base the development of useful, conceptual educational content 
and technique, has the potential for a significant positive impact on scholastic mathematics 
achievement. 
During the present study, the participants’ constant erasing of everything except their 
final answers was of concern. This gave the impression that, in the normal course of 
classroom mathematics, the teachers preferred clean, simple answers with little concern for 
the cognitive process behind them. In this case, even if educators are teaching mathematics 
conceptually, not being privy to the thought processes of their learners nullifies the benefit. It 
is impossible to evaluate, by the assessment of a final answer, whether a child has fully 
grasped a concept, or the level of abstraction and understanding that has been achieved. Basic 
mathematics is, to a degree, metaphorically intuitive by virtue of embodiment. As a result, 
children often develop their own strategies for mathematical problem solving. The onus is on 
the teacher to encourage such mathematical cognition, by modifying erroneous techniques 
and supporting those that are effective. Yet a cognitive strategy can only be determined 
through insight into the cognitive processes interim to the final answer. 
From the situated perspective, a conceptual focus in mathematics education that 
capitalises on natural basic visual perceptual skill will favour the development of abstract 
mathematical cognition, and imbue mathematics with meaning and relevance. Such a 
pedagogy might therefore reflect in improved scholastic mathematics achievement. 
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Mathematics teaching within the context of the shifting scientific attitude towards holistic, 
situated cognition, may yield a stronger relationship between mathematics achievement and 
visual perceptual skill in future studies. 
 
7.3 Reflections on the Study 
Although not strictly an inadequacy, a larger sample size would have lent greater 
significance to the results. In addition, the sample allocation into the socio-economic sub-
groups was arbitrarily applied, with no supporting evidence or confirmation of family income 
and standing. It was executed under the feeble assumption that government school attendance 
entails low status, while only those of high socio-economic standing attend private schools. 
As it happened, though, socio-economic status was ultimately rejected as a variable, after 
statistical analyses revealed it to be non-influential. The greatest limitations of the study, 
however, were the choice, design, and use of the measuring instruments, and the context in 
which they were used. 
The TVPS-3 was the most suitable available test choice, providing separately normed 
subtests. However, the high level of co-linearity amongst the subtests shown in the 
correlation matrix (refer to Section 6.4.3) suggest that the visual perceptual component skills 
that the TVPS-3 purports to assess, do not constitute a set of clearly distinguished constructs. 
In addition, the TVPS-3 lacked a visual-motor integration component. Furthermore, the fact 
that the test instructions were deliberately altered (refer to Section 5.4.1), for which apologies 
are extended to the developers, undeniably perverted its reputed reliability and validity. 
Similarly, the focus on scholastic mathematics achievement inevitably introduced 
reliability and validity issues. A diversity of mathematics syllabi over place and time would 
necessitate a distinct mathematics test for replication of the study. In addition, quality of 
education was revealed to have had a significant impact on the mathematics test results, a 
source of serious threat to external validity of the study. The priority for a randomly selected 
sample representative of the population prevented the eradication of this threat, although it 
was moderated by standardisation of the raw math test results. 
In general, the naturalistic setting of the data collection induced significant 
uncontrollable context effects. Together, these context and measurement concerns directly 
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influenced the external reliability and validity of the study. However, within the situated 
framework, situational context is of the utmost importance. The results were therefore 
considered internally reliable and valid, within the situation of this particular study. 
7.3.1 Visual Perceptual Skill Testing 
The limited mode of testing composite visual perceptual skill may have contributed to 
discrepancies between the empirical evidence and the situated cognitive theoretical 
framework, in terms of a relationship between visual perceptual skill and scholastic 
mathematics achievement. Larsen and Hammill (1975) were quoted in Section 3.4.1 as 
stating that the results of their research review suggested, “that measured visual-perceptual 
skills are not sufficiently related to academic achievement to be particularly useful” (p. 287). 
The crux of the issue lies in the word measured. Its inclusion negates an outright denial of a 
useful relationship. Instead, it subtly hints at the inadequacy of the measures of visual 
perceptual skills. 
Gestaltist principles form the basis of all current tests of visual perceptual skill (refer 
to Section 3.1). Gestaltism promotes visual perception beyond simple object detection, 
however, Gestalt theorists’ thinking has perhaps remained too dualistic, which constrained 
the full development of the gestalt (refer to Section 4.1). Consequently, realisation of the 
importance of the visuo-spatial component to visual perception was limited to the 
organisation of the perceived object or scene. Visual perceptual skill test designs reflect this 
limitation. 
Since Gestalt laws of perceptual organisation (refer to Section 3.1), and the 
conventionally accepted definition of visual perceptual skill (refer to pp. 81-82) inform 
current test designs, their focus is on identification of features of a visual array. Converging 
with Birch and Lefford’s (cited in Leonard, 1986) three levels of visual perceptual skill, 
Rosner (1982) has described the general thrust of visual perceptual skill test measurement 
thus: 
1. Recognition: gross visual discrimination of the concrete features of a visual array. 
2. Analysis: the ability to respond to selected aspects of the visual array, by separating it 
into structural components. 
3. Synthesis: the ability to re-order the components of the visual array, by mapping their 
inter-relationships. 
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The TVPS-3 realises this measurement in the identification of static designs limited to 
two-dimensional spatiality. Although there is no claim of comprehensive visual perceptual 
assessment, this is only in the context of its intentional omission of visual-motor assessment, 
in order to make the test as motor-free as possible. Yet, even purported comprehensive motor 
tests of visual perception only allow for limited consideration of movement and spatiality in 
testing. The Beery Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration, and its Supplemental 
Developmental Test of Visual Perception, involves copying tasks of comparable two-
dimensional designs. Visual-motor assessment is thus minimal, restricted to hand-eye 
coordination. This disregards anthropological (e.g., Sheets-Johnstone, 1990) and 
neuroscientific (e.g., Moore, 1997) evidence for the intimate link between the development of 
movement in the body as a whole, and the development of the visual perceptual process in 
particular. 
The narrow focus of such testing pays insufficient attention to the holistic and 
dynamic characterisation of situated visual perception. An approach, such as situated 
cognition, proceeding from the consideration of dynamic contextual factors in cognition, can 
only regard current tests as purely partial measures. Historically, the simple assessment by 
current tests were perhaps deemed adequate in researching the relation between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability, since mathematics was previously believed to be 
limited to formal symbolic manipulation. However, recent cognitive scientific theory shows 
mathematical cognition to be grounded in sensory-motor experience. Visual perceptual skill 
testing that is more appropriate to this conception, may yield an enhanced correlation 
between visual perceptual skill and mathematics achievement, favouring spatial relations. 
The theoretical review suggests that mathematics is not simple numerical calculation; 
it is the science of patterns, including those pertaining to motion and change. Pattern 
perception, in conjunction with innate subitization, develops the conception of mathematical 
objects and relationships. Situated mathematical perception and conception originates in 
sensory-motor activity, particularly that of collecting, constructing, and moving in an enacted 
world. This type of complex, interactive, dynamic perception in action requires far more 
sophisticated testing than is currently available in commercial tests of visual perceptual skill. 
Tversky’s (2005b) partial catalogue of the capacities entailed in perception could well 
proffer a basis for a new generation of visual perceptual skill tests: 
 determining static properties of entities, 
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 determining relations between static entities, 
 performing transformations on entities, 
 determining relations of dynamic and static entities, 
 performing transformations on self (p. 216). 
The first three of these correlate with that which the TVPS-3 measures. The last two are the 
spatial and motor components critical to comprehensive visual perceptual skill testing. In 
describing the first of these, Tversky uses words such as direction, speed, acceleration, 
manner, collision; and in describing the second, uses words such as movement, perspective, 
enaction. These descriptions overtly expose the additional elements of spatiality and 
temporality (refer to Sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5) crucial to visual perception. In essence, though, 
they are the situated perception of motion and change in a wide, three-dimensional enacted 
space. The visuo-motor and visuo-spatial capabilities specifically wanting in conventional 
visual perceptual testing are implicated, and are the two vital aspects accentuated in situated 
mathematical cognition. 
Therefore, in this study of the relation between visual perceptual skill and scholastic 
mathematics achievement, the TVPS-3 may have been inadequate in the assessment of visual 
perceptual strengths and weaknesses. The constrained two-dimensional test context 
ineffectually accounts for the boundless factors that contribute to such a dynamic and 
interactive facility. The flexibility of visual perception indeed renders its operationalisation 
and measurement problematic. Notwithstanding these difficulties, a test devised to 
accommodate the motor and space-time aspects might at least typify a more realistic measure, 
eradicating the need for qualified statements such as that made by Larsen and Hammill 
(1975), quoted above. That is, the inclusion of visuo-motor and four-dimensional visuo-
spatial skills may sustain a more confident assertion that visual perceptual skill positively 
relates to academic achievement. 
7.3.2 Methodological Concerns 
Cognition that is situated, and spatially-temporally structured dynamic action, poses 
enormous challenges to systematic scientific study. In an attempt to align with the situated 
theoretical framework, every effort was made to mimic the habitual classroom situation. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative correlational nature of the study was possibly too restrictive to 
account fully for the holistic and dynamic cognitive aspects. 
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Comparability with previous similar studies motivated the selection of this design, 
and the unsuitability of alternative designs enforced the choice. For example, ontologically, 
constructionist research directly contradicts the premise of situated cognitive theory. In 
addition, it is unclear how a methodology based on the interpretative epistemology might 
penetrate the subconscious dynamic interactions underlying emergence of situated cognitive 
facilities. However, the design utilised for the study was equally not ideal. The root of the 
problem perhaps lies in the resolute goal of objectivity typical in such quantitative 
correlational designs. The only means to this end is the reductionism of cognition to 
individual constructs for quantification, along with the context, to controllable factors. Yet, 
within the situated framework, these practices may actually conceal that which is being 
investigated, rather than reveal it. 
 Constructs. The emergent nature of situated cognitive facilities confounds the 
isolation of relevant constructs from the dynamic interactive network of contributory 
facilities. Certainly, operationalising a situated cognitive facility is a daunting task. The 
attempt to measure visual perceptual skill clearly illustrates this situation. Martin (2006) has 
admitted, in the TVPS-3 manual, that “the relationship of perceptual abilities to performance 
of everyday activities is subtle, but all-encompassing […] Even moving through space 
requires perception in that one needs to be able to judge distance and discern objects” 
(pp. 14 - 15). Yet the test content discloses nothing of the inclusivity of this relationship, nor 
its dynamic interactivity. Expansion of a visual perceptual test (refer to Section 7.3.1) to 
include visuo-motor and four-dimensional visuo-spatial aspects, may increase the validity of 
the test construct, but it would still be unable to capture the dynamic flexibility of the 
situated facility. 
 Context. A correlational research design generally requires some control of 
extraneous factors to enhance validity and reliability of the results (Mouton, 2001). 
However, the natural situational context is paramount in situated cognition. Consequently, 
interference with any associated factors simultaneously detracts from the full manifestation 
of the construct. In defence of the present study, this rationale justifies the flouting of certain 
validity and reliability concerns (refer to Chapter 5). Quintessentially, situated cognitive 
investigation is definitive only within its unique, situated context. This may be an 
unattainable ideal; nevertheless, development in cognitive understanding rests upon 
alternative research and assessment techniques befitting the current theoretical paradigm. 
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In general, cognitive facilities lack the apparent structure and predictability of the 
physical world, which diminishes the effectiveness of conventional scientific methodologies 
of the natural sciences. Objective measurement of the external world, and inner constructivist 
cognitive representations and processes may have sufficed under a dualistic philosophy. 
However, cognition as a situated process eradicates notions of objectivity and subjectivity. 
Cognitive facilities emerge through situated experiences; they are phenomenal. Situated 
cognitive science, informed by a phenomenological philosophy, necessitates a more holistic 
research methodology. Ideally, a phenomenological understanding of visual perception and 
mathematical cognition should precede the scientific examination of a relationship between 
visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. This is in line with Merleau-Ponty’s (1964c) 
statement that “empirical psychology must be preceded by an eidetic psychology” (p. 58). 
 
7.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
Growth of any body of positive empirical evidence, such as that provided by the 
present study, bolsters specific hypotheses. However, the preceding discussions disclose a 
number of considerations that may potentially lend greater credence to prospective research 
on the relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. Based on these, 
the following recommendations may improve the quality of future empirical evidence. 
 It is possible that some high mathematics achievers in primary grades do so by relying 
on visual memory. Correlational longitudinal studies are required to assess their 
ability to retain their level of achievement in higher grades and tertiary levels, at 
which stage mathematics accomplishment is beyond rote memorisation. 
 Long-term studies are necessary to corroborate the efficacy of teaching mathematics 
conceptually, as opposed to factually. However, such research would need to be 
sensitive to ethical considerations, so as not to disadvantage certain learners. The most 
ethically sound approach may be to assign an experimental group to extramural 
mathematics lessons that are conceptual in nature, and then to compare their level of 
mathematics achievement over time with a control group receiving mathematics 
lessons solely within the existing education system. 
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 Visual perceptual skill comprehended as the dynamic interactive ability to co-ordinate 
and render visual-motor activity in an enacted environment (refer to p. 82) calls for 
the expansion of visual perceptual skill tests, to include as a minimum motor and four-
dimensional spatial aspects argued for as crucial in this study. 
 The holistic, dynamic, and situated nature of current theories of cognition calls for 
alternative research methodologies that afford consideration to these aspects. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The poor status of scholastic mathematics achievement, across all grades in South 
African schools (refer to Chapter 1), demands urgent multi-disciplinary intervention. 
Historically, psychology has contributed not only to the didactics of mathematics, but to all 
teaching and learning. Theories from Gestaltist, behavioural, developmental, connectionist, 
and cognitive psychology have all proven influential to educational philosophy (Fey, 1994). 
It is imperative that education should continue to benefit from evolving cognitive scientific 
theories. 
Piaget (1970) has opined that “if experimental pedagogy wishes to understand what it 
is doing […] it is obvious that it will have to employ a precise psychology, not merely that of 
common sense” (p. 23). A possible argument, however, might revolve around the definition 
of a precise psychology. In terms of precision, the discipline of psychology has faced an 
embattled process for recognition by the scientific community. Indeed, it is still often 
criticised for the lack of an overarching theory and methodological rigour, as found in the 
mature natural sciences. The evolution of a comprehensive cognitive science might address 
the concern for an overarching theory. However, further meaningful contribution to situated 
cognitive science solicits cognitive research to surmount the constraints imposed by 
conventional methodologies of the natural sciences, thereby potentially eliciting further 
condemnation. 
Nevertheless, situated cognitive science demands a methodology appropriate to its 
phenomenological grounding philosophy. A phenomenological approach has the potential to 
redirect the constructivist course of psychology, and to clarify the true nature of perception, 
cognition, and mathematics. In addition, a common philosophical foundation may clarify the 
relations between them. Previous difficulties in providing a definitive description of a 
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relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability may stem partly from the 
fundamental philosophical incompatibility between formalist mathematics and constructivist 
cognitive psychology. 
The literature intimates the possible existence of a relationship between visual 
perceptual skill and mathematic ability. However, the present study presented the argument 
that traditional psychological theory displays inherent inadequacies in the conception of 
perception and cognition, and consequently lacks a robust perceptual-cognitive framework, 
within which to explore the possibility of a relationship further. Of primary concern is the 
reliance on an independent objective world, and the notion of mathematics as the 
manipulation of formal symbols, which instil the problem of representation interpretation. 
The cognitive scientific paradigm of situated cognition was introduced as a viable alternative. 
Situated cognition has been explained to begin with select innate sensory-motor 
abilities, a result of evolution in, and with, the world. Mutual interconnectivity between 
sensation and motor activity is taken to give rise to the facility of perception. Situated 
perception is thereby argued to be the dynamic co-ordination and rendition of sensory-motor 
activity with the enacted environment, through which cognition emerges. Embedment in a 
society with an effective communication system is theorised to extend cognition to higher 
levels of abstraction. Abstract mathematical cognition, facilitated by language, is thus argued 
to emerge through situated perceptual activity with the enacted world. This account grounds 
mathematical meaning in situated sensory-motor activity, and exposes visual perception as a 
component in mathematical cognition. Situated mathematics, as described, is an abstract 
cognitive conceptualisation. Mathematical objects are realised through particular human 
biological and social characteristics, through situated perception, conception, and cognition. 
This is, however, in conflict with the predominant belief in our culture that mathematics is 
transcendent and axiomatic. In order to overcome this entrenched belief, the radically 
alternative paradigm requires consolidation. 
In contrast to traditional psychological theories, situated cognitive theory thus 
clarifies several aspects of mathematics, perception, and cognition, and simultaneously 
provides a more coherent perceptual-cognitive model, to investigate the possibility of a 
relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. The situated cognitive 
paradigm further predicts a viable positive relationship between these two constructs. In 
support of this prediction, the exploratory study performed verified the hypothesis that visual 
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perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. 
Unfortunately, the exploratory nature of the present study provides limited empirical 
evidence in support of situated cognitive theory. However, the positive results may encourage 
in-depth quality investigations into mathematical cognition and perceptual skill, including 
auditory, tactile, and kinaesthetic modalities. Further research may thus assist in the 
refinement and development of theories within the situated paradigm. 
Within this theoretical framework, the study further suggested that mathematics ought 
perhaps to be taught conceptually, rather than factually. In addition, it highlighted various 
influences on mathematics education. These were not limited to the didactics and curriculum, 
but extended to the learning context, including beliefs, attitudes, motivation, and behaviours 
of both the teachers and the learners. In general, situated cognitive science theory carries the 
potential for making substantial contribution to developing an appreciation of various aspects 
of learning, and the practical application of these for the enhancement of education. Núñez 
(2007) proposed that a comprehensive cognitive science of mathematics, such as that of the 
situated paradigm, can inform mathematics education on the implementation of teaching 
methods and learning environments that are compatible with human cognition. Formal 
algorithmic mathematics education disregards cognitive conceptualisation, from which 
abstract mathematical cognition arises. In contrast, conceptualistic mathematics education 
may rest on the natural cognitive process. Furthermore, situated theory suggests that 
cognition rests on a perceptual foundation. Since perception is a dynamic facility that 
develops through experience, enhanced perceptual skill is consequently possible through 
training. Improvement in foundational perceptual skill may credibly enhance supervening 
cognitive function. 
The striving towards a comprehensive cognitive science is argued here to have thus 
far been a worthwhile endeavour. The involvement of diverse disciplines, with specialised 
knowledge contributions, has shifted basic attitudes. Philosophically, phenomenology 
unequivocally embraces the dynamism between the enacted environment and the embodied 
emergent cognition embedded within it. An extensive amount more work in cognitive science 
is required in order to achieve a comparable amalgam. Yet the theory of situated cognition is 
certainly a valuable precursor to such an amalgam. Already, the complex dynamic 
interactions that have been recognised confound previously accepted distinctions between 
sensation and perception; individual component perceptual skills; perception and memory; 
mind and body; cognition and the world; individual and collective consciousness, and so on. 
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With numerous disciplines contributing to situated cognitive science, a common theoretical 
framework amongst them may prove beneficial to further progress. Cohesion may possibly 
be promoted if the various theories were all informed by a phenomenological philosophy, 
understood as dedicating focus to the dynamic interaction between the mind, body, and 
world. 
The cognitive science theory of situated cognition is thus presented here to hold a 
promising future. In the present study, it has facilitated edifying exploration into the 
relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. There is a sensible 
balance between holism and reductionism, operating in concert. Effective communication 
among the various disciplines involved will ultimately ensure its successful development, 
providing valuable insight into human cognition, the world, and our place in it.  
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A1. Mathematics Test
 
 
 
 
 
Name:___________________________________________________________ 
School:__________________________________________________ 
Gender:____________ 
Do you attend any extra–maths lessons?__________ 
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1. Write the word numbers below in digits: 
1.   Seven hundred and forty-six thousand, six hundred and thirty-eight 
      ___________________________ 
2.   Six hundred and twenty-four thousand, nine hundred and fifty-three 
      __________________________ 
 
2. Complete the patterns: 
1.      O   ∆   O   O   ↑   O   O   O   ∆   O   ___   ___   ___ 
2.      O   ∆   O   ↑   ↓   O   ∆   O   ___   ___   ___ 
 
3.   Complete the pattern of numbers: 
1.      640      ;      630      ;      620      ;   ________   ;   ________ 
2.      250      ;   ________   ;   ________   ;      400 
3.      44 /8      ;      4 3/8      ;      4 2/8      ;   ________   ;   ________ 
4.      2 1/4      ;   ________   ;      2 3/4      ;      3      ;   ________ 
5.      18 750, 5      ;      18725, 5      ;   ________   ;   ________ 
 
4.    Arrange from biggest to smallest: 
1.      76 367      ;      76 674      ;      76 764      ;      67 647 
      _____________________________________________________ 
2.      12 639      ;      21 839      ;      21 863      ;      12 689 
      _____________________________________________________ 
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5.   Complete: 
1.      120   +   120   =   __________ 
2.      5165   +   30   +   21   =   __________ 
3.      825   -   75   =   __________ 
4.      9650   -   8350   =   __________ 
 
6.   Write as common fractions: 
1.      0, 5   =   __________ 
2.      0, 68   =   __________ 
 
7.   Write as decimal fractions: 
1.      3/10   =   __________ 
2.      4/5   =   __________ 
3.     12/20   =   __________ 
 
8.   Arrange from smallest to biggest: 
1.      1/3      ;      2/3      ;      1/6      ;      3/6 
      _______________________________________________________ 
2.      5/8      ;      3/4      ;      1/8      ;      7/8 
      _______________________________________________________ 
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9.   Fill in the spaces in the brackets: 
1.      6/6   =   12/(        ) 
2.      3/4   =   (        )/100 
3.      (        )/12   =   4/6 
4.      4/(        )   =   8/10  
 
10.   Complete: 
1.      2   +   1/4   =   __________ 
2.      2/3   +   1/7   =   __________ 
3.      3/10   +   4/5   =   __________ 
 
11.   Complete: 
1.      2/3   of   6   =   __________ 
2.      3/5   of   15   =   __________ 
3.      1/6   of   18   =   __________ 
 
12.   Find the values of y: 
1.      y   +   12   =   25                     then y   =   __________ 
2.      y   -   25   =   75                      then y   =   __________ 
3.      y   x   15   =   45                     then y   =   __________ 
4.      64   ÷   8   =   y                       then y   =   __________ 
5.      y   +   y   =   26                        then y   =   __________ 
6.      y   x   y   =   49                        then y   =   __________ 
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13.   Round off: 
1.      465   to the nearest 10.      __________ 
2.      91   to the nearest 5.      __________ 
3.      2839   to the nearest 1000.      __________ 
 
14.   Round off to the nearest Rand: 
1.      R 34, 06   =   __________ 
2.      R 544, 95   =   __________ 
3.      R 362, 50   =   __________ 
 
15.   Complete these measurement sums: 
1.      5 mm   +   6 mm   =   ________cm   ________ mm 
2.      14 mm   +   13 mm   =   ________ cm   ________ mm 
3.      65 cm   +   6 mm   =   ________cm   ________ mm 
4.      40 cm   +   60 cm   =   ________m   ________ cm 
5.      900 m   +   700 m   =   ________km   ________ m 
 
16.   Complete these mass problems: 
1.      45 g   -   24 g   =   ________ g 
2.      1 kg   -   500 g   =   ________g 
3.      60 kg   -   45 kg   =   ________g 
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17.   What number is 4 times bigger than 6 + 8?  __________ 
18.   If a dog walks 8 km in 1 hour, how far will he walk in 8 hours?  _________ 
19.   A cup holds 250 ml of milk. How many cups of milk can you pour from 
         1 litre?  __________ 
20.   A taxi travels at 120 kilometres per hour. How far will it travel in 21/2 
              hours?  __________ 
21.   There are 1200 spectators at a soccer match. Girls occupy a quarter of the 
         seats. How many boys are at the match?  __________ 
22.   The 30o angle for a wheelchair ramp is 3 times steeper than the builder 
         required. What angle did he want?  __________ 
23.   I bought 8 Fizz Pops, 6 Kit-Kats and 10 Gummi Bears from the shop. On the 
         way home, I ate 1 Kit-Kat, and gave my friend 2 Fizz Pops. When I got 
          home, I had to share all the sweets equally with my two brothers. 
1.   How many Gummi Bears did we each get?  __________ 
2.   How many Kit-Kats did we each get?  __________ 
3.   How many Fizz Pops did we each get?  __________ 
4.   How many of each sweet was left over for Mom?  __________ 
                                                                                                 __________ 
                                                                                                 __________ 
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24.   Use the graph to answer the following questions: 
 
 
1.   On what day was the most pies sold?   __________ 
2.   On what day was the fewest hamburgers sold?   __________ 
3.   How many more pies than hamburgers were sold on Thursday?   ________ 
4.   On what day were equal number of pies and hamburgers sold?   _________ 
5.   How many pies were sold during the whole week?   __________ 
 
 
YOU ARE DONE! ‼ 
Thank You 
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50
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Pies Sold
Hamburgers Sold
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A2. Mathematics Test Schedule 
Math Test Schedule 
1.  (2)     1.  746 638     (1) 
                2.  624 953     (1) 
2.  (2)     1.  O O O  or  O ↑ O     (1) 
               2.  ↑ ↓ O     (1) 
3.  (10)     1.  610     (1) ; 600     (1) 
                  2.  300     (1) ; 350     (1) 
                  3.  4 1/8     (1) ; 4     (1)     if  4 0/8  then   (1/2) 
                  4.  2 2/4     (1) ; 3 1/4     (1)     if  3 1/5  then   (1/2) 
                  5.  18 700, 5     (1) ; 18 675, 5     (1) 
4.  (2)     1.  76 764 ; 76 674 ; 76 367 ; 67 647     (1) 
               2.  21 863 ; 21 839 ; 12 689 ; 12 639     (1) 
5.  (4)     1.  240     (1) 
               2.  5 216     (1) 
               3.  750     (1) 
               4.  1 300     (1) 
6.  (4)     1.  1/2     (2)     if  5/10  then   (1) 
                2.  17/25     (2)     if  68/100  then   (1) 
7.  (3)     1.  0, 3     (1) 
               2.  0, 8     (1) 
               3.  0, 60     (1) 
8.  (2)     1.  1/6 ; 1/3 ; 3/6 ; 2/3     (1)     if biggest to smallest then   (1/2) 
                2.  1/8 ; 5/8 ; 3/4 ; 7/8     (1)     if biggest to smallest then   (1/2) 
9.  (4)     1.  12     (1) 
               2.  75     (1) 
               3.  8     (1) 
               4.  5     (1) 
10.  (4)     1.  2 1/4     (1) 
                  2.  17/21     (1) 
                  3.  1 1/10     (2)     if  11/10  then   (1) 
11.  (3)     1.  4     (1) 
                  2.  9     (1) 
                  3.  3     (1) 
12.  (12)     1.  13     (2)     if  25 – 12 then   (1) 
                    2.  100     (2)     if  75 + 25  then   (1) 
                    3.  3     (2)     if  45/15  then   (1) 
                    4.  8     (2)     if  64/8  then   (1) 
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                    5.  13     (2)     if  13 + 13  then   (2)   if  26/2  then   (1)   if  x + y  then   (1) 
                    6.  7     (2)     if  7 x 7  then   (2)   if  √7  then   (1) 
13.  (3)     1.  470     (1) 
                  2.  90     (1) 
                  3.  3 000     (1) 
14.  (3)     1.  R 34, 00     (1) 
                  2.  R 545, 00     (1) 
                  3.  R 363, 00     (1) 
15.  (15)     1.  1 cm  1 mm     (3)     if  11 mm  then   (1) 
                    2.  2 cm  7 mm     (3)     if  27 mm then   (1) 
                    3.  65 cm  6 mm     (3)     if  65, 6 cm  then   (1) 
                    4.  1 m  0 cm     (3)     if  100 cm  then   (1) 
                    5.  1 km  600 m     (3)     if  1 600 m  then   (1) 
16.  (3)     1.  21 g     (1) 
                  2.  500 g     (1) 
                  3.  15 000 g     (1) 
17.  (2)     56     if  4 (6+8)  then   (1) 
18.  (2)     64     if  8 x 8  then   (1) 
19.  (2)     4     if  1 000 / 250  then   (1) 
20.  (2)     300     if  120 x 2 1/2  or  240  then   (1) 
21.  (2)     900     if  1 200 – 1/4 (1 200)  or  300  then   (1) 
22.  (2)     10     if  30 / 3  or  90  then   (1) 
23.  (8)     1.  3     (2)     if  10 / 3  then   (1) 
                  2.  1     (2)     if  5 / 3  then   (1) 
                  3.  2     (2)     if  6 / 3  then   (1) 
                  4.  1G ; 2K ; 0F     (2) 
24.  (5)     1.  Mon     (1) 
                  2.  Fri     (1) 
                  3.  20     (1) 
                  4.  Fri     (1)     if  Mon & Tues  then   (1/2) 
                  5.  150     (1) 
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A3. TVPS-3 Response Sheet 
Name:___________________________________________________________ 
School:_________________________________________ 
Date of birth:___________________ 
 
SUBTEST 1 
                              
 
 
Item # Response Score 
DIS Ex A   
DIS Ex B   
DIS 1   
DIS 2   
DIS 3   
DIS 4   
DIS 5   
DIS 6   
DIS 7   
DIS 8   
DIS 9   
DIS 10   
DIS 11   
DIS 12   
DIS 13   
DIS 14   
DIS 15   
DIS 16   
Total Subtest 1  
176 
 
 
 
SUBTEST 2                                                                           SUBTEST 3 
 
 
  
Item # Response Score 
MEMExC   
MEMExD   
MEM 17   
MEM 18   
MEM 19   
MEM 20   
MEM 21   
MEM 22   
MEM 23   
MEM 24   
MEM 25   
MEM 26   
MEM 27   
MEM 28   
MEM 29   
MEM 30   
MEM 31   
MEM 32   
Total Subtest 2  
Item # Response Score 
SPA Ex E   
SPA Ex F   
SPA 33   
SPA 34   
SPA 35   
SPA 36   
SPA 37   
SPA 38   
SPA 39   
SPA 40   
SPA 41   
SPA 42   
SPA 43   
SPA 44   
SPA 45   
SPA 46   
SPA 47   
SPA 48   
Total Subtest 3  
177 
 
 
 
SUBTEST 4                                                                           SUBTEST 5 
 
  
Item # Response Score 
CONEx G   
CONEx H   
CON 49   
CON 50   
CON 51   
CON 52   
CON 53   
CON 54   
CON 55   
CON 56   
CON 57   
CON 58   
CON 59   
CON 60   
CON 61   
CON 62   
CON 63   
CON 64   
Total Subtest 4  
Item # Response Score 
SEQ Ex I   
SEQ Ex J   
SEQ 65   
SEQ 66   
SEQ 67   
SEQ 68   
SEQ 69   
SEQ 70   
SEQ 71   
SEQ 72   
SEQ 73   
SEQ 74   
SEQ 75   
SEQ 76   
SEQ 77   
SEQ 78   
SEQ 79   
SEQ 80   
Total Subtest 5  
178 
 
 
 
SUBTEST 6                                                                           SUBTEST 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Item # Response Score 
FGR Ex K   
FGR Ex L   
FGR 81   
FGR 82   
FGR 83   
FGR 84   
FGR 85   
FGR 86   
FGR 87   
FGR 88   
FGR 89   
FGR 90   
FGR 91   
FGR 92   
FGR 93   
FGR 94   
FGR 95   
FGR 96   
Total Subtest 6  
Item # Response Score 
CLO Ex M   
CLO Ex N   
CLO 97   
CLO 98   
CLO 99   
CLO 100   
CLO 101   
CLO 102   
CLO 103   
CLO 104   
CLO 105   
CLO 106   
CLO 107   
CLO 108   
CLO 109   
CLO 110   
CLO 111   
CLO 112   
Total Subtest 7  
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A4. Letter Requesting School Participation 
 
                                                                                                         <DATE>                                                                                
 
The Principal 
 
I am conducting a Masters research project on the relationship between visual perceptual skill 
and mathematics achievement in children. The commercially available Test of Visual 
Perceptual Skills (3rd edition) and a standardized class mathematics test will be used for 
assessment. 
 
I kindly ask for your assistance in this regard, by allowing access to your Grade 6 pupils. 
Two sessions, of approximately 1 hour each, will be required. 
 
Letters will be provided that may be sent to the parents requesting their permission. Although 
the results will be utilized for research purposes, all test information will be viewed as strictly 
confidential. A report on each child, concerning their visual perceptual strengths and 
weaknesses, will be issued to their parents and teachers. No fee will be charged for the 
testing. 
 
With your permission, I will contact your secretary to arrange a meeting with you, to discuss 
the details and practicalities. 
 
Your assistance would be greatly appreciated. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Lynn Freeguard 
021 – 883 9399 
cdwolf@iafrica.com 
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A5. Letter Requesting Parental Consent 
 
                                                                                           <DATE> 
 
 
Dear Parents 
 
Your child’s school has agreed to assist in a Masters research project I am conducting. The 
project concerns the relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematics 
achievement. A commercially available Test of Visual Perceptual Skills and a standardized 
class mathematics test will be used for assessment. 
 
Although the results will be utilized for research purposes, all test information will be viewed 
as strictly confidential. However, you will receive a report detailing your child’s visual 
perceptual strengths and weaknesses. No fee will be charged for testing. 
 
I kindly ask that you allow your child to participate in the study. Should you agree, please 
complete the attached permission slip, to be returned to your child’s class teacher before 
<DATE>. 
 
Thank you 
 
Lynn Freeguard 
Wolfswinkel Optometrists   021 – 8839399 
7 Simonsrust Centre, Stellenbosch 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Full name of child:________________________________________________________ 
Grade:________________________ 
 
I hereby grant permission for my child to participate in the above study. 
 
Name of parent / guardian:__________________________________________________ 
Signature:_______________________________________________________________ 
Date:_________________________ 
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A6. Letter Accompanying Results for School Principal 
 
Dear <NAMES> 
 
Thank you for your assistance with my research project, and apologies for any disruption I 
may have caused. 
 
Visual perception enables us to understand, analyze and interpret what we see. It is a 
composite skill encompassing a number of sub-skills; and is a primary factor in cognitive 
development, learning, and many of our daily activities. 
 
Herewith are your students’ results of the TVPS-3. 
 
To provide clarification and aid in interpretation: 
1. The Raw Scores range from 1 – 16. 
2. The Subtest Scaled Scores range from 1 – 19, and are based on a population 
distribution having a mean of 10 and standard deviation of 3. They are scaled to 
account for age. 
3. The Indices and Overall Standard Scores are standard scores which are based on a 
population distribution having a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. Since 
they are based on sums of scaled scores, age is accounted for already. 
4. The Percentile Ranks reflect one person’s performance relative to the normative 
population. (E.g.: a percentile rank of 80 indicates the student scored as well as or 
better than 80% of the same-aged students in the normative population.) 
5. The score graphic is a visual summary of the numeric scoring. 
 
Please note: 
1. The TVPS-3 does not represent a comprehensive assessment of visual perceptual 
skills. 
2. Any test result is an instance of performance at one point in time on one particular set 
of tasks. 
3. The test has been designed to be administered individually; however, for the purpose 
of the research project habitual classroom ability rather than absolute ability is of 
greater relevance. 
 
Some tasks to enhance visual perceptual skills: 
Dot-to-dots;  mazes;  find hidden images in a picture;  spot the differences between 2 similar 
pictures;  ‘memory’ card game;  ‘eye-spy’;  ‘whirly-words’-(circle words in a grid of letters);  
playing outdoors. 
 
A useful website: www.eyecanlearn.com 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require additional information. 
Yours Sincerely 
Lynn Freeguard 
Wolfswinkel Optometrists   021 – 883 9399 
Simonsrust Centre, Stellenbosch  
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A7. Results Form for Parents 
 
Dear Parents 
 
Thank you for allowing ____________________________________ to participate in my 
research project. 
 
Visual perceptual skills test results: 
 superior above av. average below av. weak 
Visual Discrimination      
Visual Memory      
Spatial Relations      
Form Constancy      
Sequential Memory      
Figure Ground      
Visual Closure      
Overall VPS      
 
Visual perception enables us to understand, analyse and interpret what we see. It is a 
composite skill encompassing a number of sub-skills; and is a primary factor in cognitive 
development, learning, and many of our daily activities. 
 
Please note: 
1. The TVPS-3 does not represent a comprehensive assessment of visual perceptual 
skills. 
2. Any test result is an instance of performance at one point in time on one particular set 
of tasks. 
3. The test was designed to be administered individually; however, for the purpose of the 
research project habitual classroom ability rather than absolute ability is of greater 
relevance. 
 
Some tasks to enhance visual perceptual skills: 
Dot-to-dots;  mazes;  find hidden images in a picture; spot the differences between 2 similar 
pictures;  ‘memory’ card game;  ‘eye-spy’;  ‘whirly-words’ -(circle words in a grid of letters); 
playing outdoors. 
 
A useful website: www.eyecanlearn.com 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require additional information. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Lynn Freeguard 
Wolfswinkel Optometrists    021 – 883 9399 
Simonsrust Centre, Stellenbosch 
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A8. Data Specification Sheet 
Data Specification 
Hypothesis: Visual perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. 
 Determine relative contribution of component visual perceptual skills to mathematics achievement. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no relationship between visual perceptual skill and scholastic mathematics achievement. 
  
Operationalisation: Raw Math = percentage score achieved on maths test 
 Scaled Math = scaled score derived from standardised Raw Math  
 Overall VPS = standard score as measured by TVPS-3 
 DIS, MEM, SPA, CON, SEQ, FGR, CLO = scaled scores as measured by TVPS-3 subtests 
  
Data Analysis Techniques: Descriptive statistics 
 t Tests 
 Standardisation / z scores 
 Pearson’s product-moment correlations 
 Multiple regression analysis Correlation Matrix 
Abbreviations:  
DIS visual discrimination 
MEM visual memory 
SPA spatial relations 
CON form constancy 
SEQ sequential memory 
FGR figure-ground 
CLO visual closure 
S-E socio-economic status 
EML extra-math lesson attendance 
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Data Description: 
 
Variable Name Range of Values Measurement Level Variable Type Values / Labels 
     
Age 127 - 164 ratio x months 
Gender 1 - 2 categorical x 1 = male; 2 = female 
EML 1 - 2 categorical x 1 = no; 2 = yes 
S-E 1 - 2 categorical x 1 = low; 2 = high 
School 1 - 3 categorical x 1 = Stellenbosch government school 
    2 = Somerset West private school 
    3 = Southern Suburb private school 
Raw Math 0 - 100 ratio y higher score = superior math achievement 
Scaled Math 1 - 99 interval Y higher score = superior math achievement 
Overall VPS 55 - 145 interval X / y higher score = superior VPS 
DIS 1 - 19 interval X1 higher score = superior visual discrimination 
MEM 1 - 19 interval X2 higher score = superior visual memory 
SPA 1 - 19 interval X3 higher score = superior spatial relations 
CON 1 - 19 interval X4 higher score = superior form constancy 
SEQ 1 - 19 interval X5 higher score = superior sequential memory 
FGR 1 - 19 interval X6 higher score = superior figure-ground 
CLO 1 - 19 interval X7 higher score = superior visual closure 
 
 
